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I. INTRODUCTION
The history of sovereign immunity in the United States is a history
of mistakes. One mistake has engendered another, with the result
that many federal laws are not enforced against the states, either in
state or federal courts or federal administrative courts, and citizens
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have limited (or in some instances, no) recourse against their federal,
state, and local governments-and all of this seems reasonable, nor-
mal, and even inevitable. This Article attempts to identify the reasons
why extensive immunities have become the norm in our legal system,
and to demonstrate that this entrenched system of immunities owes
its existence to multiple errors made by judges, scholars, and legisla-
tors in attempting to understand our early history. Because stare de-
cisis does not create historical fact, a great deal of modern doctrine is
simply wrong from an historical perspective.
Previous commentators have almost uniformly concerned them-
selves with the immunity of the states and questions of federalism. In
fact, much of the historical record addresses whether the states en-
joyed immunity from suit in the federal courts. This record is impor-
tant for understanding sovereign immunity, and is treated for the
insights it provides into the founding generation's view of sovereign
immunity. This Article concludes that the founding generation did
not intend state sovereign immunity and instead viewed the ratifica-
tion of the Constitution as consent to Article III suits by the states
individually and collectively for the United States.
The Article also focuses on the generally ignored issue of the im-
munity of the federal government, which implicates horizontal divi-
sions of power among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches.
Because courts have mistakenly read the historical record as affording
sovereign immunities to the states, the issue of the federal govern-
ment's immunity has not been treated. It is simply assumed that if
the Constitution afforded the states full immunities, the federal gov-
ernment must be immune. This Article adds to the arguments of
others that the Constitution contemplates actions against the states
in Article III cases and further asserts, relying on history and the
structural predicates of our government, that the federal government
similarly enjoys no constitutional immunity in Article III cases.
Briefly, the errors that account for sovereign immunity in its mod-
ern form are these. First, sovereign immunity is based on a modern
misunderstanding of eighteenth century English law as prohibiting
any form of recovery against the sovereign. Despite this popular mis-
conception, English procedure permitted several forms of action
against the Crown as a matter of course.1 Second, modern observers
have assumed, based on scant historical evidence, that the English
law of sovereign immunity was received into the law of the newly
1. See, e.g., Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (pts. 1-3), 34 YALE
L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924- 1925); Edwin M. Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in
Tort (pts. 4-7), 36 YALE L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-1927), 28 COLUM. L. REV. 577,
(1928); Edwin M. Borchard, Theories of Governmental Responsibility in Tort (pt.
8), 28 COLUM. L. REV. 734 (1928); Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and
Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1963).
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formed United States, despite its inconsistencies with the structures
and governing philosophies of the Union. This reception by Revolut-
ionaries, whose actions constituted treason under English law and
whose aim was the overthrow of the sovereign and institution of a rep-
resentative government, has been repeatedly described as "one of the
mysteries of legal evolution."2 This Article argues that there was no
such "reception," and that the founding generation did not accept or
adopt sovereign immunity. The constitutional language and struc-
ture, debate in the Convention and in the press, and ratification de-
bates in the states support this theory. The Supreme Court's
acceptance of sovereign immunity as a constitutional principle de-
pends on its determination of the intent of the Framers, which ignores
a great deal of historical evidence from the time of the founding and
relies primarily on a discredited account of the Eleventh Amendment
first articulated in the 1890 case of Hans v. Louisiana.3 Third, mod-
ern justifications for sovereign immunity, such as promotion of gov-
ernment efficiency and protection of public funds, are tainted by these
errors. Non-historical rationales for sovereign immunity derive much
of their force from the simple fact that we believe sovereign immunity
has been part of our history from the beginning.
Central to the modern doctrine of sovereign immunity is an histori-
cal account of the founding which is deeply flawed. This flawed ac-
count of the founding relies almost exclusively on an isolated
statement of Alexander Hamilton in a Federalist paper, later sup-
ported by one statement of James Madison and one statement of John
Marshall during the Virginia ratification debates. These three state-
ments, which address federal judicial power over the states, interpret
the national judicial power afforded in the Constitution as being sub-
ject to common law sovereign immunities.
Instead, the Founders believed that the states' ratification of the
Constitution supplied consent to suit by individual states and by the
2. Apparently the first to use the phrase was Edwin M. Borchard, Government Lia-
bility in Tort, 34 YALE L. J. 1, 4 (1924). In the intervening years, he has been
quoted by many, including Judge Traynor in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dis-
trict, 359 P.2d 457 (1961). See also Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622
(1980), where the Court stated:
Although it has never been understood how the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity came to be adopted in the American democracy, it apparently
stems from the personal immunity of the English Monarch as expressed
in the maxim, "The King can do no wrong." It has been suggested, how-
ever, that the meaning traditionally ascribed to this phrase is an ironic
perversion of its original intent: "The maxim merely meant that the King
was not privileged to do wrong. If his acts were against the law, they
were injuriae (wrongs). Bracton, while ambiguous in his several state-
ments as to the relation between the King and the law, did not intend to
convey the idea that he was incapable of committing a legal wrong."
Id. at 645 n.28 (quoting Borchard, supra, at 4).
3. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
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states collectively on behalf of the United States in Article III cases.
This belief is evidenced by an examination of the records of the Consti-
tutional Convention, which do not discuss sovereign immunity, but
which proceed from and adopt structural predicates inconsistent with
immunities, the state conventions, ratification documents, debate in
the popular press, private correspondence at the time, and early case
law. These materials demonstrate that the founding generation's in-
terpretation of the Constitution with regard to sovereign immunity is
at odds with the Supreme Court's long-standing view that the sover-
eign immunity is a constitutional doctrine, with the Eleventh Amend-
ment standing for the broad "presupposition" of immunity implicitly
embodied in Article III.
The implications of this mistaken acceptance of Hamilton's,
Madison's, and Marshall's statements as authoritative are far-rang-
ing. If this Article is correct in its interpretation of constitutional lan-
guage and its assessment of the views of the founding generation,
ratification of the Constitution by each state effected its consent to
suit under Article III, Section 2. Similarly, the immunity of the
newly-created national government was limited through consent of
the states collectively. Contrary to the current view of sovereign im-
munity, the Constitution subjects the United States to suit in federal
court, and the states to suit in federal 4 and state courts for violations
of federal law under the authority of the Supremacy Clause.5 By im-
4. This power is subject to narrow Eleventh Amendment limitations. This Article
adopts the scholarly consensus on the Eleventh Amendment, which holds that it
simply rescinds two of the categories of judicial power extended in Article III,
Section 2, leaving the remainder of Article III intact. See infra section III.G. See,
e.g., CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
(1972); JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES (1987);
Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doc-
trines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515 (1977); Martha A. Field, The Eleventh
Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congressional Imposition
of Suit Upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203 (1978); William A. Fletcher, A
Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of
an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition against Jurisdic-
tion, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment
and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889
(1983); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State
Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L. J. 1 (1988); Laurence H. Tribe, Intergovernmen-
tal Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Is-
sues in Controversies about Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682 (1976). The
Supreme Court's contrary view originates in Hans, 134 U.S. 1, and reads the
Eleventh Amendment broadly, as standing for the "presupposition" of sovereign
immunity. See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779
(1991).
5. There is some case law which suggests that the obligations of federalism run in
the opposite direction, and that states have the power to enforce constitutional
law against the United States. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923),
in which Massachusetts brought suit against the Secretary of the Treasury, alleg-
2002]
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plication, this reading raises questions about the justifications for
state and local government immunities in state political systems as
well. 6 The historical account offered here also renders unnecessary
various statutory waivers of immunity, including the Federal Tort
Claims Act7 and the Tucker Act,8 and raises questions about the ap-
propriateness of retained immunities contained in general waivers.
Time and tradition have, of course, embedded the mistake of sover-
eign immunity in our legal culture. Completely excising this embed-
ded mistake and other derivative mistakes, which are now firmly
entrenched in constitutional, statutory, and common law, is extraordi-
narily unlikely,9 and perhaps even impossible. However, the mistake
has thwarted the administration of justice in this country over the
course of more than two centuries, depriving many claimants against
the United States, states, counties, municipalities, and often their cor-
porate and individual agents, of the protection of our law. In recogni-
tion of these many injustices, this Article suggests that a claim of
sovereign immunity should be assessed on its merits, independent of
the doctrine's invalid historical justifications, and applied accordingly.
Sovereign immunity in such instances would be a prudential rather
than a jurisdictional doctrine, in which concerns about the appropri-
ate vertical allocation of authority between state and federal govern-
ments, and appropriate horizontal allocations among the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches of both levels of government, would
control.
Stripped of its historical justifications, sovereign immunity is sup-
ported only by concerns about separation of powers. The govern-
ment's political functions are entitled to judicial deference. However,
separation of powers principles implicate both the division of power
and restraint of its exercise. Sovereign immunity clearly protects too
ing that a federal grant program exceeded Congress's Article I powers and vio-
lated the Tenth Amendment. The Court held that it lacked jurisdiction, stating,
"We need not go so far as to say that a State may never intervene by suit to
protect its citizens against any form of enforcement of unconstitutional acts of
Congress; but we are clear that the right to do so does not arise here." Id. at 485.
See also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (rejecting two claims
by the state that the federal government had, through passage of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, violated the Due Process and Bill of Attainder clauses, but
decided a third claim challenging the Act on Fifteenth Amendment grounds).
6. To the extent that the law of immunity in the federal courts has had an impact on
state law, as it almost certainly has, these questions arise.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2002). See infra note 467 and accompanying text.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (2002). See infra note 467 and accompanying text.
9. The mechanisms are available but are not likely viable politically: widespreadjudicial acknowledgment at the United States and state supreme court levels
that sovereign immunity is an accretion of time-honored mistakes which cannot




much, focusing solely on the division of power and ignoring its re-
straining function. Separation of powers requires that divisions of
government act as a check on the power of other divisions. Thus, the
judiciary plays a role in restraining the executive and legislative
branches of government. The constitutional structure requires the
federal judiciary to monitor its own coordinate branches along a hori-
zontal axis' 0 and the states along a vertical axis."1
Absent the constraints of sovereign immunity, the judiciary prop-
erly reviews at least some actions of the political branches of the fed-
eral and state governments. The hard question is which actions.
Although a full analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, the begin-
ning of an answer can be found in the political question doctrine,
which addresses the same concerns of the appropriate balance of
power, but independent of the flawed historical account which accom-
panies constitutional sovereign immunity; in the treatment of non-
constitutional immunities, including foreign sovereign immunities; in
various federal abstention doctrines; and in the common law of judi-
cially created immunities 12 following waivers of sovereign immunity,
in which courts attempt to balance the needs of the political branches
to govern effectively with the rights of the citizenry to redress govern-
mental violations of law.
Following this introduction, Part II describes the Supreme Court's
understanding of sovereign immunity and identifies the historical ac-
count which grounds that understanding. Part III demonstrates the
flaws in the Supreme Court's historical account. Part III comprises
the bulk of the argument and shows that the Framers and ratifiers of
10. This structure is replicated in the states. Some state constitutions specifically
include separation of powers provisions. For example, the Florida Constitution
states the following in its Declaration of Policy:
The State Constitution contemplates the separation of powers within
state government among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches
of the government. The legislative branch has the broad purpose of de-
termining policies and programs and reviewing program performance.
The executive branch has the purpose of executing the programs and
policies adopted by the Legislature and of making policy recommenda-
tions to the Legislature. The judicial branch has the purpose of deter-
mining the constitutional propriety of the policies and programs and of
adjudicating any conflicts arising from the interpretation or application
of the laws.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 20.02(1) (1998).
11. What courts term "federalism" encompasses the same structural concerns as sep-
aration of powers. Sovereign immunity in its vertical dimension limits the ability
of federal courts to adjudicate issues involving state government; in its horizontal
dimension, it operates to limit judicial review of coordinate branches within the
federal or state system. Both types of restrictions are based on concerns about
separation of powers.
12. Including judicial distinctions between ministerial and discretionary functions
and proprietary and governmental functions, the public duty doctrine, and
others. See infra Part V.
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the Constitution understood that ratification constituted consent of
the individual states, and collective consent of the states for the
newly-created United States to suit in federal court under Article III.
This conclusion depends on an examination of the law of sovereign
immunity in England at the time of the framing, constitutional lan-
guage, the structure of the new government, and the understandings
of Framers and ratifiers as expressed in ratification debates, the popu-
lar press, and the ratification documents of the states. This Part also
examines the statements of Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall in the
political context of the times. It demonstrates that those statements
were politically motivated and inconsistent with other views taken by
those three men, as well as with the understanding expressed by other
Framers and ratifiers. The conclusion that there is no constitutional
immunity is also supported by early decisional law which holds that
ratification constituted consent to suit in the categories of cases enu-
merated in Article III, Section 2. Part IV examines the underpinnings
of sovereign immunity, independent of its mistaken historical and con-
stitutional basis, concluding that the only valid basis for immunity is
the principle of separation of powers. The fifth and last Part suggests
eliminating sovereign immunity while preserving its separation of
powers functions through existing prudential doctrines, such as the
political question doctrine, duty determinations, and discretionary
function immunities. Such doctrines demonstrate that separation of
powers concerns inherent in sovereign immunity can be protected pru-
dentially rather than jurisdictionally.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S HISTORICAL ACCOUNT
The Supreme Court has long held that sovereign immunity is a
constitutional doctrine that protects the United States and states indi-
vidually against lawsuits in federal court without consent. The mod-
ern Supreme Court's account of the founding holds that the
Constitution as originally enacted did not contemplate federal court
jurisdiction over non-consenting states and, by necessary implication,
over a non-consenting federal government. According to the Supreme
Court's view, the only vehicle by which the federal government may
act directly13 against a non-consenting state is the Fourteenth
Amendment's enforcement power in Section 5, which is specifically
aimed at the states. 14 Otherwise, the states are sovereign and not
13. Acceptance of conditional federal funding may operate to place indirect, volun-
tary restrictions on the sovereignty of the states.
14. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No State shall make or en-
force any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 5 states:
[Vol. 81:1
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subject to the enforcement of federal law against them through suit in
federal courts, 15 administrative courts,16 or even in their own
courts,1 7 despite the Supremacy Clause. The basis of this account is
the Supreme Court's assessment of the intent of the founding genera-
tion. In assessing that intent, the Court has relied upon English his-
tory and the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity;' 8 three
isolated statements, by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. 81,
James Madison in the Virginia ratification debates, and John Mar-
shall in the Virginia ratification debates,19 that states may not be
sued; evidence from the ratification documents of New York and
Rhode Island,20 ignoring the contrary evidence contained in the ratifi-
cation documents of other states;2 1 the disputed and uncertain history
of the Eleventh Amendment;2 2 and Hans v. Louisiana,2 3 a decision
which postdated the founding by more than a century, has been widely
criticized, 24 and which in turn relies on the statements of Hamilton,
Madison, and Marshall noted above.
The Supreme Court's view of the founding also disregards the
views of Madison, Hamilton, and many others that limitations on the
states as effected through the judicial power were absolutely neces-
sary to the functioning of the United States. 2 5 Under the Confeder-
acy, the states had ignored the treaties and laws of the Confederacy.
"The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. The federal government may
act indirectly against the states through conditional funding, which is short of
conditioning funding on consent to suit. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445
(1976).
15. E.g., Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (holding states
are immune from federal court suits by Indian tribes); Monaco v. Mississippi, 292
U.S. 313 (1934) (holding states are immune from federal court suits by foreign
nations); Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921) (holding states are immune
from admiralty proceedings); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding states
are immune from federal question suits brought by their own citizens).
16. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S.Ct. 1864 (2002) (holding states
are immune from Federal Maritime Commission adjudicative proceedings).
17. E.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding sovereign immunity shields
states from private suits in state courts pursuant to federal causes of action).
18. Id. at 715 ("When the Constitution was ratified, it was well established in En-
glish law that the Crown could not be sued without consent in its courts."). This
is a misstatement of English law. See infra section III.B.
19. E.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 122 S.Ct. at 1864; Alden, 527 U.S. at 706-07, 717-18;
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (quoting Alexander Ham-
ilton in The Federalist No. 81, and James Madison and John Marshall in the
Virginia ratification debates).
20. E.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 719, 749. See infra subsection III.C.3.c.i.
21. See infra subsections III.C.3.c.ii to iv.
22. See supra note 4.
23. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
24. See supra note 4.
25. See infra subsection III.A.3.
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Willful state violation of these laws had necessitated the Conven-
tion.26 The Supreme Court, in disregard of this clear history, views
state sovereignty as encompassing the states' ability to avoid the en-
forcement of federal law against them.27 According to the Court,
"neither the Supremacy Clause nor the enumerated powers of Con-
gress confer authority to abrogate the States' immunity from suit in
federal court."28 To the contrary, all of the Framers and ratifiers who
spoke on the issue, Federalists and Antifederalists alike, believed that
the powers of the judiciary and the legislature had to be coextensive.
Otherwise, there would be no method of enforcing the law and the
Constitution would preserve the very problems-state disregard of na-
tional law-which had been the downfall of the Confederacy. 29
Over time, dissenters have articulated a different and fuller ver-
sion of the history of the founding and concluded that the states did
not enjoy full immunities as a matter of constitutional law. Justices
Brennan,30 Stevens,31 Souter,32 and Breyer 33 have propounded this
view on the modern Court, concluding that the federal government
has the power to bind the states through exercise of its Article I pow-
ers. Those dissenting views hold that the states consented to suit by
the federal government and by other states. The dissenters stop
short, however, of this Article's additional conclusions: first, that the
Constitution subjects the federal government, as well as the state gov-
ernments, to the power of the federal courts under Article III through
consent of the United States given by the states collectively in their
ratification of the Constitution; and second, that both the federal and
state governments are subject to suit by individuals through consent
of the states individually and collectively for the United States
through ratification of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court's conclusion that Article III was subject to
common law sovereign immunity primarily relies on the much-quoted
statements of Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. 81 and James
Madison in the Virginia ratification debates. John Marshall's state-
ment in those debates is also frequently cited. Historians have long
concluded that the Constitution was ratified at least in part because
26. See infra subsection III.C.1.
27. E.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
28. Id. at 733.
29. See infra subsection III.C.1.
30. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 5 (1989) (Brennan, J.).
31. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S.Ct. 1864, 1879 (2002) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 92 (2000) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
32. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 100 (Souter, J., dissenting); Alden, 527 U.S. at 760
(Souter, J., dissenting).
33. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Secondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 693
(1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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"many of the most eminent advocates of the new Federal Government
.. successful[ly] dissipat[ed] ... the fear" that the "Federal Judiciary
[had power] to summon a State as defendant and to adjudicate its
rights and liabilities."34 The Supreme Court itself has stated that
"the representations of Madison, Hamilton, and Marshall that the
Constitution did not abrogate the States' sovereign immunity may
have been essential to ratification."35 Thus, these three statements
form the linchpin of the Supreme Court's view of sovereign immunity
as a constitutional doctrine. 36 According to Hamilton,
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general prac-
tice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is
now enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union. Unless, therefore
there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will
remain with States and the danger intimated must be merely ideal ...
[Tihere is no color to pretend that the State governments would, by the adop-
tion of that plan, be divested of the privilege of paying their own debts in their
own way, free from every constraint but that which flows from the obligations
of good faith. The contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding
on the conscience of the sovereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive
force. They confer no right of action independent of the sovereign will. 3 7
James Madison made similar statements during the ratification de-
bates in Virginia:
It is not in the power of individuals to call any state into court. The only
operation it can have, is that, if a state should wish to bring a suit against a
citizen, it must be brought before the federal court. This will give satisfaction
to individuals, as it will prevent citizens, on whom a state may have a claim,
being dissatisfied with the state courts. It is a case which cannot often hap-
pen, and if it should be found improper, it will be altered .... It appears to me
that this can have no operation but this-to give a citizen a right to be heard in
the federal courts; and if a state should condescend to be a party, this court
may take cognizance of it.38
34. 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 91 (1923).
35. Welch v. Tex. Dept. of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 483 (1987); see
also Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 122 S.Ct. at 1870.
36. See Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Seminole Tribe: "For over a century we
have reaffirmed that federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States
'was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power
of the United States."' 517 U.S. at 54 (quoting Hans, 134 U.S. at 15). This "pre-
supposition" has "two parts: first, that each State is a sovereign entity in our
federal system; and second, that '[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not
to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent."' Id. (quoting THE
FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487-88 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
37. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487-88 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). A more extensive quotation and analysis of Hamilton's argument appears
infra at subsection III.E.2.
38. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 533 (J.B. Lippincott Co. 1941) (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed.
1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES] (This work is a collection of debates and
other materials related to the ratification of the Constitution, which includes the
Journal of the Federal Convention and the printed debates from the several state
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Finally, John Marshall, who was not present at the Constitutional
Convention, but served as a delegate to Virginia's ratification conven-
tion, argued:
With respect to disputes between a state and the citizens of another state, its
jurisdiction has been decried with unusual vehemence. I hope that no gen-
tleman will think that a state will be called at the bar of the federal court. Is
there no such case at present? Are there not many cases in which the legisla-
ture of Virginia is a party, and yet the state is not sued? It is not rational to
suppose that the sovereign power should be dragged before a court. The in-
tent is, to enable states to recover claims of individuals residing in other
states. I contend this construction is warranted by the words. But, say they,
there will be partiality in it if a state cannot be a defendant - if an individual
cannot proceed to obtain judgment against a state, though he may be sued by
a state. It is necessary to be so, and cannot be avoided. I see a difficulty in
making a state a defendant, which does not prevent its being a plaintiff. If
this be only what cannot be avoided, why object to the system on that account?
If an individual has a just claim against any particular state, is it to be pre-
sumed that, on application to its legislature, he will not obtain satisfaction?
But how could a state recover any claim from a citizen of another state, with-
out the establishment of these tribunals?3 9
Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall were clearly capable and quali-
fied interpreters of the Constitution. Madison is credited as being the
primary draftsman of the document that provided the basis for discus-
sion at the Convention,40 and was a co-author of The Federalist pa-
pers41 and a delegate to both the Constitutional Convention 42 and
Virginia's ratification convention. 43 Hamilton was a member of the
federal44 and New York conventions 45 and also a co-author of The
conventions. For ease to the reader in locating the sources cited, this Article cites
directly to the location of these collected materials in Elliot's Debates.). A more
extensive quotation and analysis of Madison's remarks appear infra at subsection
III.E.3.
39. 1 id. at 555-56. A full analysis of this argument appears infra at subsection
III.E.4. By 1821, in his decision in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821), Mar-
shall described sovereign immunity as a device utilized to protect states from
their creditors, having nothing to do with the dignity of states or the respect that
should be accorded them. See id. at 291-92.
40. The Virginia Plan, or the Randolph Plan, was introduced by Edmund Randolph,
the governor of Virginia, on behalf of Virginia's representatives to the Conven-
tion. Historians believe that Madison was the primary or even the sole drafter of
the plan. 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST
SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION
1023 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) [hereinafter BAILYN'S DEBATES].
41. As "Publius," Madison, with Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, published a se-
ries of articles entitled The Federalist, which argued for ratification of the Consti-
tution and provided an influential interpretive resource for constitutional
adjudication.
42. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 125.
43. 3 id.
44. 1 id. at 124.
45. 2 id. at 206.
[Vol. 81:1
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Federalist.4 6 Marshall was a member of the Virginia ratification con-
vention 47 and later wrote many pivotal opinions during his service as
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.48 These creden-
tials entitle their statements to some measure of deference.
However, the interpretation advanced by Hamilton, Madison and
Marshall is contradicted by the great weight of the historical evidence,
including their own contemporaneous and later statements bearing on
the issue. It is at odds with the reasons for the drafting of the Consti-
tution;49 the plain language of the Constitution;50 the structure of the
new government (with its system of divided but overlapping executive,
legislative, and judicial powers that are each limited by the constitu-
tional structure and restrained by checks and balances of the other
branches); the reasons advanced for each category of judicial power by
the Framers and ratifiers, including Madison and Hamilton;51 and,
finally, other contemporaneous interpretations of Article III, including
interpretations advanced by Madison and Hamilton themselves.
52
Most notably, Madison complained that the federal judicial restraint
on the states was inferior to his preferred legislative veto, because
"where the law aggrieves individuals, [they] may be unable to support
an appeal agst. a State to the supreme Judiciary."53
Other contemporaneous interpretations read the Constitution as
clearly authorizing suits against the states54 and include the opinions
of James Wilson, later Supreme Court Justice, Framer, and member
of the important Committee of Detail,55 which drafted the Constitu-
tion advanced in the Pennsylvania ratification debates; and the dis-
cussion of immunities and Article III in the Virginia ratification
debates by all the participants, both Federalist and Antifederalists
alike (including the Federalists Edmund Randolph, Framer and mem-
ber of the Committee of Detail and Governor of Virginia; Edmund
46. See supra text accompanying note 41.
47. See generally, 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38.
48. Appointed by John Adams, Marshall served as Chief Justice from his appoint-
ment in 1801 to 1835. See infra subsection III.E.4 for discussions of some of those
opinions.
49. The impetus for the Constitutional Convention was to permit a central authority
to enforce treaty obligations against the states and to prevent the passage of un-
just state laws, in particular those creating paper money and interfering with
contractual obligations. See 1 BAILYN's DEBATES, supra note 40, at 198-99. For a
full discussion, see infra section III.A.
50. See infra subsection III.C.2.
51. See infra section III.D.
52. See infra subsections III.E.2 and 3.
53. Letter to Thomas Jefferson from James Madison (Oct. 24, 1787), in 1 BAILYN'S
DEBATES, supra note 40, at 198. For a full discussion, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 362-69. This statement clearly contemplates the possibility of an indi-
vidual citizen's suit against a state.
54. And, by implication, suits against the federal government as well.
55. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 221.
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Pendleton, President of the Virginia convention; George Nicholas; and
the outspoken Antifederalists, Patrick Henry, George Mason, and Wil-
liam Grayson),56 except Madison and Marshall; statements in the
North Carolina ratification debates by William R. Davie, a member of
the Federal Convention, and William Lenoir;57 debate in the press
during the ratification period;5s the understandings of the ratifiers
evinced by the ratification documents produced by the majority of the
states; 59 and early judicial interpretations of Article III, which viewed
ratification of the Constitution as consent to jurisdiction under Article
111.60 The great weight of the evidence demonstrates that the found-
ing generation, Federalists and Antifederalists alike, understood the
Constitution to eliminate common law sovereign immunity by effect-
ing a general consent to suit by the states individually and collectively
as the United States in the categories of cases enumerated in Article
111.61
It is also problematic to rely on Madison's, Hamilton's, and Mar-
shall's statements as possibly "essential" to ratification of the Consti-
tution, as the Supreme Court has done. 62 By the time Hamilton's
statements in The Federalist No. 81 appeared, eight states had al-
ready ratified. One day after Marshall and Madison spoke at the Vir-
ginia convention, the count rose to nine with New Hampshire's
ratification. Thus, the Constitution became official without reliance
on Madison's and Marshall's statements. 63
Against the weight of evidence, Madison's, Hamilton's, and Mar-
shall's statements must be understood as part of the polemics of the
ratification process rather than as the prevailing interpretation of the
founding generation.64 Madison, Hamilton, and Marshall were capa-
ble and well qualified to speak on the meaning of the Constitution.
But they were also politicians, highly cognizant of the very serious
threats to ratification specifically posed by state indebtedness, the
56. See infra subsection III.C.3.a.
57. See infra note 222.
58. See infra subsection III.C.3.b.
59. See infra subsection III.C.3.c.
60. See infra section III.F.
61. Including cases arising under the Constitution and U.S. laws; cases in which the
United States is a party; and cases between two or more states, between a state
and a diverse citizen, and between a state and a foreign state, citizen, or subject.
These latter two categories were eliminated by the Eleventh Amendment.
62. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S.Ct. 1864, 1870 (2002); Welch
v. Tex. Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 483 (1987).
63. Other evidence makes it clear that Virginia's ratification did not depend on their
statements either. See infra text accompanying notes 213-19, 264-70.
64. Others have made this suggestion previously. Gibbons, supra note 4, at 1906-08;
Jackson, supra note 4, at 47-48.
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possibility of legal action on those debts in federal courts,6 5 and the
general Antifederal sentiment.6 6 The most plausible construction of
the historical record is that the statements of Hamilton, Madison, and
Marshall represent a political strategy. In an elevation of political ex-
pediency over principle, Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall relied on
the common law of sovereign immunity, a doctrine inconsistent with
the structure and philosophy of the proposed new government and
with the language of the Constitution to improve its chances of ratifi-
cation. On this slight foundation rests the modern edifice of sovereign
immunity.
III. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND FOUNDING GENERATION
A. The Constitutional Convention's Article III Deliberations
There was very little debate in the Constitutional Convention con-
cerning the judiciary, and none specifically addressing sovereign im-
munity. This section describes the discussion at the Convention itself,
provides background for the Article's subsequent arguments, and
makes an important preliminary point. Although the Framers did not
debate sovereign immunity, the Constitution they drafted is inconsis-
tent with state and federal sovereign immunity. The Framers debated
federal power over the states, and statements during the Convention,
as well as Article III and the Supremacy Clause, mandate the conclu-
sion that the states were subject to the power of the federal courts at
least with respect to issues of federal law. In other words, it is not
possible to conclude, as the Supreme Court has done, that the dele-
gates to the Convention ignored sovereign immunity because it was an
accepted structural predicate that needed no discussion. Rather, the
delegates ignored sovereign immunity because it was inconsistent
with and irrelevant to the proposed new union of the states.
1. The Proposals
At the National Convention, the basis of the debate was the Ran-
dolph Plan, also known as the Virginia Plan, jointly drafted by the
Virginia delegation (but produced primarily by James Madison 67 ) dur-
65. For a compelling and insightful argument that the structure of the government
adopted by the United States was shaped substantially by the political battles
between creditors and debtors, see Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice" Politics,
The Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DuKE
L.J. 1421.
66. Including the desire of those whose power depended on the primacy of the states
to retain that power. One of the most prominent examples is Governor George
Clinton of New York, whose Antifederalism posed a major obstacle to ratification
in New York. See infra text accompanying notes 333-35.
67. 1 BAILYN'S DEBATES, supra note 40, app. at 1077.
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ing the days before the arrival of delegates from other states68 and
presented to the Convention on May 29 by Virginia's governor, Ed-
mund Randolph.69 Charles Pinckney of South Carolina presented a
proposal on the same day.70 William Patterson of New Jersey and
Alexander Hamilton of New York subsequently presented proposals to
the Convention.71 With respect to the judiciary, the Virginia Plan
provided in its ninth resolution:
Resolved, That a national judiciary be established [to consist of one or more
supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National Leg-
islature] .... That the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be to hear and
determine in the first instance, and of the supreme tribunal to hear and deter-
mine in the dernier ressort, all piracies and felonies on the seas: captures from
an enemy; cases in which foreigners, or citizens of other states, applying to
such jurisdictions, may be interested, or which respect the collection of the
national revenue; impeachments of any national officers, and questions which
involve the national peace and harmony. 7 2
Charles Pinckney's draft, Article IX, provided:
The legislature of the United States shall have the power, and it shall be their
duty, to establish such courts of law, equity, and admiralty, as shall be neces-
sary .... One of these courts shall be termed the Supreme Court, whose juris-
diction shall extend to all cases arising under the laws of the United States, or
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to the trial of im-
peachment of officers of the United States; to all cases of admiralty and mari-
time jurisdiction. In cases of impeachment affecting ambassadors, and other
public ministers, this jurisdiction shall be original; and in all other cases
appellate.
7 3
Patterson submitted a series of propositions to the Convention on
June 15. The New Jersey Plan, as it was known, called for simple
amendment of the existing Articles of Confederation to remedy some
of the Confederation's problems, retaining the supremacy of the
states. With respect to the judiciary, the plan resolved:
68. The Convention met on May 14 but did not achieve a quorum until May 25 when
seven state delegations were present. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 139.
69. 1 id. at 143.
70. 1 id. at 145. Pinckney's proposal was not discussed by the Convention.
71. Propositions Offered to the Convention by the Honorable Mr. Patterson (June 15,
1787), in 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 175; Colonel Hamilton's Plan of
Government (June 18, 1787), in 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 179.
72. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 144. Elliot's Debates omits the words "to
consist of one or more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by
the National Legislature," leaving a blank space. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DE-
BATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 32 (Ad-
rienne Koch ed., 1966) (1927), includes these words in its version of Randolph's
plan. The debate on June 5, as reported in both sources, discusses these words.
73. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 148-49. This proposal is notable in that the
legislature, and not the Constitution, establishes "such courts ... as shall be
necessary." 1 id. The fact that the Convention chose not to adopt the language of
Pinckney's proposal suggests that the Framers intended the judicial power to be
self-executing.
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That a federal judiciary be established, to consist of a supreme tribunal ....
That the judiciary, so established, shall have authority to hear and determine,
in the first instance, on all impeachments of federal officers; and by way of
appeal, in the dernier ressort, in all cases touching the rights and privileges of
ambassadors; in all cases of captures from an enemy; in all cases of piracies
and felonies on the high seas; in all cases in which foreigners may be inter-
ested, in the construction of any treaty or treaties, or which may arise on any
act or ordinance of Congress for the regulation of trade, or the collection of the
federal revenue. 7 4
Hamilton's plan, introduced June 18, called for a strong national
government with an executive and Senate elected for life and an as-
sembly elected for three year periods. The national government would
establish state courts and appoint state governors, who would have
veto power over state legislation. With respect to the national and
state judiciaries, Hamilton's plan provided:
7. The supreme judicial authority of the United States to be vested in judges,
to hold their offices during good behavior, with adequate and permanent sala-
ries. This court to have original jurisdiction in all cases of capture; and an
appellate jurisdiction in all causes in which the revenues of the general gov-
ernment, or the citizens of foreign nations, are concerned.
8. The legislature of the United States to have power to institute courts in
each state, for the determination of all matters of general concern.
7 5
The Convention focused initially on the Virginia Plan. It agreed
unanimously on the first clause, providing for a national judiciary.
76
This was in itself a significant advance beyond the Articles of Confed-
eration, which had provided no permanent national court, instead
utilizing a complicated method of choosing judges case-by-case in dis-
putes involving the states or between parties claiming land grants
from two or more states. 77 The Convention also added the words "to
consist of one supreme tribunal, and of one or more inferior tribunals"
74. 1 id. at 176. The New Jersey Plan revised the existing Articles of Confederation
to afford the Confederation more extensive powers, including powers to levy im-
posts and create stamp taxes, regulate foreign and interstate commerce, and es-
tablish an executive and judiciary. The plan permitted the Congress to make
requisitions, but included the power to collect requisitions from any state which
did not comply. The plan also included a supremacy clause, which provided the
basis for Article VI. The executive would have power to "call forth the powers of
the confederated states, or so much thereof as may be necessary" to force the
states to obey federal law. 1 id. at 177.
75. 1 id. at 179-80.
76. 1 id. at 160. The action was unanimous. MADISION, supra note 72, at 67.
77. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 81-82. The parties would "appoint, by joint
consent, commissioners or judges to constitute a court for hearing and determin-
ing the matter." 1 id. If the parties could not agree, Congress would nominate
three persons from each state, and the parties would alternately strike names
until thirteen remained, then Congress would draw lots to choose between seven
and nine judges. See 1 id.
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to the first clause of the Virginia Plan's ninth resolution7S and ap-
proved clauses dealing with tenure of office and compensation. 79
2. The Supreme Court and the Federal Judiciary
There was no disagreement about the creation of the Supreme
Court. Whether inferior tribunals should be established was vigor-
ously debated. John Rutledge of South Carolina rejected entirely the
establishment of inferior tribunals in favor of state courts which
would decide all cases in the first instanceSO and moved to expunge
the reference to inferior tribunals.81 He argued that the right of ap-
peal to the supreme national tribunal would be sufficient to secure
national rights and uniformity of judgments and that the establish-
ment of inferior courts would unnecessarily encroach on the states'jurisdiction.82 James Madison, James Wilson, and John Dickinson
disagreed. Madison responded in two ways: first, that without inferior
courts, appeals to the Supreme Court would be too numerous, and sec-
ond, that appeal would not provide an adequate remedy in many
cases:
What was to be done after improper Verdicts in State tribunals obtained
under the biased directions of a dependent Judge, or the local prejudices of an
undirected jury? To remand the cause for new trial would answer no purpose.
To order a new trial at the Supreme bar would oblige the parties to bring up
their witnesses, tho' ever so distant from the seat of the Court. An effective
Judiciary establishment commensurate to legislative authority, was
essential.8 3
There was a divided vote.8 4 The Convention then passed a compro-
mise proposed by James Madison and James Wilson, deferring the is-
sue: the national legislature was authorized to establish inferior
tribunals as it thought necessary.8 5
78. 1 id. at 160; accord MADISON, supra note 72, at 67. On the next day, the Conven-
tion agreed to strike the words "one or more" so the clause read simply "to consist
of one supreme tribunal, and inferior tribunals." 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note
38, at 161; accord MADISON, supra note 72, at 67.
79. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 161; accord MADISON, supra note 72, at 68-
69.
80. MADISON, supra note 72, at 67.
81. Id. at 71.
82. Id. at 71. Roger Sherman of Connecticut agreed.
83. Id. at 72.
84. See id. Massachusetts and New York were divided; Connecticut, New Jersey,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia were in favor of Rutledge's motion;
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia were opposed. Id.
85. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 163; MADISON, supra note 72, at 72-73. The
vote was Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North
Carolina, and Georgia in favor; Connecticut, South Carolina opposed; and NewYork divided. The report in Elliot's Debates lists New Jersey as opposed, but
Madison lists New Jersey in favor of the motion. This compromise reflects Pinck-
ney's proposal, supra text accompanying note 73.
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Views about the appointment of the national judiciary were di-
verse. Hamilton's plan included no provision concerning appoint-
ment.8 6 Patterson's plan called for appointment by the executive,
8 7
the Virginia Plan by the national legislature,8 8 and Pinckney's by the
Senate.8 9 In debate, James Wilson favored executive appointment,
reasoning that "intrigue, partiality, and concealment" would attend
appointment by a "numerous body."90 Benjamin Franklin suggested
the process used in Scotland, namely nomination by lawyers, "who al-
ways selected the ablest of the profession in order to get rid of him,
and share his practice among themselves."9 1 James Madison favored
appointment by the Senate, concurring with Pinckney, and adding
that legislatures might not have the ability to assess judicial qualifica-
tions. The Senate was "not so numerous as to be governed by the mo-
tives of the other branch; and [was] sufficiently stable and
independent to follow their deliberate judgments."9 2 Madison moved,
and the Convention agreed, that "appointment by the Legislature" be
struck and left blank "to be hereafter filled on maturer reflection."
93
On June 13, Madison's proposal that the Senate appoint the national
judiciary passed unanimously. 94 In subsequent days, the issue was
reopened. A motion to substitute the executive for the Senate was re-
jected. 95 Massachusetts delegate Nathaniel Gorham suggested that
"Judges be nominated and appointed by the Executive by & with the
advice & consent of the 2 nd branch" and James Madison revised that,
moving that Judges would be nominated by the executive and that the
nomination would become an appointment unless two-thirds of the
Senate disagreed within a specified period. 96 Only Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, and Virginia were in favor. 97 Gorham's idea was ulti-
mately approved as part of a compromise on appointments
generally. 98
86. See supra text accompanying note 75.
87. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 176.
88. 1 id. at 182.
89. Pinckney's proposal, supra text accompanying note 73, provided in article VII
that "The Senate shall have the sole and exclusive power... to appoint.., judges
of the Supreme Court." 1 id. at 148.
90. MADISON, supra note 72, at 67.
91. Id. at 68.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 174; MADISON, supra note 72, at 113.
95. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 209; MADISON, supra note 72, at 317. Na-
thaniel Gorham of Massachusetts and James Wilson of Pennsylvania, and their
states, along with Virginia and Maryland, favored the motion.
96. MADISON, supra note 72, at 317.
97. Id. at 346.
98. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 214, 222.
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The Framers' beliefs in the necessity of a strong judiciary are clear
in various discussions.99 For example, the Convention debated the
creation of a Council of Revision 100 with authority to review legisla-
tive acts. Madison and Wilson moved to include the judiciary in this
revisionary check,101 and were defeated,102 with others objecting thatjudges might be biased in their judicial functions by participation in
the making of law and that the judiciary should be distinct from other
branches.103 The discussion makes clear, however, the Framers'
views of the judiciary as an independent branch with significant con-
stitutional functions. In opposing Madison's and Wilson's positions,
Elbridge Gerry stated that the Judiciary need not be part of such a
council "as they will have a sufficient check against encroachments on
their own department by their exposition of the laws, which involved a
power of deciding on their Constitutionality."104 Discussions of the
objectives of the national government similarly indicate the necessity
of a powerful judiciary. According to Madison's estimation, the "neces-
sity of providing more effectually for the security of private rights and
the steady dispensation of Justice" was indisputable; "[i]nterferences
with these were evils which had more perhaps than any thing else,
produced this convention." 105
3. Federal Oversight of State Law
The Convention was also clear on the need for a national oversight
of state laws. The Convention's working draft, presented by Edmund
Randolph for the Virginia delegation and drafted primarily by
Madison, included the following provision:
Resolved, .... that the national legislature ought to be empowered.., to nega-
tive all laws passed by the several states, contravening, in the opinion of the
national legislature, the articles of union, or any treaty subsisting under the
authority of the Union. 1 0 6
Early in the Convention, on June 8, Charles Pinckney, seconded by
Madison, moved to strike this provision and substitute a much
broader power "[t]o negative all laws which to them shall appear im-
99. For a complete discussion, see infra subsection III.C.1.
100. MADISON, supra note 72, at 32. Edmund Randolph proposed that the executive
and members of the national judiciary should form a council which would review
every legislative enactment, with power to reject it, subject to reenactment by the
national legislature. See id.
101. Id. at 66.
102. Id. at 79-81.
103. Id. at 80-81.
104. Id. at 61. Gerry's motion that the executive alone had absolute power to negative
legislation was rejected. Id. at 66. The motion that two-thirds of each house of
the legislature could overrule the revisionary check of the executive passed. Id.
105. Id. at 76.
106. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 144.
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proper."l0 7 This proposal was defeated with only Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, and Madison's home state of Virginia voting in the af-
firmative.10 8 Madison's notes of the Convention state his position:
He [Madison] could not but regard an indefinite power to negative legislative
acts of the States as absolutely necessary to a perfect system. Experience had
evinced a constant tendency in the States to encroach on the federal authority;
to violate national Treaties; to infringe the rights & interests of each other; to
oppress the weaker party within their respective jurisdictions. A negative
was the mildest expedient that could be devised for preventing these mis-
chiefs. The existence of such a check would prevent attempts to commit
them .... [Iun order to give the negative this efficacy, it must extend to all
cases. A discrimination would [sic] only be a fresh source of contention be-
tween the two authorities .... This prerogative of the General Government is
the great pervading principle that must controul the centrifugal tendency of
the States; which, without it, will continually fly out of their proper orbits and
destroy the order & harmony of the political System. 109
When the Convention considered the resolutions offered by Ran-
dolph and as amended by the whole house, it reviewed the proposed
legislative veto again in its original, narrower version. Madison re-
peated his arguments in favor of a veto power, adding that the states
could "pass laws which will accomplish their injurious objects before
they can be repealed by the General Legislature or be set aside by the
National Tribunals."110 Governor Morris and Roger Sherman argued
strongly against a national legislative power to veto state laws as un-
necessary and offensive, noting that state laws contrary to the na-
tional law would be set aside by the judiciary or repealed by a national
law.1" 1 The proposal was defeated with only three states-Massachu-
setts, Virginia, and North Carolina-in favor.112 Luther Martin pro-
posed as an alternative an early version of the Supremacy Clause
which passed unanimously.'1 3 In the absence of a congressional
power to negative the states' passage of legislation, the Convention
recognized that power resided in the national judiciary to override
state law which conflicted with national law. Thus, the Supremacy
Clause had a very important function to play, a function which has
partially disintegrated over time through the Supreme Court's eleva-
tion of state sovereign immunity. 114
Under the Supreme Court's current view of sovereign immunity as
a constitutional doctrine, the Supremacy Clause cannot fulfill its func-
tion in the constitutional design. The Court considers the Supremacy
Clause subject to the unexpressed, but underlying constitutional pre-
107. 1 id. at 166.
108. 1 id.
109. MADISON, supra note 72, at 88-89.
110. Id. at 304.
111. Id. at 304-05.
112. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 207.
113. 1 id; accord MADISON, supra note 72, at 305-06.
114. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 731 (1999).
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mise of state sovereign immunity.115 In other words, the Supremacy
Clause and Article III cannot operate to enforce federal law against an
unconsenting state. This puts the modern United States in precisely
the same situation as under the Articles of Confederation-something
the Framers decried and what had necessitated the Constitutional
Convention. The possibility of suit by the United States against a
state for violations of federal law undercuts this conclusion somewhat.
However, that limitation on state power has been rarely used.116 It
also requires the operation of at least two and possibly three branches
of the federal government to control a state: to enforce federal law
against a state, the executive must bring an action, possibly through
congressional authorization, and the judiciary must decide against the
state. Given the Framers' suggestions for a congressional negative,
and the historical basis for rejecting sovereign immunity as a constitu-
tional premise, it seems unlikely that this was the sole method of fed-
eral control contemplated by the Framers.
4. Article III
There is very little recorded debate with respect to the categories of
cases over which the judiciary could exercise power. On June 12, the
Convention voted to strike out the extension of jurisdiction over "all
piracies and felonies on the high seas" and "all captures from an en-
emy."11 7 It also voted to change the words "other States" in the
phrase "cases in which foreigners, or citizens of other states, applying
to such jurisdictions, may be interested," to "two distinct States of the
Union, applying to such jurisdictions, may be interested."118 On June
13, Randolph and Madison moved "[tihat the jurisdiction of the Na-
tional Judiciary shall extend to cases, which respect the collection of
the national revenue, impeachments of any national officers, and
115. According to the Alden Court, "the Supremacy Clause enshrines as 'the supreme
Law of the Land' only those federal Acts that accord with the constitutional de-
sign .... The Constitution, by delegating to Congress the power to establish the
supreme law of the land when acting within its enumerated powers, does not
foreclose a State from asserting immunity to claims arising under federal law
merely because that law derives not from the State itself but from the national
power." Id. at 731-32.
116. See United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 139 (1965) (holding that the
United States Attorney General could sue Mississippi for injunctive relief for vio-
lation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175,
188 (1936) (finding California subject to federal district court jurisdiction for vio-
lations of the Safety Appliance Act); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892)
(concerning a boundary dispute between the United States and Texas).
117. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 173; accord MADISON, supra note 72, at
112.




questions which involve the national peace and harmony.""19 On July
18, noting "[s]everal criticisms having been made on the definition" of
the jurisdiction of the national judiciary, Madison proposed an altera-
tion which was unanimously adopted: "[t]hat the jurisdiction of the
national judiciary shall extend to cases arising under laws passed by
the general legislature, and to such other questions as involve the na-
tional peace and harmony."120 The Convention referred this resolu-
tion (with others) to the Committee of Detail on July 23 and 26.121
The Convention also referred to the Committee the propositions of-
fered by Charles Pinckney and by William Patterson.12 2 Edmund
Randolph prepared a draft for the Committee's review; James Wilson
prepared a second draft for the Committee's review. 123
The Committee of Detail presented a draft constitution to the Con-
vention on August 6, 1787. With respect to jurisdiction, article XI
provided:
SECT. 3 The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to all cases aris-
ing under laws passed by the Legislature of the United States; to all cases
affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers, and Consuls; to the trial of
impeachments of officers of the United States; to all cases of Admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction; to controversies between two or more States, (except
such as shall regard Territory or Jurisdiction) between a State and Citizens of
another State, between Citizens of different States, and between a State, or
the Citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens, or subjects. In cases of im-
peachment, cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls,
and those in which a State shall be party, this jurisdiction shall be original.
In all the other cases before mentioned it shall be appellate, with such excep-
tions and under such regulations as the legislature shall make. The Legisla-
ture may assign any part of the jurisdiction abovementioned (except the trial
of the President of the United States) in the manner, and under the limita-
tions which it shall think proper, to such Inferior Courts, as it shall constitute
from time to time.1 2 4
119. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 174; accord MADISON, supra note 72, at
112.
120. MADISON, supra note 72, at 319.
121. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 221. The Committee was composed of Oli-
ver Ellsworth of Connecticut, Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts, Edmund
Randolph of Virginia, John Rutledge of South Carolina, and James Wilson of
Pennsylvania.
122. 1 id. at 223.
123. 1 BAILYN'S DEBATES, supra note 40, app. at 1086. The draft relied on the materi-
als provided by the Convention, but also state constitutions, the Articles of Con-
federation, and resolutions of the Continental Congress.
124. MADISON, supra note 72, at 393. Section 1 tracked the Convention's decisions
regarding the courts: "The Judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in
one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as shall, when necessary, from
time to time, be constituted by the Legislature of the United States." Id. Section
2 dealt with issues of tenure and compensation, but did not address appointment:
"The Judges of the Supreme Court, and of the Inferior Courts, shall hold their
offices during good behaviour. They shall, at stated times, receive for their ser-
vices, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in
office." Id. Section 4 provided: "The trial of all criminal offences (except in cases
20021
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The Committee apparently received very little guidance from the Con-
vention on this section. The first clause repeats the resolution of the
Convention. The remaining clauses presumably constitute the Com-
mittee's judgment on the sorts of questions which may affect the na-
tional peace and harmony. Many are borrowed from the propositions
put forth in the Virginia Plan and those submitted by Charles Pinck-
ney and William Patterson. The second clause of section 3 mirrors
Pinckney's draft, which included jurisdiction over cases affecting am-
bassadors, public ministers and consuls, 125 and Patterson's as well.12 6
The third clause, dealing with impeachments, was included in the Vir-
ginia Plan and in Pinckney's and Patterson's plans.127 The fourth,
concerning admiralty jurisdiction, appeared in Pinckney's plan128 and
duplicates parts of the Virginia Plan and Patterson's plan.129 Juris-
diction over "controversies between two or more states" had no analog
in the materials before the Convention, although the Articles of Con-
federation had provided for resolution of disputes between states. 13 0
The sixth clause, extending jurisdiction to "controversies between a
state and citizens of another state" apparently derived from the Vir-
ginia Plan, which included jurisdiction over "cases in which foreigners,
or citizens of other states, applying to such jurisdictions, may be inter-
ested."131 But the extension of jurisdiction over controversies between
a United States citizen and foreign states, citizens and subjects, and
between a state and a foreign state, was entirely new. On August 20,
of impeachments) shall be in the State where they shall be committed; and shall
be by Jury." Id. Section 5 provided:
Judgment, in cases of Impeachment, shall not extend further than to
removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of
honor, trust or profit, under the United States. But the party convicted
shall, nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment
and punishment according to law.
Id.
125. See supra text accompanying note 73.
126. Patterson's proposals, supra text accompanying note 74, provided for jurisdiction
"in all cases touching the rights and privileges of ambassadors."
127. See supra text accompanying notes 72-74.
128. See supra text accompanying note 73.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 72 and 74.
130. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. The Articles of Confederation included
all disputes between states "concerning boundary, jurisdiction, or any other cause
whatever." ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IX. The draft excluded jurisdiction
regarding "territory or jurisdiction," giving the Senate authority to resolve such
controversies in article IX, section 3.
131. Supra text accompanying note 72. The original language was changed by the
Convention on June 12 to read "cases in which foreigners, or citizens of two dis-
tinct states of the union, applying to such jurisdictions, may be interested." 1
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 173; accord MADISON, supra note 72, at 112.
The original and amended clauses, which were lost in the votes on June 13 and
July 18 setting out more general principles of jurisdiction, were presumably the
forerunner of state/citizen diversity jurisdiction.
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the Convention referred additional propositions to the Committee of
Detail, without debate or consideration of them, including "The juris-
diction of the Supreme Court shall be extended to all controversies
between the United States and an individual state, or the United
States and the citizens of an individual state."132
The debate on the new draft of the jurisdiction provision was ap-
parently minimal. The first clause was amended to include cases aris-
ing under the Constitution as well as the laws of the United States.13 3
The provision was also amended, by unanimous agreement, to include
jurisdiction over controversies "to which the United States shall be a
party," apparently without discussion or debate. 134 Madison and Mor-
ris moved to change the beginning of the section to substitute "the
Judicial power" for "the jurisdiction of the supreme Court," which re-
ceived unanimous agreement. 13 5
The resulting provision underwent further revision by the Commit-
tee of Style and Arrangement,1 36 which submitted its report to the
Convention on September 12, 1787. The revisions, which are under-
lined in the following excerpt, included substantive changes, some of
which were not previously debated: 137
Section 2. The iudicial power [Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court] shall extend
to all cases, both in law and equity, arising under this constitution, the laws
[passed by the Legislature] of the United States, and treaties made. or which
shall be made. under their authority: to all cases affecting ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party. [to the trial
of impeachments of officers of the United States]; to controversies between
two or more States [except such as shall regard Territory or Jurisdiction]; be-
tween a state and citizens of another state; between citizens of different
States; between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of dif-
ferent states: and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign States,
citizens, or subjects.
In cases [of impeachment,] affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the supreme court [this
132. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 250; accord MADISON, supra note 72, at
486. Charles Pinckney submitted this proposition.
133. See generally 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 268.
134. 1 id.; accord MADISON, supra note 72, at 538.
135. MADISON, supra note 72, at 539.
136. The Convention appointed this Committee, composed of eleven elected members,
one from each participating state, on August 31. ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note
38, at 280. The Committee included Nicholas Gilman of New Hampshire, Rufus
King of Massachusetts, Roger Sherman of Connecticut, David Brearly of New
Jersey, Governor Morris of Pennsylvania, John Dickinson of Delaware, Daniel
Carroll of Maryland, James Madison of Virginia, H. Williamson of North Caro-
lina, Pierce Butler of South Carolina, and Abraham Baldwin of Georgia. 1 id.
137. 1 id. The Committee was formed "to refer to such parts of the Constitution as
have been postponed, and such parts of reports as have not been acted on, to a
committee of a member from each state." 1 id. Notably, the Committee included
a clause in article I, section 10 prohibiting states from impairing the obligation of
contract, which was adopted without debate.
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jurisdiction] shall have [be] original jurisdiction. In all other cases before
mentioned, the sunreme court [it] shall have [be] appellate iurisdiction, both
as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the
Congress [Legislature] shall make.
The trial of all crimes, exceot in cases of impeachment. shall be by iurv: and
such trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall have been
committee: but when not committed within any state. the trial shall be at such
place or places as the Congress may by law have directed. [The Legislature
may assign any part of the jurisdiction abovementioned (except the trial of the
President of the United States) in the manner, and under the limitations
which it shall think proper, to such Inferior Courts, as it shall constitute from
time to time.]138
5. Conclusion
Thus, the Convention did not explicitly address the issue of sover-
eign immunity. Was sovereign immunity an underlying assumption
so fundamental that it did not require discussion, as the modern Su-
preme Court has concluded? Or conversely, as this Article argues,
was it so antithetical to the nature and purposes of the new union that
it was simply irrelevant to the discussion? The debate at the Conven-
tion demonstrates the Framers' shared belief that federal power over
the states was essential to the union. The example of the Confederacy
had proved that point, and the Framers structured the new govern-
ment so that the federal judiciary could enforce state compliance with
federal law. Sovereign immunity is entirely inconsistent with this
structural predicate. Further, the ease with which the Framers in-
cluded a provision which subjected the United States to the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts suggests that they did not contemplate
sovereign immunity with regard to the federal government either.
B. Sovereign immunity in England
The Supreme Court's conclusion that the Constitution embodies
the concept of sovereign immunity takes the English common law doc-
trine of sovereign immunity as a premise which would have informed
the Founders' views of appropriate government. However, the nature
of sovereign immunity in the English common law, despite modern
statements of the doctrine, did not prohibit actions against the Crown,
and the Framers, many of them lawyers, some trained in England,
and all familiar with the common law, likely understood this point.
The common law rule cited by modern American jurists, that a sov-
ereign may not be sued without consent, derives from Sir William
Blackstone's famous Commentaries on the Law of England ("Black-
138. MADISON, supra note 72, at 624 (underlined material indicated through compari-
son with unrevised version, id. at 393); accord 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38,
at 229, 303-04.
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stone's Commentaries").139 Blackstone's Commentaries describes En-
glish law as precluding any action against the sovereign:
[The King] owes no kind of subjection to any other potentate upon earth.
Hence it is, that no suit or action can be brought against the king, even in civil
matters, because no court can have jurisdiction over him. For all jurisdiction
implies superiority of power: authority to try would be vain and idle, without
an authority to redress; and the sentence of a court would be contemptible,
unless that court had power to command the execution of it: by who, says
Finch, shall command the king? Hence it is likewise, that by law the person of
the king is sacred, even though the measures pursued in his reign be com-
pletely tyrannical and arbitrary: for no jurisdiction upon earth has power to
try him in a criminal way; much less to condemn him to punishment.
1 4 0
139. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND (Thomas B. Wait,
& Co. 1807) (1765).
140. 1 id. at 242. Other passages contribute to this impression of the King's personal
immunity as complete and absolute. As Blackstone describes, the King could
submit to the jurisdiction of the Court voluntarily, or, alternatively, his officers
could be sued or punished criminally.
Are then, it may be asked, the subjects of England totally destitute of
remedy, in case the crown should invade their rights, either by private
injuries, or public oppressions? To this we may answer, that the law has
provided a remedy in both cases. And, first, as to private injuries: if any
person has, in point of property, a just demand upon the King, he must
petition him in his court of chancery, where his chancellor will adminis-
ter right as a matter of grace, though not upon compulsion .... [A]s to
cases of ordinary public oppression, where the vitals of the constitution
are not attacked, the law hath also assigned a remedy. For as a King
cannot misuse his power, without the advice of evil counselors, and the
assistance of wicked ministers, these men may be examined and pun-
ished. The constitution has therefore provided, by means of indictments,
and parliamentary impeachments, that no man shall dare to assist the
crown in contradiction to the laws of the land. But it is at the same time
a maxim in those laws, that the King himself can do no wrong: since it
would be a great weakness and absurdity in any system of positive law,
to define any possible wrong, without any possible redress.
1 id. at 242-43. In a further passage, Blackstone elaborates on the nature of the
Crown and advances a more modern rationale for the King's immunity from suit:
the constitutionally mandated independence of the sovereign and the separation
of powers.
Besides the attribute of sovereignty, the law also ascribes to the
King, in his political capacity, absolute perfection. The King can do no
wrong. Which ancient and fundamental maxim is not to be understood,
as if every thing transacted by the government was of course just and
lawful, but means only two things. First, that whatever is exceptionable
in the conduct of public affairs is not to be imputed to the King, nor is he
answerable for it personally to his people: for this doctrine would totally
destroy that constitutional independence of the crown, which is neces-
sary for the balance of power in our free and active, and therefore com-
pounded, constitution. And, secondly, it means that the prerogative of
the crown extends not to do any injury; it is created for the benefit of the
people, and therefore cannot be exerted to their prejudice.
1 id. at 245. Together, these passages create the impression of sovereign immu-
nity as a complete protection from legal action.
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Blackstone's Commentaries was widely known and relied upon by law-
yers in the colonies and in the new nation,14 1 and was presumably
relied upon by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. 81 and by
James Madison and John Marshall in their statements in the Virginia
ratification debates. Despite this reliance, it is clear that Blackstone
overstated the doctrine of sovereign immunity in parts of Blackstone's
Commentaries, and it is possible-perhaps likely-that colonial law-
yers realized this, based on Blackstone's Commentaries itself or those
lawyers' familiarity with English procedures.14 2 In contrast to the
broad conception of immunity ascribed to Blackstone, Blackstone's
Commentaries suggests that the sovereign had a constitutional obliga-
tion to redress aggrieved parties. 14 3 Blackstone acknowledged that
the King had a constitutional duty to right wrongs and, further, that
141. Blackstone's work was widely available in the colonies and served as one of the
primary resources for American lawyers during the founding period. Julius S.
Waterman, Thomas Jefferson and Blackstone's Commentaries, in ESSAYS IN THE
HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW 451-57 (David H. Flaherty ed., 1969); FORREST
McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM (1985).
142. For example, James Wilson's opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793),
criticizes Blackstone's views on sovereign immunity, notes that the English King
could in fact be sued, and recognizing that "the difference is only in the form, not
the thing." Id. at 460. The comments of George Nicholas in the Virginia ratifica-
tion debates also supports this view of the general knowledge of educated mem-
bers of the founding generation. In comparing the English system with that
under the Constitution, Nicholas observed:
In England, in all disputes between the King and people, recurrence is
had to the enumerated rights of the people, to determine. Are the rights
in dispute secured? Are they included in the Magna Charta, Bill of
Rights, &c.? If not, they are, generally speaking, within the King's pre-
rogative. In disputes between Congress and the people, the reverse of
the proposition holds. Is the disputed right enumerated? If not, Con-
gress cannot meddle with it.
Which is the most safe? The people of America know what they have
relinquished for certain purposes. They also know that they retain every
thing else, and have a right to resume what they have given up, if it be
perverted from its intended object. The King's prerogative is general,
with certain exceptions. The people are, therefore, less secure than we
are.
3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 246. The premise of these statements is
that the English people had specified rights against the Crown, and that the Con-
stitution provided greater protections.
143. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 139, at 255. Later revisions of Blackstone's Com-
mentaries attempted to undo the confusion created by Blackstone's discussion of
the necessity of royal consent. Warren, in his update of the work, refined Black-
stone's statement that persons privately injured by the Crown could petition for
relief as a matter of the King's grace with the following additional sentence: "The
prayer of this petition, which is really in the nature of an action against the sov-
ereign for the recovery of debts, chattels real, or personal, and unliquidated dam-
ages, is grantable ex debitojustitiae [as a matter of right, as opposed to ex gratia,
as a matter of grace]." SAMUEL WARREN, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, SYSTEM-
ATICALLY ABRIDGED AND ADAPTED TO THE ExISTING STATE OF THE LAW AND CONSTI-
TUTION WITH GREAT ADDITIONS (1855).
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the King must and always did so: "[A]s it [the law] presumes that to
know of any injury and to redress it are inseparable in the royal
breast, it then issues as of course in the king's own name, his orders to
his judges to do justice to the party aggrieved."144 At another point in
Blackstone's Commentaries, he states: "the prerogative of the crown
extends not to do any injury; for being created for the benefit of the
people, it cannot be exerted to their prejudice." 14 5
These suggestions are borne out in the English case law. Case law
from at least a generation before publication of Blackstone's Commen-
taries demonstrates that actions were prosecuted against the King
without his consent. 146
Finally, able scholarly analyses demonstrate that sovereign immu-
nity in Blackstone's time was a matter of pleading practice rather
than a true bar. The sovereign could be sued by various devices, with-
out the necessity of consent. 147
144. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 139, at 255.
145. 3 id.
146. The Case of the Bankers in the Court of Exchequer, 1700, 2 W. & M., 12 Will. 3,
reprinted in THOMAS BAYLY HOWELL, 14 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRI-
ALS 1-114 (1812) (demonstrating that actions lay against the King without his
consent). In such a case, creditors of the Crown sued to enforce payment of royal
annuities. The House of Lords ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs had pro-
ceeded properly by seeking a remedy in the Court of Exchequer. Lord Chief Jus-
tice Holt found that the plaintiffs had proceeded by monstrans de droit, which did
not require the King's prior consent, and observed that it was unnecessary to
obtain the King's consent even where the plaintiff proceeded by petition of right:
"It is objected, that the petition should be first sued to the king: but by the records
in Ryly's Placita Parl. 351, 257, Staundf. 72, it appears, that these petitions of
right have been sued to the court of the King's-bench." Id. at 34. All of the jus-
tices agreed that a deprivation of right requires a remedy: "We are all agreed that
they [the King's creditors] have a right; and if so, then they must have some
remedy to come at it too." Id. at 34. Lord Somers argued that the only appropri-
ate remedy was a petition of right addressed to the King, and offered justifica-
tions similar to those proffered by modern courts in this country: control of the
government's resources was a public policy decision properly left to political
rather than judicial control. See id. at 103, 105. Lord Somers acknowledged,
however, that not all petitions required the King's consent. Id. at 83-84. Lord
Somers's argument prevailed in the Exchequer Chamber, but was rejected by the
House of Lords. See id. at 111. Justice Iredell, in his opinion in Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 429 (1793), relied heavily on Lord Somer's argu-
ments, quoting him extensively. Id. at 437-39. See infra text accompanying
notes 405-09.
147. The devices included the Petition of Right, which originally required the Crown's
consent, but was routinely issued by the court without actual consent of the King
well before Blackstone's time. For descriptions of the Petition of Right, see
Ludwik Erhlich, Proceedings Against the Crown (1216-1377), in 6 OXFORD STUD-
IES IN SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY (Paul Vinogradoff ed., Octagon Books 1974)
(1921), and WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (A.L. Goodhart &
H.G. Hanburg eds., 7th ed. 1956). Such petitions became available during the
reign of Edward I in the thirteenth century and permitted a disposition of a dis-
pute against the King in the court of Exchequer, Chancery, or King's Bench.
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Thus, in England, what our system has termed "sovereign immu-
nity" did not bar relief against the Crown, but specified how such re-
lief could be obtained, channeling actions against the sovereign
through a system of mandatory writs which existed alongside other
forms of action. Nonetheless, the idea that a sovereign could be sued
only with consent was repeated by Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall,
as well as some early judicial decisions, without the important qualifi-
cation that the King was constitutionally required to consent if sover-
eign wrongdoing had occurred. This led ultimately to the now firmly
entrenched American belief that neither the federal government nor
the individual states may be sued in federal court without consent, as
a matter of constitutional law.
C. The Intent of the Founding Generation: Ratification as
Consent
For the remainder of the argument, this Article assumes that
Blackstone's formulation, that a sovereign may not be sued without
consent, was accepted by many of the founding generation as part of
English common law. However, as this Article demonstrates, the
Founders understood ratification of the Constitution to provide that
consent.148 Through ratification, the states consented to various cate-
gories of suit against them as enumerated in the Constitution: cases
involving federal law and cases in which the parties were a state and
another state, a state and a diverse citizen, or a state and a foreign
state, citizen, or subject. 149 Similarly, the states collectively con-
sented to suit against themselves as the United States in cases in
which the United States was a party and in cases involving federal
Monstrans de droit and traverse were common law methods of obtaining posses-
sion or restitution of real or personal property from the Crown, which did not
require consent. These methods had never required the King's consent, having
been created by Parliament in the fourteenth century specifically to provide relief
against the Crown without the need for consent. For detailed histories of the
system of writs, see, e.g., Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34
YALE L.J. 1 (1924); Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sover-
eign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2-19 (1963); Roger C. Cramton, Nonstatutory
Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Need for Statutory Reform of Sover-
eign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68 MICH. L.
REV. 387 (1970); and David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive
Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1972). James E. Pfander's schol-
arly and exhaustive treatment of these issues deserves separate mention: James
E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: Toward a First
Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 Nw. U.
L. REV. 899, 906-26 (1997).
148. This conclusion follows naturally from the evidence above. If the Founders recog-
nized that sovereign immunity was a matter of pleading practice rather than a
jurisdictional bar, see supra note 147 and accompanying text, the conclusion fol-
lows even more easily.
149. Consent was revoked in these latter two categories by the Eleventh Amendment.
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law. The constitutional extension of the national judicial power to
such cases limited the sovereign power of the United States from its
very inception by the document that created it. These conclusions are
well-supported by the language of the Constitution and the early his-
tory of the United States, in particular the reasons for the Constitu-
tional Convention; the structure of government chosen by the
Convention; the articulated purposes of various Article III extensions
of judicial power; the understandings of the Framers and ratifiers and
individuals who participated in the public debate as evidenced by the
Convention; the state ratifying conventions and ratification docu-
ments; writings in the popular press; and early decisional law which
equated ratification with consent, most notably Chisholm v. Geor-
gia,150 decided just six years after the drafting of the Constitution by
Justices who were themselves Framers and ratifiers, 15 1 and Cohens v.
Virginia,15 2 interpreting the Eleventh Amendment as providing only
a limited immunity to states. 15 3
The Supreme Court's conclusion that the Constitution affords im-
munity to the states relies heavily on what it perceives to be the intent
150. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
151. Justice John Blair of Virginia, who was present at the Constitutional Convention
and signed the Constitution, 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 125; Justice
James Wilson of Pennsylvania, who was present at the Constitutional Conven-
tion, drafted a version of the Constitution as a member of the Committee of De-
tail, 1 BAILYN'S DEBATES, supra note 40, app. at 1086, signed the Constitution, 1
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 125, and was also present at the Penn-
sylvania ratification convention and voted for ratification, 2 id. at 415-529; Chief
Justice John Jay of New York, who was present at the New York ratification
convention, 2 id. at 206, and voted for ratification, 2 id. at 412; and Justice Wil-
liam Cushing, the Vice-President of the Massachusetts ratification convention, 2
id. at 2, who voted for ratification, 2 id. at 180. The lone dissenter was Justice
James Iredell, who was present at the North Carolina ratification convention and
voted for ratification, 4 id. at 250. The lawyer who argued on behalf of Chisholm
that Georgia was subject to suit was Edmund Randolph, then Attorney General
of the United States, and also a Framer and ratifier. Randolph, a member of the
Virginia delegation, presented the proposal which was the basis for discussion in
the Convention, but did not sign the Constitution. 1 id. at 125. Randolph voted
for ratification despite various objections to the Constitution. 3 id. at 652.
152. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
153. The early case law holding that ratification constituted consent is discussed be-
low. It is useful to note, however, that the view of ratification as consent has
persisted well into the twentieth century. For example, in Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas, 491 U.S. 1 (1989), the Court held:
[T]o the extent that the States gave Congress the authority to regulate
commerce, they also relinquished their immunity where Congress found
it necessary, in exercising this authority, to render them liable. The
States held liable under such a congressional enactment are thus not
"unconsenting"; they gave their consent all at once, in ratifying the Con-





of Framers and ratifiers, as expressed by Hamilton in The Federalist
No. 81 and Madison and Marshall in the Virginia ratification debates.
This Article offers a different view of that collective intent. Although
there is no direct evidence of the Framers' intent in the debates of the
Convention, several sources provide substantial evidence that the
Framers and ratifiers read the Constitution as subjecting the states,
and by logical extension, the federal government, to the power of the
federal courts. Most notably, the language of the Constitution, the
ratification debates and documents, and debate in the press during
the period of ratification, demonstrate that the Founders, Federalists
and Antifederalists alike, understood the Constitution to extend the
national judicial power to the states and the federal government by
implication.
With respect to the Framers, the most reliable indicator of collec-
tive intent is the language of the Constitution itself, which subjects
government entities to the judicial power.15 4 Further, inferences of
the collective intent may be drawn from the structure of the govern-
ment set forth by the Constitution, which contemplates independent
co-equal branches with the power to check each other. Discussion in
the Convention of the necessity of a judiciary, the division of power to
prevent abuse, and the need for uniformity of law, demonstrates that
the government created by the Framers requires susceptibility of the
states, and the federal government as well, to the national judicial
power. The Framers viewed as necessary a federal judiciary with
powers coequal to those of the political branches to provide a check on
those branches (horizontal separation of powers) and with power to
act on the states to ensure uniformity of law (vertical separation of
powers).
Collective intent may also be discerned through examination of the
statements of individual Framers and ratifiers, as well as others who
participated in the public debate. Additionally, the state ratification
process provides important information. The understanding of those
whose actions put the Constitution in place, as much as the intentions
of those who drafted it, is crucial to discerning the meaning of Article
III, Section 2 and its relation to common law sovereign immunity. De-
bate in the various state ratification proceedings and in the popular
press, including The Federalist, indicate clearly that those who rati-
fied the Constitution, as well as those who refused to vote for ratifica-
tion, understood it to extend the judicial power of the United States to
the states through their consent.
154. See infra subsection III.C.2.
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1. The Structure of the Federal Government and the Necessity of
a Powerful Judiciary
The Constitution sets out three branches of government, in three
initial articles: Article I, the legislative; Article II, the executive; and
Article III, the judiciary. The Framers enumerated the powers of each
branch and provided for checks by the various branches on the power
of the others because they were greatly concerned about possible
abuses of power. Although a number of delegates argued against any
national courts other than the Supreme Court, 15 5 the delegates were
in agreement that a national judiciary, with powers equivalent to the
legislative power, was necessary for a properly functioning
government.
The Framers had two existing models for the structure of the new
government-in the Confederation and in many of the states-both of
which they chose to avoid. The Confederation lacked power over the
states. The difficulties with that political structure led the Framers to
adopt a system in which the vertical allocation of powers permitted
the federal judiciary to oversee state conformance to federal law. In
many of the states, the legislature was supreme. The example of
these states demonstrated the need for a horizontal allocation of
power in which the judiciary was a coequal branch, not subservient to
the legislature.
The Confederation had no judiciary. Rather than a permanent na-
tional court, the Articles of Confederation established a method for
case-by-case resolution of disputes involving the states; state courts
handled all other matters. 15 6 This aspect of the Confederacy had en-
gendered significant problems, and it was clear from the earliest dis-
cussions about a new government that a national judiciary was
essential. In a letter to Edmund Randolph, written in April 1787,
prior to the beginning of the Convention, James Madison addressed
the need for a national judiciary:
Let this national supremacy be extended also to the judiciary department. If
the judges in the last resort depend in the states, and are bound by their oaths
to them and not to the union, the intention of the law and the interests of the
nation may be defeated by the obsequiousness of the tribunals to the policy or
prejudices of the states. 15 7
Commenting more specifically on the defects of the Confederation,
Hamilton observed in The Federalist No. 22:
A circumstance which crowns the defects of the Confederation remains yet to
be mentioned-the want of a judiciary power. Laws are a dead letter without
courts to expound and define their true meaning and operation. The treaties
of the United States, to have any force at all, must be considered as part of the
155. See supra text accompanying note 85 for references to the compromise which per-
mitted Congress discretion to authorize inferior federal courts.
156. See supra text accompanying note 77.
157. 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 108.
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law of the land. Their true import, as far as respects individuals, must, like
all other laws, be ascertained by judicial determinations. 158
Madison's comments in The Federalist No. 10 also decried the
mingling of power, which characterized the Confederation:
Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous cit-
izens .... that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties,
and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice
and the rights of the minority party, but by the superior force of an interested
and overbearing majority.
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest
would certainly bias his judgment, and not improbably, corrupt his integrity.
With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges
and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of
legislation but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the
rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens?
And what are the different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to
the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts?
It is a question to which creditors are parties on one side and the debtors on
the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties
are, and must be, themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or in
other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail. 1 5 9
Edmund Randolph also noted this defect in the Articles of Confedera-
tion in a speech in the Virginia ratification debate: "I cannot conceive
how they could have formed a system that provided no means of en-
forcing the powers which were nominally given it. Was it not a politi-
cal farce to pretend to vest powers, without accompanying them with
the means of putting them in execution?"160
Concerns about vertical divisions of power clearly informed the
Framers' decisions about the judiciary. One of the issues which moti-
vated the Convention was the Confederation's inability to enforce the
Treaty of 1783 against the recalcitrant states. The treaty provided
that "creditors on either side, shall meet with no lawful impediment to
the recovery of the full value in sterling money, of all bona fide debts
heretofore contracted."161 Many states had passed laws which vio-
lated the treaty, making Continental or state bills of credit legal
tender, but there were no national courts to enforce provisions of the
peace agreement. The national judicial power was consequently seen
as critically important to the proposed government. James Wilson's
argument for the national government in the Pennsylvania ratifica-
tion debates focused on such problems: "[wie could not, in some in-
stances, perform our treaties, on our part; and, in other instances, we
158. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 150 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
159. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77, 79-80 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
160. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 26.
161. Treaty of 1783, article IV, 8 Stat. 58.
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could neither obtain nor compel the performance of them, on the part
of others."16 2 Similarly, William Davie, in the North Carolina ratifica-
tion debate, recognized:
The people of the United States have one common interest; they are all mem-
bers of the same community and ought to have justice administered to them
equally in every part of the continent, in the same manner, with the same
despatch, and on the same principles. It is therefore absolutely necessary that
the judiciary of the Union should have jurisdiction in all cases arising in law
and equity under the Constitution.
1 6 3
Thus, the Framers recognized as necessary a system in which the
national government had the ability to enforce its laws. It was essen-
tial to the union that the national judiciary had the power to compel
the states to conform to the laws of the United States.16 4 It is impossi-
ble to reconcile this essential objective of the new government with an
unexpressed intention that the power of the national judiciary would
be limited by sovereign immunity. Such an implicit limitation would
simply replicate the central defects of the Confederation and it was
clear that the Framers set out to accomplish much more. The need for
federal oversight of state law was recognized at the Convention; al-
though the Convention rejected a national legislative veto over state
law,165 the Framers recognized that power resided in the national ju-
diciary to enforce federal law against the states.16 6 State immunity in
the federal courts is inconsistent with the structure of the government
devised by the Framers.
The example of the states also helped define the Framers' vision of
the federal judiciary's function within the federal government. In
many of the states, the legislature was supreme. The Framers instead
provided the national judiciary with independent power (including
tenure and specified compensation) as well as power to check the polit-
ical branches of the federal government. A judiciary empowered to
review congressional action and to enforce the law against the politi-
cal branches was essential to the horizontal separation of powers envi-
sioned by the Framers. If the legislative or executive branches have
the power to act, the judiciary must have the power to review such
action for conformance to law. Federalists and Antifederalists alike
believed that the judicial and legislative powers should be coextensive.
One of the most vocal Antifederalists, Patrick Henry, in discussing the
Virginia judiciary in the Virginia ratification debates, stated:
162. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 431. Wilson discussed the subject at
greater length, noting that many of the states had violated the Treaty of 1783.
163. 4 id. at 157-58.
164. The argument that the federal executive could enforce federal law against the
states by bringing a lawsuit against a state does not meet this objection. See
supra text accompanying note 116.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 106-14.
166. Id.
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[O]ur judges opposed the acts of the legislature. . . . They had fortitude to
declare that they were the judiciary, and would oppose unconstitutional
acts.... I take it as the highest encomium on this country [meaning Virginia],
that the acts of the legislature, if unconstitutional, are liable to be opposed by
the judiciary. 1 6 7
George Nicholas, in responding to Patrick Henry, stated,
[Who is to determine the extent of such [legislative] powers? I say, the same
power which, in all well-regulated communities, determines the extent of leg-
islative powers. If they exceed these powers, the judiciary will declare it void,
or else the people will have a right to declare it void. 1 6 8
Other examples of this basic premise include Edmund Pendleton's
view, expressed in the Virginia ratification debates and William Da-
vie's, in the North Carolina debates. According to Pendelton:
I have mentioned the necessity of making a judiciary an essential part of the
government. It is necessary, in order to arrest the executive arm, prevent ar-
bitrary punishments, and give a fair trial, that the innocent may be guarded,
and the guilty brought to just punishment, and that honesty and industry be
protected, and injustice and fraud be prevented. Taking it for granted, then,
that a judiciary is necessary, the power of that judiciary must be coextensive
with the legislative power, and reach to all parts society intended to be
governed. 169
Davie similarly stated:
[I] f there were any political axiom under the sun, it must, be that the judicial
power ought to be coextensive with the legislative. The federal government
ought to possess the means of carrying the laws into execution .... If laws are
not to be carried into execution by the interposition of the judiciary, how is it
to be done? 17 0
Thus, both Federalists and Antifederalists believed that the judici-
ary was essential to monitor and ensure the appropriate vertical allo-
cation of power between the states and the federal government. The
federal judiciary was also necessary to provide a horizontal check on
the powers of the federal legislative and executive branches. Sover-
eign immunity of the federal and state governments is inconsistent
with this structural premise.
At the outset of the Convention, the Randolph Plan, introduced by
the Virginia delegation and credited primarily to Madison, proposed
that the national legislature have authority to override state law. The
sixth resolution provided:
6. Resolved .... that the national legislature ought to be empowered . .. to
negative all laws passed by the several states, contravening, in the opinion of
the national legislature, the articles of union, or any treaty subsisting under
the authority of the Union. 1 7 1
167. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 325.
168. 3 id. at 443.
169. 3 id. at 517.
170. 4 id. at 158.
171. 1 id. at 144.
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The Convention agreed to this resolution on May 31, 1787.172 On
June 8, Pinckney moved and was seconded by Madison to strike this
resolution and replace it with, "[t]o negative all laws which to them
shall appear improper."17 3 This revision was rejected, seven to three,
with Delaware divided. 174 On July 17, the Convention again consid-
ered the sixth resolution, and this time rejected it.175 The judiciary,
then, was left with the ability to enforce federal law against the states
and to invalidate contradictory state laws. In Madison's view, this
was not an optimal solution, being less direct and less effective than a
legislative veto. 17 6 Hamilton's comments in The Federalist No. 22,
however, indicate that the national judiciary would have the power to
ensure uniformity of law where necessary among the states:
The treaties of the United States, to have any force at all, must be considered
as part of the law of the land. Their true import, as far as respects individu-
als, must, like all other laws, be ascertained by judicial determinations. To
produce uniformity in these determinations, they ought to be submitted, in
the last resort, to one SUPREME TRIBUNAL. And this tribunal ought to be
instituted under the same authority which forms the treaties themselves.
These ingredients are indispensable. If there is in each State a court of final
jurisdiction, there may be as many different final determinations on the same
point as there are courts.... To avoid the confusion which would unavoidably
result from the contradictory decisions of a number of independent judicato-
ries, all nations have found it necessary to establish one court paramount to
the rest, possessing a general superintendence and authorized to settle and
declare in the last resort a uniform rule of civil justice. 177
Thus, the modern Supreme Court's view, that the states cannot be
bound by the laws of the United States, except in suits brought by the
United States or with their consent, and (implicitly) that the federal
government cannot be sued except with consent, simply ignores much
of the historical record and the constitutional structure adopted by the
Framers.
172. 1 id. at 153.
173. 1 id. at 166.
174. 1 id. Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia voted in favor; Connecticut,
New York, New Jersey, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia
voted against.
175. 1 id. at 207. Massachusetts, Virginia, and North Carolina voted for the resolu-
tion; Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, South Caro-
lina and Georgia voted against. 1 id.
176. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (April 16, 1787) in SAUL K.
PADOVER, THE COMPLETE MADISON: His BAsIc WRITINGS 185 (1953); see also Let-
ter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (October 24, 1787), in 1 BAILYN's
DEBATES, supra note 40, at 195-99.




2. The Constitutional Language
The most important source of information concerning the meaning
of the Constitution and the intent of Framers and ratifiers must be
the language of the Constitution itself, and the language of the Consti-
tution is clear on this point. The language of the Constitution as origi-
nally ratified afforded no immunity from suit to the United States or
any state individually. To the contrary, Article III, Section 2 specifi-
cally provided that the jurisdiction of the national courts extends to
cases against the United States and against individual states:
The judicial Power shall extend . . . to Controversies to which the United
States shall be a party;-to Controversies between two or more
States;-between a State and Citizens of another State ... and between a State
... and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 1 78
This language is clear on its face.179
The prevailing reading of the Constitution as being subject to im-
plicit sovereign immunities has given rise to an extensive body of law
designed to determine whether a government entity has in fact con-
sented to suit. Notably, Article III, Section 2 constitutes consent to
suit under the "clear statement" rule adopted by the Supreme Court.
The long-standing rule is that a purported waiver of immunity must
be strictly construed and can occur only through a "clear statement" of
178. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The Eleventh Amendment changed the states' suscepti-
bility to suit in federal court, providing that the states may not be sued by citi-
zens of another state or by citizens or subjects of a foreign state. Importantly, the
Eleventh Amendment did not address judicial power over the United States or
over cases arising under federal law. The Supreme Court has read the Eleventh
Amendment as a broad statement of sovereign immunity; this Article accepts the
views of the many critics of this interpretation, and argues that the Supreme
Court's expansive reading is incorrect. See supra note 4.
179. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 81, n.6 (1996) (Stevens, J. dissent-
ing) (observing, based on the language of Article III and the decision of the jus-
tices in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 429 (1793), that the view that
the Supreme Court had a constitutional obligation to take jurisdiction of suits
against states was "not implausible"). In Seminole Tribe, Justice Stevens also
posed the question, "[W]hy a general grant ofjurisdiction to federal courts should
not be treated as an adequate expression of the sovereign's consent to suits
against itself?" Id. at 97 (quoting John Paul Stevens, Is Justice Irrelevant?, 87
Nw. U. L. REV. 1121, 1126 (1993)). John J. Gibbons, in The Eleventh Amendment
and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889
(1983), also states:
Certainly from a textual standpoint, the suggestion that the states wereimmune from suit in federal court seems preposterous on its face in light
of the express provision in article III of the Constitution for federal juris-
diction "extending to all Cases" arising under the Constitution or federal
statutes and treaties.




the government's intention.l8 0 If Article III is subjected to the clear
statement rule, it passes. Congress has used language very similar to
that in Article III to waive the United States' immunity in the Tucker
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1), and the United States Supreme Court has
upheld that waiver under the clear statement rule.' 8 1 The text of 28
U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the United
States Court of Federal Claims, of:
(1) Any civil action against the United States for the ... recovery of... any
penalty claimed to have been collected without ... authority or any sum al-
leged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the
internal-revenue laws.
1 8 2
Although this provision is obviously narrower than the various gov-
ernment-party extensions of judicial power in Article 111,183 it differs
from Article III only in that specific respect.l8 4 Both provisions sim-
ply extend judicial power to federal courts over cases against specified
government entities. The language of neither provision explicitly pre-
cludes a retained sovereign immunity. If congressional enactment of
180. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187 (1996); Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 673
(1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting); United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527 (1995);
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238-40 (1985).
181. According to the majority in Williams, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) waives the govern-
ment's sovereign immunity from suit by authorizing federal courts to adjudicate
"[a]ny civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-reve-
nue tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected." 514
U.S. at 529. The dissenters did not question the general conclusion that
§ 1346(a)(1) was a waiver of sovereign immunity, focusing instead on standing
issues (the respondent Williams paid taxes owed by her ex-husband in order to
remove a federal tax lien from her property). 514 U.S. at 545-46 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting). See M. Carr Ferguson, Jurisdictional Problems in Federal Tax Con-
troversies, 48 IowA L. REV. 312, 327 (1963). For the history of the provision, see
H.R. REP. No. 83-659, at 3 (1953), H.R. CONF. REP. No. 83-2276, at 2 (1954).
182. 28 U.S.C. §1346(a)(1) (2002).
183. Affording "jurisdiction" rather than "extend[ing] judicial power" and addressing a
particular type of action against the United States, rather than to more generally
specified actions, such as those involving federal law, or more broadly specified
party actions, such as those "to which the United States shall be a Party," U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, exemplifies the restricted nature of this provision.
184. Other jurisdictional provisions which satisfy the clear-statement rule are some-
what more explicit in subjecting the United States to suit. Unlike Article III,
Section 2 and § 1346(a)(1), it is impossible to read these provisions as subject to
implicit immunities. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2002) (stating the Court of
Claims "shall have jurisdiction to render judgment" in any claim against the
United States); 28 U.S.C. § 2410 (2002) (stating the United States may be named
a party in specified actions involving real property); 43 U.S.C. § 666 (2002) (stat-
ing that "consent is given to join the United States as a defendant" in suits in-
volving the adjudication of water rights). Similarly, the Federal Tort Claims Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2002), provides that the "The United States shall be liable" for
torts in the same way that individuals are, in addition to the jurisdictional provi-
sion in 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2002). See also Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 702 (2002); Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § § 1346(f), 2409(a) (2002).
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this language, standing alone, constitutes consent to suit against the
United States, it is extremely difficult to argue that ratification of the
Constitution, extending "judicial power" to enumerated cases in which
the United States or a state is a party and "original jurisdiction" to
state-party cases, does not. The first cannot constitute a clear and un-
equivocal waiver of immunity, while the second is subject to an unex-
pressed but understood immunity. The irony here is apparent. The
Supreme Court reads the constitutional provision granting judicial
power as requiring congressional implementation through clear con-
sent to suit; however, the constitutional provision itself, enacted by
the states as part of the nation's founding document, satisfies the
Court's test but has been itself held insufficient to constitute consent.
As Justice Stevens has remarked, "[t]he majority's affection for plain
language seems to end where its devotion to sovereign immunity
begins."185
Other aspects of Article III, Section 2, indicate that it encompasses
the consent of the states to suit against themselves individually and
collectively as the new United States. Article III speaks of "judicial
power" in the first paragraph, enumerating the categories of cases to
which that power extends, but uses the term "jurisdiction" in the sec-
ond paragraph, which specifies that the Supreme Court will have orig-
inal jurisdiction over some of those categories. While an earlier
version of the provision used the term "jurisdiction" in both places,
Madison and Morris moved to change the term to "judicial power,"
which was passed unanimously.S6
The term "judicial power" is a broad and encompassing term,
broader than simple "jurisdiction." The term "jurisdiction" suggests
procedural concerns, and may more easily encompass underlying limi-
tations such as sovereign immunity. In contrast, the term "judicial
power" suggests that Article III extends to the national judiciary a
fundamental governmental authority not subject to unexpressed and
extraconstitutional common law limitations. This "judicial power" ex-
tends to all cases involving the United States and to specified cases
involving the states.
What sort of power can be exercised only if its objects permit? If
the judicial power over states and the United States extended by Arti-
cle III is subject to the constraints of sovereign immunity, it is no
power at all.18 7 If it has any meaning at all, the language of Article III
demonstrates at a minimum that suits against the government were
contemplated by the Framers; there is no mention of immunity from
suit for the United States or the states. Fairly read, Article III does
185. United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 621 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
186. See MADISON, supra note 72, at 539.
187. See supra subsection III.C.1., which demonstrates that the purposes of Article III
are inconsistent with an implicit sovereign immunity.
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not simply give federal courts jurisdiction in instances where the
United States or a state consents to be sued; it authorizes actions
against states and the United States as a fundamental constitutional
principle and empowers the national judiciary to decide those actions.
Other portions of the Constitution provide additional indirect sup-
port for the interpretation that ratification of the Constitution entails
rejection of common law doctrines of sovereign immunity. First, al-
though immunity is not mentioned in connection with suits against
the United States, the states, or for cases involving federal law, it is
explicitly afforded in the Constitution in other instances. Article I,
Section 6, protects Senators and Representatives from arrest except
for treason, felony, or breach of peace when Congress is in session and
provides immunity for speech and debate in the Congress.18 8 Second,
several provisions of the Constitution make it clear that the new
United States rejected other privileges associated with a monarchy. 8 9
It would be reasonable to conclude that the broad language of Article
III, and the representative government contemplated by the Constitu-
tion, constitutes a rejection of the monarch's privilege to avoid suit
without consent. Third, the guarantee in Article VI that the contrac-
tual obligations of the United States were to be "as valid against the
United States under this Constitution, as under the Confedera-
tion,"19 0 articulates an intention to honor contractual obligations
188. Article I, Section 6 provides:
The Senators and Representatives ... shall in all Cases, except Treason,
Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their
Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and
returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House,
they shall not be questioned in any other Place.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
189. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 6, 10; art. II, § 1. Several provisions convey this rejection
clearly. Article I, Section 9, Clause 8 provides: "No Title of Nobility shall be
granted by the United States." Article I, Section 10, Clause 1 similarly restricts
the States: "No State shall ... grant any Title of Nobility." Article II, Section 1,
Clause 6 limits the President's receipt of "emoluments" from the states: "The
President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which
shall neither be increased nor diminished during that Period for which he shall
have been elected, and he shall not receive within the Period any other Emolu-
ment from the United States, or any of them." The debates of the Federal Con-
vention also make this point clear: Benjamin Franklin discusses his
"apprehension" that the government of the States may "end in a Monarchy" and
describes this possibility as "Catastrophe." See MADISON, supra note 72, at 53.
John Dickenson, although noting the merits of limited monarchy, stated: "A lim-
ited Monarchy however was out of the question. The spirit of the times-the state
of our affairs, forbade the experiment, if it were desireable." Id. at 56-57. Ed-
mund Randolph noted that the "permanent temper of the people was adverse to
the very semblance of Monarchy," id. at 58, and argued against a single execu-
tive, regarding it "as the foetus of monarchy." Id. at 46.
190. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 1. It would be possible to argue that this provision means
that any immunities afforded the Confederation would inure to the United States
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which is inconsistent with a notion of broad implicit immunities under
Article III.
Article III should be interpreted in the context of the reasons for its
inclusion in the Constitution. Although the record is scant, the Fram-
ers' apparent reasons for extending the judicial power to cases involv-
ing a state and a citizen of another state was to prevent bias by the
state courts against other states or their citizens and to provide equaljustice.191 It is almost inconceivable that this concern for justice
would incorporate an unexpressed understanding that such actions
could occur only if a state, whose biased courts would not provide jus-
tice to a diverse citizen, consented case-by-case to jurisdiction in the
federal courts. There is no reason to suppose that a state legislature
or executive would be any less biased against diverse citizens in the
waiver of immunity than the state judiciary in hearing and deciding a
suit. It is unlikely that bias infected state judicial but not legislative
or executive branches, or that the Framers believed that it did. With
respect to cases arising under federal law, the Framers extended judi-
cial power to the federal courts to ensure necessary uniformity of the
federal laws.192 Again, it is inconceivable that the judicial power to
hear cases raising issues of federal law was subject to an unexpressed
understanding that the United States, or any state, could evade the
application of federal law and defeat the acknowledged necessity of
uniformity by simply refusing to appear in court.
An additional embarrassment which plagues the interpretation of
Article III as encompassing sovereign immunity is the assignment of
different meanings to various clauses in Article III, Section 2, despite
their similarities. If one inserts into the constitutional text the Su-
preme Court's interpretations relating to immunity, Article III, Sec-
tion 2 as originally ratified would read:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority excluding cases in which the United
States or a State is sued as a defendant- unless the United States or the State
consents, or in the case of a State, unless the United States sues a State;-to
all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction excluding cases in which the
United States or a State is sued as a defendant. unless the United States or
under the Constitution, but it seems a poor vehicle by which to convey that idea.
If the point had been to provide for immunity rather than to preserve existing
obligations, surely the clause would be more direct.
191. See infra subsection III.D.3. There was no debate in the Federal Convention over
this head of jurisdiction. The resolution of the Convention, adopted July 18,
1787, provided that the federal courts should have "jurisdiction ... to cases aris-
ing under laws passed by the general legislature, and to such other questions as
involve the national peace and harmony." 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at
210.
192. See infra subsection III.D.1.
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the State consents. or in the case of a State. unless the United States sues a
State;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party includin
cases where the United States sues a State. but excluding cases in which the
United States is sued as a defendant unless the United States consents;-to
Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of
another State excludina cases in which the State is sued as a defendant un-
less the State consents;-between Citizens of different States;-between Citi-
zens of the same State claiming Lands under the Grants of different States,
and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects excluding cases in which the State is sued as a defendant. unless the
State consents.
Considering only the states, it is universally agreed first, that the lan-
guage "The judicial Power shall extend . . . to Controversies between
two or more States" in fact constitutes consent of the states to suit,
19 3
but second, that the language "The judicial Power shall extend ... to
Controversies between a State and Citizens of another State" does
not. 194 This is a curious reading. Each of these clauses is part of the
same sentence; each follows the introductory phrase, "The judicial
Power shall extend ... to Controversies"; each is part of an enumera-
tion of cases or controversies. The common law of sovereign immunity
applied equally to both instances. According to Blackstone's account,
the sovereign answered to no one-neither subject nor foreign sover-
eign.195 If the sovereign consents to suit by ratifying the constitu-
tional language, "The judicial Power shall extend ... to Controversies
between two or more States," how is it possible that ratification of the
language in the next clause, "The judicial Power shall extend . . . to
Controversies ... between a State and citizens of another State," does
not constitute consent? It cannot be that the states surrendered their
immunity in suits between states because that was contemplated "in
193. South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904). In that case, the Court
ruled that its original jurisdiction over "controversies between two or more
states," extended to a suit by South Dakota as the donee of holders of bonds is-
sued by North Carolina, and secured by a mortgage of railroad stock owned by
North Carolina, to compel payment of the bonds and subjection of the mortgaged
property to satisfaction of the debt. Id. at 317-18. Justice White dissented, joined
by Chief Justice Fuller and Justices McKenna and Day, on the grounds that the
construing the Fifth Clause of Section 2 as permitting a state to sue another state
on bonds donated to it by a private citizen would circumvent the spirit of the
Eleventh Amendment prohibition on such suits by a citizen against a state. See
id. at 328 (White, J., dissenting); see also New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S.
76 (1883) (holding that one state could not create a controversy with another
state by assuming the prosecution of debts owed by the other state to its citizens,
in view of the Eleventh Amendment).
194. This latter clause, of course, has been changed by the Eleventh Amendment, but
the Supreme Court has insisted that the Eleventh Amendment did not change
the law; rather, it simply restored the original constitutional intention which had
been subverted by the majority in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419
(1793). See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 722-23 (1999). This Article dis-
agrees with the Supreme Court's interpretation. See infra Section III.G.
195. See supra Section III.B.
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the plan of the convention" (which is simply a synonym for "Constitu-
tion"196) while a surrender of immunity in other contexts was not.19 7
Nothing in the language of the Constitution or the debates of the Fed-
eral Convention and the state ratification conventions supports such a
conclusion. 198
It is similarly problematic to read the Fourth Clause of Section 2,
"The judicial Power shall extend . . .to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party" as a surrender of immunity by the
states in suits brought against them by the United States,199 but not
as a limitation on the immunity of the United States.200 The Supreme
Court has long recognized that the United States may bring a lawsuit
against a state without the state's consent. 2 0 1 As the Supreme Court
held in Monaco v. Mississippi:
196. The terms "Constitution" and "plan of the convention" appear to have been used
interchangeably by the founding generation. See, e.g., Madison's statement in
the Virginia ratification debates in discussing diversity jurisdiction: "There are
also many public debtors, who have escaped from justice for want of such a
method as is pointed out in the plan on the table." 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra
note 38, at 583. The latter phrase, "plan of the convention" has perhaps been
misused by some modern jurists following the example of Alexander Hamilton,
see infra text accompanying notes 341-44, to advance interpretations of the Con-
stitution which are contrary to its plain language.
197. Nothing in the language of the Constitution, the debates in the Federal Conven-
tion or the state ratification conventions, or other sources supports this divergent
reading of the similarly worded and constructed clauses of Article III. The
Court's decision in Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934), announces, but
does not support, the conclusion that the states' consent to suits involving two or
more states was inherent "in the plan of the convention" while consent to other
extensions of the judicial power was not. See id. at 323. Accordingly, the Court
denied Monaco's motion for leave to file suit against Mississippi. Id. at 332.
198. Although the Articles of Confederation provided that the Congress had power to
decide disputes between two or more states "concerning boundary, jurisdiction, or
any other cause whatever," 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 81, the Articles
generally offer no insight into the meaning of the Constitution on immunity is-
sues. The mechanism for resolution of disputes between states was complex and
could be invoked only case-by-case. The legislative or executive branch of a state
could petition Congress, which would meet with representatives of both states,
who would agree to appoint a judge to constitute a court for resolution of the
matter. If the disputing states could not agree, Congress would list three persons
from each, and the disputing states would take turns striking names to limit the
list to thirteen persons from which seven to nine would be drawn by lot to act as
judges. 1 id. at 82.
199. United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892) (discussing boundary dispute be-
tween U.S. Territory and Texas).
200. Kansas v. United States, 204 U.S. 331, 342 (1907) (concluding that "[i]t does not
follow that because a State may be sued by the United States without its consent,
therefore the United States may be sued by a State without its consent. Public
policy forbids that conclusion.").
201. See, e.g., Unites States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140 (1965) (finding that
"[t]he reading of the Constitution urged by Mississippi [that it could not be sued
without its consent] is not supported by precedent, is not required by any lan-
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Upon a similar basis rests the jurisdiction of this Court of a suit by the United
States against a State, albeit without the consent of the latter. While that
jurisdiction is not conferred by the Constitution in express words, it is inher-
ent in the constitutional plan. Without such a provision, as this court said in
United States v. Texas, supra, "the permanence of the Union might be
endangered."
2 0 2
Despite the Court's opinion in Monaco, it strains credulity to read the
Fourth and Fifth Clauses of Article III, Section 2, as surrendering im-
munity while the First, Sixth, and Ninth Clauses do not.
The last clause of Article III, Section 2 as originally ratified ex-
tends the judicial power of the United States to controversies "be-
tween a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or
Subjects." If all of the clauses are read consistently such that their
ratification constituted consent to suit, then the states consented in
this last clause to suit by foreign sovereigns in federal courts. This
provision was, of course, changed by Eleventh Amendment, which
reads in pertinent part: "The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States... by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State."20 3 Sovereign nations generally do not submit to
the jurisdiction of another nation's courts, and the original inclusion of
this power may lend legitimacy to the prevailing view that these juris-
dictional categories are generally subject to an unexpressed retention
of common law sovereign immunity. Madison spoke to this point in
the Virginia ratification debates, taking the position that the clause
was subject to sovereign immunity.
I do not conceive that any controversy can ever be decided, in these courts,
between an American state and a foreign state, without the consent of the
parties. If they consent, provision is here made. The disputes ought to be
tried by the national tribunal. This is consonant to the law of nations. Could
there be a more favorable or eligible provision to avoid controversies with for-
eign powers? Ought it to be put in the power of a member of the Union to drag
the whole community into war? As the national tribunal is to decide, justice
will be done. It appears to me, from this review, that though, on some of the
subjects of this jurisdiction, it may seldom or never operate, and though others
be of inferior consideration, yet they are mostly of great importance, and in-
dispensably necessary.
2 0 4
It may seem inconceivable that states would have consented to suit
against themselves in federal courts by any foreign nation or subjects
or citizens of foreign nations. It is possible-but obviously problem-
atic-to adopt the Supreme Court's approach and assume that the
guage of the Constitution, and would without justification in reason diminish the
power of courts to protect the people of this country against deprivation and de-
struction by States of their federally guaranteed rights. We hold that the State
was properly made a defendant in this case.").
202. 292 U.S. at 329.
203. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
204. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 533-34.
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Framers assigned different meanings to the same language in various
clauses of Article III. If the different clauses were intended to have
differing effects, it would have been an easy matter to so indicate. A
failure to do so cannot be viewed as the result of compromise and the
difficulties of drafting by committee, since the Committees of Detail
and of Style apparently had a fairly free hand with the drafting of thejudiciary article. 205 This clause, however, may deserve a different in-
terpretation than the others. The other categories contemplate recip-
rocal arrangements: the states gain the protection of the Union by
agreeing to be subject to the power of the national judiciary with re-
spect to federal laws; the United States is formed only if it is subject to
the power of the judiciary; the states agree reciprocally to submit to
suit by each other, each other's citizens, and the United States, and so
on. Retention of common law sovereign immunities is inconsistent
with these reciprocal arrangements. But the Constitution obviously
embodies no reciprocal agreements with respect to foreign nations,
and it may accordingly be reasonable to read this clause as subject to
the law of nations, which permitted a suit against a sovereign only
with its consent. 20 6 Consent requires reciprocity in this context. 207
205. See supra subsection III.A.4.
206. This analysis would also apply to suits against the United States by a foreign
sovereign, which would be encompassed in the extension of judicial power under
Article III "to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party." U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2.
207. The remaining approach is to take the Framers at their word and to view the pre-
Eleventh Amendment clause as affording foreign states and subjects rights to sue
the states in federal courts. In historical context, this reading may not be as
surprising as it appears to a modern generation inured in the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity. First, one important reason for the Constitutional Convention
was the necessity of centralized power over foreign relations and the defense of
the United States. Permitting the federal courts to determine controversies be-
tween states and foreign states or their subjects or citizens would promote the
peace and permit the national government, rather than individual states, to han-
dle issues which could potentially lead to armed conflict. See Chisholm v. Geor-
gia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 467-68 (1793) (opinion of Justice Cushing). Second, the
articulated reasons for diverse citizen/diverse state-citizen suits was the pre-
sumed bias of state courts in favor of their residents. See infra subsection III.D.3.
The founding generation would similarly have believed that the federal courts of
the United States would be predisposed in favor of the states against a foreign
state in any such action. Such suits perhaps also seemed fairly unlikely, given
the difficulties of communication and travel at the time, and the probable recog-
nition by foreign states and citizens of the bias factor just described. Finally, the
ability of foreign sovereigns to sue in federal court was limited in the original
clause to actions against the states, and did not include actions against the
United States, which may simply suggest that the position of the states in the




3. The Understandings Expressed in the Ratification Process
a. The State Ratification Debates
Apart from Madison and Marshall in the Virginia ratification de-
bates, the recorded comments of every other participant in the ratifi-
cation debates2O8--Federalist and Antifederalist alike-show that
they read the Constitution to extend the national judicial power to
cases brought against the states by diverse citizens. The most exten-
sive discussion in the ratification debates occurred in Virginia, where
Madison and Marshall argued that the exercise of power under the
State/Diverse Citizen Clause of Article III, Section 2, required the con-
sent of the state. Their arguments addressed the Antifederalist con-
cerns that the Constitution would permit British creditors to sue in
federal court for the payment of debts, and that holders of depreciated
obligations against the states would use the federal courts to force
payment by the states at face value. As Patrick Henry argued:
It sounds mighty prettily to gentlemen, to curse paper money and honestly
pay debts. But apply to the situation of America, and you will find there are
thousands and thousands of contracts, whereof equity forbids an exact literal
performance. Pass that government, and you will be bound hand and foot.
There was an immense quantity of depreciated Continental paper money in
circulation at the conclusion of the war. This money is in the hand of individ-
uals to this day. The holders of this money may call for the nominal value, if
this government be adopted. This state may be compelled to pay her propor-
tion of that currency, pound for pound. Pass this government, and you will be
carried to the federal court, (if I understand that paper right,) and you will be
compelled to pay shilling for shilling. I have doubt on the subject; at least, as
a public man, I ought to have doubts. A state may be sued in the federal court,
by the paper on your table. It appears to me, then, that the holder of the
paper money may require shilling for shilling.
2 0 9
Henry warned that the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto
laws would prevent the government from protecting the states against
such claims. 2 10 George Mason argued similarly that the judicial
power to enforce payments of debts, and the prohibition of ex post
208. A statement by Oliver Ellsworth in the Connecticut ratification debates suggests
that he may have shared the view articulated by Hamilton in The Federalist No.
81, and Madison and Marshall in the Virginia ratification debates. In discussing
the necessity of forcing the states to conform to national law, Ellsworth stated:
Hence we see how necessary for the Union is a coercive principle. No
man pretends the contrary: we all see and feel this necessity. The only
question is, Shall it be a coercion of law, or a coercion of arms? There is
no other possible alternative .... I am for coercion by law-that coercion
which acts only upon delinquent individuals. This Constitution does not
attempt to coerce sovereign bodies, states, in their political capacity.
2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 197. Ellsworth's meaning depends on what
he meant by the political capacity of the states. It is possible to subject a state to
suit without intruding on its political functions.
209. 3 id. at 318-19.
210. 3 id. at 473-75.
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facto laws, would entail the "destruction and annihilation of all the
citizens of the United States, to enrich a few."211
Mason raised other concerns: that debts already paid (in land
grants) would have to be paid again;212 that jurisdiction over the
states for the payment of state debts would impair the dignity of the
sovereign states;213 and that any judgment entered against a state
could not be enforced, concluding that "[a] power which cannot be exe-
cuted ought not to be granted."214 These comments indicate that the
Antifederalists in the Virginia convention believed that the Constitu-
tion subjected the states to suit in federal court.
Madison's attempts to reassure the opponents of ratification were
met with disbelief. Madison advanced an interpretation, later secon-
ded by Marshall,215 that the suits feared by the Antifederalists would
not materialize because the states enjoyed immunity under the
Constitution:
The only operation it can have, is that, if a state should wish to bring a suit
against a citizen, it must be brought before a federal court .... It appears to
me that this can have no operation but this-to give a citizen a right to be
heard in the federal courts; and if a state should condescend to be a party, this
court may take cognizance of it.216
Patrick Henry's response was cutting:
As to controversies between a state and the citizens of another state, his[Madison's] construction of it is to me perfectly incomprehensible .... [Hie
says that the state may be plaintiff only. If gentlemen pervert the most clear
expressions, and the usual meaning of the language of the people, there is an
end of all argument. What says the paper? That it shall have cognizance of
controversies between a state and citizens of another state, without discrimi-
nating between plaintiff and defendant. What says the honorable gentleman?
The contrary-that the state can only be plaintiff. When the state is debtor,
there is no reciprocity. It seems to me that gentlemen may put what construc-
tion they please on it.217
Another Antifederalist, Grayson, also rejected Madison's arguments
although with less vehemence: "My honorable friend, whom I much
respect, said that the consent of the parties must be previously ob-
tained .... [I]t is not so with our states. It is fixed in the Constitution
that they shall become parties."218
Notably, Madison and Marshall also failed to convince their fellow
Federalists. In response to Antifederalist concerns, Edmund Ran-
211. 3 id. at 479-80.
212. 3 id. at 526-27.
213. 3 id.
214. 3 Id.
215. 3 id. at 555-56.
216. 3 id. at 533.
217. 3 id. at 543.
218. 3 id. at 566-67.
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dolph agreed that a state could be sued in federal court by a citizen of
another state2 19 and argued that such suits furthered justice:
It is only to render valid and effective existing claims, and secure that justice,
ultimately, which is to be found in every regular government. It is said to be
disgraceful. What would be the disgrace? Would it not be that Virginia, after
eight states had adopted the government, none of which opposed the federal
jurisdiction in this case, rejected it on this account?... I ask the Convention of
the free people of Virginia if there can be honesty in rejecting the government
because justice is to be done by it? I beg the honorable gentleman to lay the
objection to his heart-let him consider it seriously and attentively. Are we to
say that we shall discard this government because it would make us all hon-
est? Is this to be the language of the select representatives of the free people
of Virginia?
2 20
Randolph's view is entitled to special deference. As a member of the
Committee of Detail, he drafted the Constitution presented to the
Committee of Detail, and ultimately to the Convention on August
6,221 which included jurisdiction over controversies between "a state
and citizens of another state." The drafter's interpretation, particu-
larly when it accords with that of the great majority of contemporane-
ous interpretations, should control.
The discussion in other states was not as extensive as Virginia's,
and only a few relevant comments have survived. In North Carolina,
Lenoir also raised the concern of state indebtedness and expressed his
understanding that the states were subject to suit by Article III:
This state has made a contract with its citizens. The public securities and
certificates I allude to. These may be negotiated to men who live in other
states. Should that be the case, these gentlemen will have demands against
this state on that account. The Constitution points out the mode of recovery;
it must be in the federal court only, because controversies between a state and
the citizens of another state are cognizable only in the federal courts.
22 2
b. The Popular Press
The debate in the newspapers and pamphlets of the day raised nu-
merous objections to the extensions of national judicial power in Arti-
cle III. Many commentators objected to the supposed deprivation of
the right to trial by jury2 23 and to the inconvenience of having cases
219. According to Randolph, "[Any doubt respecting the construction that a state may
be plaintiff, and not defendant, is taken away by the words where a state shall be
a party." 3 id. at 573.
220. 3 id. at 573-75.
221. James Wilson prepared a second draft of the Constitution for the Committee. His
view accords with Randolph's. See 2 id. at 491-93; see also discussion infra text
accompanying notes 318-19.
222. 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 205-06.
223. See THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing that the Constitu-
tion guarantees trial by jury in criminal cases and does not abolish it in civil
cases). The Massachusetts debates also contained similar statements, see 2 EL-
LIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 109-12 (Holmes, expressing concern about the
qualification, selection, and regulation ofjurors), as did North Carolina, see 4 id.
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tried in federal courts, which many assumed would be far distant from
their homes.224 The more general concern that the creation of a na-
tional government would ultimately eliminate state governments was
at 147, 170-72 (Iredell assuring convention that the right to trial by jury in civil
cases is left to discretion of Congress); 4 id. at 150-51 (Governor Johnson, same);
4 id. at 175-76 (Maclain, same); 4 id. at 144 (Spaight, same); 4 id. at 149-50(M'Dowall stating that the right to trial by jury in civil cases should be assured in
the Constitution); 4 id. at 155 (Spencer, same); 4 id. at 151 (Bloodworth, conclud-ing that the right to trial by jury is removed by the Constitution), and South
Carolina, see 4 id. at 295 (Barnwell, arguing that right to jury trial problematic in
cases in other states, where litigant has no neighbors, friends, or relations to sit
as jurors); 4 id. at 306-08 (Pinckney, expressing that the difficulty of specifying
the right to trial by jury in civil cases is left to Congress). Other publications also
expressed this notion. See The Impartial Examiner I, part 2, On the Diversity of
Interests and the Dangers of Standing Armies and a Supreme Court, VIRGINIA
INDEP. CHRON., Feb. 27, 1788, reprinted in 2 BAILYN'S DEBATES, supra note 40, at
254 (Constitution does not provide for civil jury trial); Brutus XIV, The Supreme
Court: The Danger of Appellate Jurisdiction, NEW YORK J., Feb. 28 and March 6,
1788, reprinted in 2 BAILYN's DEBATES, supra note 40, at 260 (Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction, as to law and fact, destroys right to jury trial); A Colum-bian Patriot [Mercy Otis Warren], Observations on the Constitution, The Gulph of
Despotism Set Open, Feb. 1788, reprinted in 2 BAILYN's DEBATES, supra note 40,
at 290 (noting abolition of trial by jury in civil cases). Various state ratification
debates included proposed amendments giving the federal court jurisdiction overdiversity cases where the amounts in controversy are satisfied and trial by jury in
such cases where either party requested it. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at323 (Massachusetts, proposed amendments VII and VIII); 1 id. at 326 (New
Hampshire proposed amendments VII and VIII); 1 id. at 328 (New York: "That
the trial by jury . . .ought to remain inviolate."); 1 id. at 334 (Rhode Island's
Declaration of Rights IX: "That no freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned, or
disseized of his freehold, liberties, privileges, or franchises, or outlawed, or exiled,
or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the
trial by jury"); Hugh Williamson, General Bankruptcy and Loff of Honor ...
Rejoice in the Prospect of Better Times, Speech at Edenton, North Carolina (Nov.
8, 1787), in DAILY ADVERTISER, Feb. 25-27, 1788, reprinted in 2 BAILYN'S DEBATES,
supra note 40, at 227-28 (explaining that diversity of civil practice prevented con-
stitutional extension of right to jury trial).
224. Letter from Richard Henry Lee to the Governor (Oct. 16, 1787), VIRGINIA GA-
ZETTE, Dec. 6, 1787, reprinted in 1 BAILYN'S DEBATES, supra note 40, 465 at 471(citing the "vexatious and oppressive callings of citizens from their own country
... to be tried in a far distant court, and as it may be without a jury"); Agrippa[James Winthrop] XII, Cherish the Old Confederation Like the Apple of Our Eye,
MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE, Jan. 11, 15, 18, 1788, reprinted in 1 BAILYN'S DEBATES,
supra note 40, at 767 ("This, right to try causes between a state and citizens of
another state, involves in it all criminal causes; and a man who has accidentally
transgressed the laws of another state, must be transported, with all his wit-
nesses, to a third state, to be tried. He must be ruined to prove his innocence.");
see Hugh Williamson, supra note 221, at 230 (addressing Agrippa's concern, not-
ing that "[t]he authors of this remark have not fully considered the question, else
they must have recollected that the poor of this country have little to do with
foreigners, or with the citizens of distant States. They do not consider that there
may be an Inferior Court in every State; nor have they recollected that the ap-peals being with such exceptions, and under such regulations as Congress shall
make, will never be permitted for trifling sums, or under trivial pretences, unless
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given voice in this debate as well. Many assumed that the national
courts would displace state judiciaries. 2 25 Commentators also ob-
jected specifically to the lack of immunity with regard to state war
debts. These objections clearly demonstrate the general understand-
ing that the states were in fact subject to suit by the terms of the
Constitution.
Examples of the view that ratification constituted the ratifying
states' consent to the power of the federal courts are numerous. Bru-
tus, 2 2 6 who published a number of articles in the New York Journal,
wrote a lengthy article entitled The Judicial Power: Can an Individ-
ual Sue a State?227 in which he concluded that the Constitution did in
fact permit an individual to sue a state, and argued extensively that
such jurisdiction should not be extended. Brutus argued that subject-
ing a state to the power of the federal courts was "humiliating" and
"degrading," and raised the familiar objection that suits against the
states for revolutionary war debts would cripple the states:
Every state in the Union is largely indebted to individuals. For the payment
of these debts they have given notes payable to the bearer. At least this is the
case in this state. Whenever a citizen of another state becomes possessed of
one of these notes, he may commence an action in the supreme court of the
general government; and I cannot see any way in which he can be prevented
from recovering .... And when the citizens of other states possess them, they
may bring suits against the state for them, and by this means, judgments and
executions may be obtained against the state for the whole amount of the
state debt .... The situation of the states will be deplorable. By this system,
they will surrender to the general government, all the means of raising
money, and at the same time, will subject themselves to suits at law, for the
recovery of the debts they have contracted in effecting the revolution .... If
the power of the judicial under this clause will extend to the cases above
stated, it will, if executed, produce the utmost confusion, and in its progress,
we suppose that the national Legislature shall be composed of knaves and
fools.").
225. The Impartial Examiner, supra note 223, at 254 ("The supreme court is another
branch of federal authority, which wears the aspect of imperial jurisdiction, clad
in dread array, and spreading its wide domain into all parts of the continent.
This is to be co-extensive with the legislature, and, like that, is to swallow up all
other courts of judicature."); Brutus XV, The Supreme Court: 'No Power Above
Them that Can Controul Their Decisions, or Correct Their Errors, NEW YORK
JOURNAL, March 20, 1788, reprinted in 2 BAILYN'S DEBATES, supra note 40, at 372,
376-77 ('Perhaps nothing could have been better conceived to facilitate the aboli-
tion of the state governments than the constitution of the judicial. They will be
able to extend the limits of the general government gradually, and by insensible
degrees, and to accommodate themselves to the temper of the people.").
226. Brutus is believed to have been Robert Yates, one of New York's delegates to the
Convention and a leading Antifederalist. NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS AD-
MINISTRATION, THE FOUNDING FATHERS: NEW YORK, at http://www.archives.gov/
exhibithall/chartersof freedom/constitution/new-york.html (last visited Sept.
6, 2002).




will crush the states beneath its weight. And if it does not extend to these
cases, I confess myself utterly at a loss to give it any meaning.2 2 8
Anticipating possible objections that such suits would never be per-
mitted or, that if they were, judgments could never be enforced,229
Brutus opined:
It may be said that the apprehension that the judicial power will operate in
this manner is merely visionary, for that the legislature will never pass laws
that will work these effects. Or if they were disposed to do it, they cannot
provide for levying an execution on a state, for where will the officer find prop-
erty whereon to levy? To this I would reply, if this is a power which will not or
cannot be executed, it was useless and unwise to grant it to the judicial. For
what purpose is a power given which it is imprudent or impossible to exercise?
If it be improper for a government to exercise a power, it is improper they
should be vested with it. And it is unwise to authorise a government to do
what they cannot effect. 2 3 0
The Federal Farmer raised similar objections, clearly demonstrat-
ing the view that Article III, Section 2 was not subject to an underly-
ing common law sovereign immunity.
How far it may be proper to admit a foreigner or the citizen of another state to
bring actions against state governments, which have failed in performing so
many promises made during the war, is doubtful: How far it may be proper so
to humble a state, as to oblige it to answer to an individual in a court of law, is
worthy of consideration; the states are now subject to no such actions; and this
new jurisdiction will subject the states, and many defendants to actions, and
processes, which were not in the contemplation of the parties, when the con-
tract was made; all engagements existing between citizens of different states,
citizens and foreigners, states and foreigners; and states and citizens of other
states were made the parties contemplating the remedies then existing on the
laws of the states-and the new remedy proposed to be given in the federal
courts, can be founded on no principle whatever. 2 3 1
Timothy Pickering reiterates the interpretation that the Constitution
subjected the states to diverse citizen or foreign citizen suits and ap-
proves that extension of power as necessary and appropriate, in a ref-
utation of the Federal Farmer:
[A]s particular states may pass laws unjust in their nature, or partially unjust
as they regard foreigners and the citizens of other states, it seems to be a wise
provision, which puts it in the power of such foreigners & citizens to resort to
a court where they may reasonably expect to obtain impartial justice....
[T]here is a particular & very cogent reason for securing to foreigners a trial,
either in the first instance, or by appeal, in a federal court. With respect toforeigners, all the states form but one nation. This nation is responsible for
the conduct of all its members towards foreign nations, their citizens & sub-
228. 2 id. at 224-26.
229. Including Hamilton's statements in THE FEDERALIST No. 81. See supra note 37
and accompanying text. For a full discussion of Hamilton's position, see subsec-
tion III.E.2.
230. Brutus XIII, supra note 225, at 225.
231. Letter III from the Federal Farmer to the Republican, POUGHKEEPSIE COUNTRY
J., Oct. 10, 1787, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 234 (Herbert J.
Storing ed., 1981). Storing describes this series of letters as "one of the ablest
Anti-Federalist pieces," 2 id. at 214.
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jects; and therefore ought to possess the power of doing justice to the latter.
Without this power, a single state, or one of its citizens, might embroil the
whole union in a foreign war.2 3 2
James Winthrop, writing under the pseudonym "Agrippa," argued
against the Constitution in a number of essays. He also understood
the Constitution to subject the states to the jurisdiction of the federal
courts:
This power extends to all cases between a state and citizens of another state.
Hence a citizen, possessed of the notes of another state, may bring his action,
and there is no limitation that the execution shall be levied on the publick
property of the state, but the property of individuals is liable. This is a foun-
dation for endless confusion and discord. This, right to try causes between a
state and citizens of another state, involves in it all criminal causes; and a
man who has accidentally transgressed the laws of another state, must be
transported, with all his witnesses, to a third state, to be tried. He must be
ruined to prove his innocence.
2 3 3
Winthrop believed that this jurisdiction was essential to the design of
the new government: "These are necessary parts of the new system,
and it will never be complete till they are reduced to practice."
2 34
Winthrop also argued, as Agrippa, for the Massachusetts convention
to ratify the Constitution only subject to amendments, including the
following:
Resolved, that the constitution lately proposed for the United States be re-
ceived only upon the following conditions: . . . 3. Congress shall not have
power to try causes between a state and citizens of another state, nor between
citizens of different states; nor to make any laws relative to the transfer of
property between those parties, nor any other matter which shall originate in
the body of any state.... 9. The judicial department shall be confined to cases
in which ambassadours are concerned, to cases depending upon treaties, to
offences committed upon the high seas, to the capture of prizes, and to cases in
which a foreigner residing in some foreign country shall be a party, and an
American state or citizen shall be the other party; provided no suit shall be
brought upon a state note.
2 3 5
In his summary of his views, Winthrop specifically advanced his inter-
pretation that the states were subject to suit: "By article 3, section 2,
Congress empowered [sic] to appoint courts with authority to try civil
causes of every kind, and even offences against particular states."
23 6
232. Letter from Timothy Pickering to Charles Tillinghast entitled "Refutation of the
'Federal Farmer'" (Philadelphia, Dec. 24, 1787), in 1 BAILYN'S DEBATES, supra
note 40, at 289, 302-03.
233. Agrippa [James Winthrop] XII, supra note 224, at 767.
234. Id. His view was in accord with that of the Framers. See supra subsection
III.C.1.
235. Agrippa [James Winthrop] XVIII, Amend the Articles of Confederation or Amend
the Constitution? Fourteen Conditions for Accepting the Constitution, MASSACHU-
sETTs GAZETTE, Feb. 5, 1788, reprinted in 2 BAILYN'S DEBATES, supra note 40, at
155, 158.
236. Agrippa [James Winthrop] X, A Summary View: This System Ought to Be Re-
jected, MASSACHUSETTS GAZETTE, Jan. 1, 1788, reprinted in 1 BAILYN'S DEBATES,
supra note 40, at 673, 674.
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Thus, those who addressed the issue of state sovereignty believed
that the Constitution, through Article III, Section 2, specifically per-
mitted individuals to bring suits against states in federal courts. 23 7
Many of these commentators disagreed with the wisdom of extending
that power to the national judiciary, but none doubted that the Consti-
tution did in fact do so.
c. Inferences from the Ratification Documents
The ratification documents of the majority of the states permit or
compel the inference that the states understood that both they and the
federal government were subject to suit by the terms of Article III,
Section 2. The states can be grouped into two main categories. The
first group, which includes only New York and Rhode Island, specifi-
cally interpreted Article III judicial power over the states as subject to
underlying sovereign immunities in accord with interpretations ad-
vanced by Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall during the ratification
process. The Supreme Court has relied on the ratification documents
of these two states in its recent case law, and ignored the significant
majority of eleven states which comprise the second group, whose rati-
fication documents either permit to varying degrees, or compel the in-
ference that ratification constituted consent to suit under Article
111.238 These eleven states may further be divided into three sub-
groups. The first includes a group of five states2 39 which proposed no
amendments in their ratification documents, despite the Antifederal-
ist criticism of state/citizen suits in the popular press that was under-
way at the times of their ratifications.240 A second subgroup of three
states2 4 1 proposed amendments. None dealt with the issue of suits
against government entities, although critics of the Constitution had
proposed specific amendments limiting state/citizen suits. Finally,
the last group was comprised of two states, Virginia and North Caro-
lina, which proposed identical amendments of Article III which would
have protected state sovereignty by deleting state/citizen jurisdiction,
but which specifically retained judicial power over suits involving the
federal government.
The implicit premise is that the extension of judicial power over
suits between a state and a diverse citizen waived any existing com-
mon law immunity, a rejection of the position taken by Hamilton,
237. With the exception of Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist No. 81. See infra
subsection III.E.2 for a full discussion of Hamilton's position.
238. E.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
239. Delaware, New Jersey, Georgia, Connecticut, and Maryland.
240. At the least, Federal Farmer's letters had appeared during the fall of 1787, prior
to any ratification. By the time Maryland ratified in April 1788, many of the
publications cited in subsection III.C.3.b, supra, had been circulated.
241. Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and South Carolina.
[Vol. 81:1
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Madison, and Marshall in the ratification process. Virginia's proposed
amendment lends further support to the earlier argument that the
Virginia convention discounted Madison's and Marshall's arguments:
if the convention accepted their representations, the proposed amend-
ment would have been superfluous.
The ratification documents of Virginia and North Carolina are also
notable for their conscious retention of jurisdiction over the United
States, which precludes any contention that Virginia and North Caro-
lina accepted sovereign immunity as an implicit constitutional pre-
mise. The most plausible conclusion from the ratification documents of
these eleven states, considered as a whole, is that the states under-
stood the Constitution to eliminate the English common law of sover-
eign immunity and to extend the national judicial power to cases
involving the state and national governments.
Thus, only two states directly opposed judicial power over govern-
ment entities in ratifying the Constitution. Of the remaining eleven
states, nine chose, in the face of Antifederalist criticisms about the
national judicial power over the states, not to propose such amend-
ments. With respect to these nine, a reasonable (although admittedly
unnecessary) inference is that their ratification of the Constitution
waived immunity, individually as states and collectively as the United
States in Article III cases. The other two states eliminated state/citi-
zen jurisdiction precisely because they believed it was NOT subject to
underlying common law sovereign immunities, rejecting the Hamil-
ton-Madison-Marshall argument that Article III did not permit state/
citizen suits absent state consent. Notably, they retained the Article
III grant of power over the United States government, demonstrating
that they did not object to sovereign immunity generally, but only to
the extent it permitted citizen suits against the states in federal court.
i. New York and Rhode Island: No Citizen Suits against
States
The ratification documents of New York and Rhode Island have
been cited by the modern Supreme Court in support of the view that
the Constitution embodies sovereign immunities. 24 2 These ratifica-
tion documents preclude an inference that New York and Rhode Is-
land interpreted the Constitution as extending the judicial power to
cases involving states and diverse citizens. Both New York and Rhode
Island ratified specifically subject to the understanding that Article
III did not permit citizen suits against the states. New York's ratifica-
242. E.g., Alden, 527 U.S. 706. The Court has not recognized that the ratification doc-
uments of the remaining states permit or compel a contrary inference. Justice
Kennedy's opinion identifies the New York and Rhode Island ratification docu-




tion document stated, "That the judicial power of the United States, in
cases in which a state may be a party, does not extend... to authorize
any suit by any person against a state."243 The Constitution was rati-
fied "[u]nder these impressions, and declaring that the rights afore-
said cannot be abridged or violated, and that the explanations
aforesaid are consistent with the said Constitution."244 The Rhode Is-
land ratification document proposed a similar amendment, the first
part of which sets out Rhode Island's interpretation of Article III:
It is declared by the Convention, that the judicial power of the United States,
in cases in which a state may be a party, does not extend to ... authorize any
suit by any person against a state; but to remove all doubts or controversies
respecting the same, that it be especially expressed, as a part of the Constitu-
tion of the United States, that Congress shall not, directly or indirectly, either
by themselves or through the judiciary, interfere with any one of the states, in
the redemption of paper money already emitted, and now in circulation, or in
liquidating and discharging the public securities of any one state; that each
and every state shall have the exclusive right of making such laws and regula-
tions for the before-mentioned purpose as they shall think proper. 2 4 5
Although this statement is cast in the form of an amendment, it
adopts the interpretation of Article III advanced by Hamilton,
Madison, and Marshall: states were not subject to suit by citizens.
The latter part of Rhode Island's amendment also limits generaljudicial power over cases involving United States law. The limited na-
ture of the latter part of the clause suggests a very specific concern
that states be permitted to handle their debts in their own way. The
fact that it does not go further suggests that the Rhode Island conven-
tion accepted the Framers' view on the necessity of extending national
judicial power over the states with respect to United States law.2 46 As
243. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 329. The document also specified:
[T]he jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States, or of any
other court to be instituted by the Congress, is not in any case to be
increased, enlarged, or extended, by any faction, collusion, or mere sug-
gestion; and that no treaty is to be construed so to operate as to alter the
Constitution of any state.
1 id. The New York ratification document also proposed amendments that there
would be no inferior federal courts, except for trial of admiralty and maritime
cases, and piracies and felonies on high seas; in other cases, state courts would
have jurisdiction with a right of appeal to the Supreme Court. In addition, indi-
viduals who disagreed with a judgment of the Supreme Court could make appli-
cation to the President, who could nominate with the advice and consent of the
Senate, not less than seven commissioners, to correct the errors or review the
decree, "and to do justice to the parties in the premises." 1 id. at 331.
244. 1 id. at 329. Gibbons, supra note 4, at 1912, also incorrectly characterizes this
language as a proposed amendment rather than as an "impression" or "explana-
tion," and concludes that the New York ratifying convention thus believed that
without this language, the Constitution subjected the states to suit in some
instances.
245. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 336.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 99-114.
[Vol. 81:1
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
experiences under the Articles of Confederation confirmed, 24 7 uni-
formity of law on national issues was essential, as was state conform-
ance to that law.
The ratification documents of these two states demonstrate that
both rejected the extension of national judicial power over suits by citi-
zens against states. This conclusion, however, extends no further: the
ratifiers did not object to the exercise of national judicial power over
other actions against the states (by another state, or by the United
States) and they did not object to judicial power over the United
States. States' rights, then, and not preservation of sovereign immu-
nity as a generally applicable doctrine, prompted the proposals of New
York and Rhode Island. Neither proposed an amendment with respect
to judicial power over the United States or over cases involving federal
law,248 which the Framers saw as necessary to ensure uniformity.
Consequently, the ratification documents in New York and Rhode Is-
land cannot be taken as a full rejection of the view that ratification of
the Constitution waived sovereign immunity.
ii. No Proposed Amendments; Inference that Ratification
Constituted Consent to Suit
Delaware, which was the first state to ratify, proposed no amend-
ments;2 49 neither did New Jersey,2 50 Connecticut,
2 5 1 or Georgia, 2 52
all of which ratified soon after.25 3 Criticisms of Article III for its abro-
gation of the sovereign immunity of the states had appeared in the
press when these four states ratified, in late 1787 and early 1788,254
although much of the material discussed above had not yet been pub-
lished. 2 55 Alexander Hamilton's contrary interpretation in The Feder-
alist No. 81, for example, did not appear in print until May 28, 1788.
Given the language of the Constitution, the governmental structures
it established, and the existence of Antifederalist criticisms, it is rea-
sonable to infer that these states understood their ratifications as con-
stituting consent to suit in Article III cases. The inference is stronger
247. See supra text accompanying notes 77, 105.
248. There is one exception: the Rhode Island document, which would ensure that the
federal government could not exercise power to regulate state debt in anyway.
249. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 319. Delaware ratified December 7, 1787.
250. 1 id. at 320-21. New Jersey ratified December 18, 1787.
251. 1 id. at 321-22. Connecticut ratified January 9, 1788.
252. 1 id. at 323-24. Georgia ratified January 2, 1788.
253. Pennsylvania also ratified early, on December 12, 1787, without proposed amend-
ments. 1 id. at 319-20. However, Pennsylvania subsequently proposed amend-
ments, and so is treated below. See infra text accompanying notes 257-58.
254. E.g., Federal Farmer, supra note 231.
255. See supra subsection III.C.3.b.
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with respect to Maryland, which ratified April 28, 1788,256 when the
debate in the press was well under way. Each of these five states ar-
guably acceded to the implications of Article III: that the states were
subject to suit, without the necessity of consent, in the categories of
cases enumerated. The inference that the ratifiers considered the fed-
eral government to be subject to suit is somewhat weaker, since that
issue had not been explicitly debated in the conventions or the press.
However, given the clear language of the Constitution and the similar-
ities between the extensions of judicial power over the United States
and the states, it is reasonable to infer that these states understood
ratification to subject the new central government to suit as well.
iii. Article III Amendments Proposed
This group includes four states which proposed some amendments,
but did not include proposals dealing with the judicial power over the
states or the United States, although several dealt with Article III
issues.
256. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 549. Maryland ratified on April 26, 1788.
Delegates from eleven counties and from Annapolis and Baltimore announced on
behalf of their colleagues that: "[T]hey were elected and instructed, by the people
they represented, to ratify the proposed Constitution, and that as speedily as pos-
sible, and to do no other act; that, after the ratification, their power ceased, and
they did not consider themselves as authorized by their constituents to consider
any amendments." 2 id. at 548. After ratification, a minority proposed amend-
ments. None dealt with the immunity of the states or the federal government.
Several dealt with the judiciary, ensuring trial by jury in all criminal cases, con-
current state court jurisdiction over certain actions, and amount in controversy
limitations on federal court jurisdiction:
The great objects of these amendments were, 1st. To secure the trial byjury in all cases .. .2d. To give a concurrent jurisdiction to the state
courts, in order the Congress may not be compelled, as they will be
under the present form, to establish inferior federal courts, which, if not
numerous, are very expensive; the circumstances of the people being un-
equal to the increased expense of double courts and double officers-an
arrangement that will render the law so complicated and confused, that
few men can know how to conduct themselves with safety to their per-
sons or property, the great and only security of freeman. 3d. To give
such jurisdiction to the state courts that transient foreigners, and per-
sons from other states, committing injuries in this state, may be amena-
ble to the state whose laws they violate and whose citizens they injure.
4th. To prevent an extension of the federal jurisdiction, which may, and
in all probability will, swallow up the state jurisdictions, and conse-
quently sap those rules of descent and regulations of personal property,
by which men hold their estates.
2 id. at 550-51.
Interestingly, the Minority Committee appointed to consider amendments re-jected the proposed amendment: "That every man hath a right to petition thelegislature for redress of grievances, in a peaceable and orderly manner." 2 id.




Pennsylvania ratified early, on December 12, 1787, without pro-
posed amendments. However, on September 3, 1788, Pennsylvania
proposed, in the form of a petition to the new Congress, a revision of
Article III, Section 1: "That Congress establish no court other than the
Supreme Court, except such as shall be necessary for determining
causes of admiralty jurisdiction";25 7 and of Article III, Section 2:
"[T]hat such appellate jurisdiction, in all cases of common-law cogni-
zance, be by a writ of error, and confined to matters of law only; and
no such writ of error shall be admitted, except in revenue cases, unless
the matter in controversy exceed the value of three thousand dol-
lars."2 58 Pennsylvania's proposals would have prevented the estab-
lishment of inferior federal courts and limited the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
South Carolina ratified on May 23, 1788, proposing a limitation of
the United States' taxing power, and also declaring "that no section of
paragraph of the said Constitution warrants a construction that the
states do not retain every power not expressly relinquished by them,
and vested in the general government of the Union."2 59 Massachu-
setts, which ratified on February 6, 1788,260 and New Hampshire,
which ratified on June 21, 1788,261 each proposed a limitation of the
federal judicial power in diversity cases. The Massachusetts proposal
limited the Supreme Court's power over such cases based on the
amount in controversy;2 62 New Hampshire's proposal went further,
stating that the federal courts had appellate jurisdiction only, and
limited that jurisdiction based on the amount in controversy. 2 63
The inference that the states understood that ratification consti-
tuted consent to suit under Article III is very strong with respect to
each of these states. They ratified (or, in the case of Pennsylvania,
proposed amendments subsequent to ratification) at a time when the
press was circulating criticisms of Article III for subjecting the states
to suit,2 6 4 and each proposed amendments dealing with the judiciary
but not with sovereign immunity. The inference is even stronger with
respect to Massachusetts, since the Massachusetts convention re-
jected Agrippa's suggested amendments to prevent citizen suits
against the states, 26 5 which had been directed specifically at the Mas-
sachusetts convention.
257. 2 id. at 546.
258. 2 id.
259. 1 id. at 325.
260. 1 id. at 323.
261. 1 id. at 325-27.
262. 1 id. at 323.
263. 1 id. at 325-27.
264. See supra subsection III.C.3.b.
265. Supra text accompanying notes 233-36.
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iv. Virginia and North Carolina: Amendments Affirming
that Ratification Constituted Consent to Suit
Finally, it is not possible to read the remaining ratification docu-
ments from Virginia and North Carolina except as an explicit refuta-
tion of the argument that Article III preserved common-law sovereign
immunities. The Virginia convention adopted the view taken by its
delegates (except Madison and Marshall) that the Constitution sub-
jected the states and the United States government to suit in the spec-
ified categories of cases.2 66 To avoid that result with respect to the
states and to preserve the powers of state judiciaries, the Virginia con-
vention proposed rewriting Article III so that it omitted power over
cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, and
over cases between a state and diverse citizens, foreign states, citizens
or subjects.267 The North Carolina ratification document is identi-
cal. 26 8 This provision was specifically identified as an "amendment"
to the Constitution, in contrast to the ratification documents of New
York and Rhode Island, which ratified based on the "understanding"
that the states were not subject to suit.2 69 It also included a new pro-
vision, based on George Mason's suggestions in the ratification de-
bates,2 70 which made the national judicial power prospective only,
except with respect to certain categories of cases.27 1
Importantly, however, the Convention's rewritten Article III re-
tained the judicial power over "controversies to which the United
States shall be a party."27 2 The only possible inference is that the
Virginia convention did not object to suits against the government en-
tities as a general principle. It viewed the Constitution as a rejection
of sovereign immunities. Its recommended amendments would have
avoided that result with respect to the states, but it approved the re-
266. See supra text accompanying notes 208-21.
267. See 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 660-61. The Virginia convention also
proposed eliminating diversity jurisdiction.
268. See 4 id. at 246.
269. See supra subsection III.C.3.c.i.
270. Mason suggested the following provision as a solution to the problem of collection
of British debts and other claims (specifically, Indiana Company claims, and the
escheat or British land titles): "[Tihe judicial power shall extend to no case where
the cause of action shall have originated before the ratification of this Constitu-
tion, except in suits for debts due to the United States, disputes between states
about their territory, and disputes between persons claiming lands under grants
of different states." 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 530.
271. The provision read:
[T]he judicial power of the United States shall extend to no case where
the cause of action shall have originated before the ratification of the
Constitution, except in disputes between states about their territory, dis-
putes between persons claiming lands under the grants of different
states, and suits for debts due to the United States.




jection of sovereign immunity with respect to the United States. This
subjection of the United States, but not the states, to the power of the
national courts may simply be viewed as part and parcel of the state-
centered union that many Virginians advocated. But their proposed
amendments make it impossible to assert that Virginia and North
Carolina ratified a Constitution which they read to encompass sover-
eign immunities. Rather, both conventions clearly understood the
Constitution to do just the opposite. And at least with respect to the
United States government, that result was acceptable to the ratifiers.
Sovereign immunity clearly was not an implicit structural premise of
the new union for the important state of Virginia and its neighbor,
North Carolina, and the certainty that these states understood the
Constitution to abrogate immunity lends support to the inferences
about the views of the other nine states analyzed above.
D. Reasons for the Various Categories of Judicial Power in
Article III
It is inconceivable that the grants of judicial power in Article III
were subject to an unexpressed understanding that the United States
or the states could opt out and subvert the constitutional framework of
horizontal separation of powers (with respect to the United States gov-
ernment) and vertical separation of powers (with respect to the
states).
The reasons given by the Framers and ratifiers for judicial power
over cases involving federal law and cases involving a state and a di-
verse citizen make it clear that they did not interpret the Constitution
as subject to implicit immunities. It is implausible that the judicial
power over issues of federal law was subject to an unexpressed state
sovereign immunity. One of the central reasons for the Convention
was the Confederation's inability to enforce its laws against the states.
To replace the impotent Articles with a Constitution subject to the
same deficiency would have been senseless. Much of the discussion in
the Convention and the ratification debates indicated a clear necessity
for uniformity of federal law through the action of federal courts on
the states.
It is similarly implausible that the Framers intended the judicial
power over state-diverse citizens suits to be subject to implicit immu-
nities. The Framers' concern was that the state courts would not af-
ford an unbiased forum for state-diverse citizen suits. The creation of
a national judicial power which could be executed only if the state's
legislature consented cannot address that concern. The result of such
an arrangement would be that the national forum would never be
used: state legislatures and executives would likely be as or more bi-
ased against diverse citizens than state judiciaries, and there is no
20021
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reason to think that they would routinely consent to suit against the
State in the federal forum.
1. Cases Involving Federal Law
Each of the proposals for the Constitution submitted at the Con-
vention included national jurisdiction over cases involving federal is-
sues. The Virginia Plan, in its ninth resolution, included jurisdiction
over "questions which involve the national peace or harmony."273 Ar-
ticle IX of Charles Pinckney's proposal extended national judicial
power to "all cases arising under the laws of the United States."27 4
The New Jersey Plan gave federal courts power to hear cases involv-
ing the construction of treaties or any act of Congress dealing with
commerce or collection of the federal revenue. 275 Hamilton suggested
the creation of inferior federal courts for "the determination of all mat-
ters of general concern."276 Following a discussion of the Virginia
Plan, Madison's proposal passed unanimously, extending jurisdiction
to "cases arising under laws passed by the general legislature."277
This was the resolution which was referred to the Committee of De-
tail, along with some of the other proposals listed above. This resolu-
tion provided the authority for the ensuing draft of the Constitution,
which extended the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court "to all cases
arising under laws passed by the legislature of the United States."2 78
The Committee of Style and Arrangement revised this language to
read: "to all cases .. .arising under this constitution, the laws of the
United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made under their
authority."279
The purpose of this extension of judicial power was to ensure uni-
formity of the national law by providing a Supreme Court which would
have power to interpret and enforce the law. There seems to have
been very little disagreement, if any, about this power. Discussion in
the ratification debates on this category was minimal. Edmund Pen-
dleton in the Virginia ratification debates asked rhetorically:
Must not the judicial powers extend to enforce the federal laws, govern its own
officers, and confine them to the line of their duty? Must it not protect them,
in the proper exercise of duty, against all opposition, whether from individuals
or state laws? 2 8
0
John Marshall opined:
273. 1 id. at 144.
274. 1 id. at 148-49.
275. 1 id. at 176.
276. 1 id. at 179-80.
277. 1 id.
278. 1 id. at 229.
279. 1 id. at 303.
280. 3 id. at 548.
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Is it not necessary that the federal courts should have cognizance of cases
arising under the Constitution, and the laws, of the United States? What is
the service or purpose of a judiciary, but to execute the laws in a peaceable,
orderly manner, without shedding blood, or creating a contest, or availing
yourselves of force? If this be the case, where can its jurisdiction be more
necessary than here? To what quarter will you look for protection from an
infringement on the Constitution, if you will not give the power to the
judiciary? 2 8 1
Edmund Randolph also spoke on the issue:
It has not yet been denied that a federal judiciary is necessary to a certain
extent. Every government necessarily involves a judiciary as a constituent
part. If, then, a federal judiciary be necessary, what are the characters of its
powers? That it shall be auxiliary to the federal government, support and
maintain harmony between the United States and foreign powers, and be-
tween different states, and prevent a failure ofjustice in cases to which partic-
ular state courts are incompetent. If this judiciary be reviewed as relative to
these purposes, I think it will be found that nothing is granted which does not
belong to a federal judiciary. Self-defence is its first object. Has not the Con-
stitution said that the states shall not use such and such powers, and given
exclusive powers to Congress? If the state judiciaries could make decisions
conformable to the laws of their states, in derogation to the general govern-
ment, I humbly apprehend that the federal government would soon be en-
croached upon. If a particular state should be at liberty, through its judiciary,
to prevent or impede the operation of the general government, the latter must
soon be undermined. It is, then, necessary that its jurisdiction should "extend
to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution and the laws of
the United States."2 8 2
Madison's opinions were similar:
The first class of cases to which its jurisdiction extends are those which may
arise under the Constitution .... That causes of a federal nature will arise,
will be obvious to every gentleman who will recollect that the states are laid
under restrictions, and that the rights of the Union are secured by these re-
strictions .... With respect to the laws of the Union, it is so necessary and
expedient that the judicial power should correspond with the legislative, that
it has not been objected to .... Controversies affecting the interest of the
United States ought to be determined by their own judiciary, and not be left to
partial, local tribunals.2 8 3
Discussion in the North Carolina ratification debates was similar.
In response to Spencer's comments that state judiciaries were incom-
petent to handle cases arising under federal law,2s 4 several delegates
responded. Spaight stated:
The gentleman objects to the cognizance of all cases in law and equity arising
under the Constitution and the laws of the United States. This objection is
very astonishing. When any government is established, it ought to have
power to enforce its laws, or else it might as well have no power. What but
281. 3 id. at 554.
282. 3 id. at 570-71.
283. 3 id. at 532.
284. 4 id. at 136-37. Spaight also criticized the establishment of federal courts on
grounds of the expense occasioned by creating and maintaining them, as well as
for the inconvenience federal courts might occasion for litigants, who might be
required to travel long distances to court.
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that is the use of a judiciary? The gentleman, from his profession, must know
that no government can exist without a judiciary to enforce its laws, by distin-
guishing the disobedient from the rest of the people, and imposing sanctions
for securing the execution of the laws.
2 8 5
Governor Johnston responded similarly, and noted the possibility of
concurrent jurisdiction in the federal and state courts over some
matters:
[Tihe learned member from Anson [Spencer] says that the federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction of all cases in law and equity arising under the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States. The opinion which I have always enter-
tained is, that they will, in these cases, as well as in several others, have
concurrent jurisdiction with the state courts, and not exclusive jurisdiction. I
see nothing in this Constitution which hinders a man from bringing suit wher-
ever he thinks he can have justice done him. The jurisdiction of these courts
is established for some purposes with which the state courts have nothing to
do, and the Constitution takes no power from the state courts which they now
have. 2 8 6
Governor Johnston added: "It is obvious to every one that there ought
to be one Supreme Court for national purposes."28 7 Later Supreme
Court Justice Iredell added: "As to the clause respecting cases arising
under the Constitution and laws of the Union, which the honorable
member objected to, it must observed, that laws are useless unless
they are executed."28 8 Davie stated:
With respect to their having jurisdiction of all cases arising under the laws of
the United States, although I have a very high respect for the gentleman, I
heard his objection to it with surprise. I thought, if there were any political
axiom under the sun, it must be, that the judicial power ought to be coexten-
sive with the legislative. The federal government ought to possess the means
of carrying the laws into execution .... If laws are not to be carried into execu-
tion by the interposition of the judiciary, how is it to be done?2 8 9
Davie also stated, in discussing the issue of states debts:
The people of the United States have one common interest; they are all mem-
bers of the same community, and ought to have justice administered to them
equally in every part of the continent, in the same manner, with the same
despatch, and on the same principles. It is therefore absolutely necessary that
the judiciary of the Union should have jurisdiction in all cases arising in law
and equity under the Constitution.
2 9 0
It is inconceivable that this extension of the judicial power, deemed
so necessary and important to the enforcement of law and to the uni-
formity of law, was subject to an unexpressed understanding that any
state (unless sued by the United States), or the United States, could
285. 4 id. at 139.
286. 4 id. at 141.
287. 4 id. at 142.
288. 4 id. at 145.
289. 4 id. at 158.
290. 4 id. at 157-58.
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simply decide not to submit itself to the power of the federal court. 29 1
The experience of the Confederacy, in which states had routinely and
almost uniformly ignored the obligations imposed by the central gov-
ernment, taught the Framers that a union could not be created if the
states were free to avoid the dictates of the Constitution and federal
law.
2. Cases Involving the United States as a Party
None of the proposals submitted by delegates to the Federal Con-
vention included judicial power over cases in which the United States
was a party. Neither did the Committee of Detail's August 6 draft.
On August 20, the Convention referred to the Committee additional
propositions, including Charles Pinckney's: "The jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court shall be extended to all controversies between the
United States and an individual state, or the United States and the
citizens of an individual state."29 2 The Framers agreed unanimously
to the final version of the clause, "the judicial power shall extend to...
controversies to which the United States shall be a party."
29 3
It is appropriate that national courts rather than state courts
would hear cases involving the United States. Hamilton, in The Fed-
eralist No. 80, stated simply, "Controversies between the nations and
its members or citizens can only be properly referred to the national
tribunals. Any other plan would be contrary to reason, to precedent,
and to decorum." 29 4 Even the vocal Antifederalist George Mason criti-
cized the clause but accepted it as extending power over cases involv-
ing the United States.29 5 First, he questioned the interpretation
advocated by George Nicholas, that the clause contemplated only ac-
tions in which the United States was a plaintiff, as "incomprehensi-
291. It is possible to read Hamilton's, Madison's, and Marshall's statements concern-
ing the sovereignty of the states as extending only to the judicial power over cases
involving a state and a diverse citizen or a state and a foreign citizen. See, e.g.,
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 145-49 (1996) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing) (explaining that Hamilton's statements in The Federalist No. 81 referred
only to immunity with respect to diversity cases); see also Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 773 n. 13 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting). The modem Court, however,
has extended state sovereign immunity to cases arising under federal law. See,
e.g., Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44; Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S.
775 (1991). Under the Supreme Court's interpretation of Article III, the states
were also subject to suit by the United States. See supra text accompanying note
116.
292. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 250.
293. 1 id. at 268.
294. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
295. It is possible that this was a political strategy on Mason's part, and that absent
his goal of defeating ratification by Virginia, he would have read the clause as
encompassing an underlying immunity. Given the language of the Constitution,
and the context of the entire ratification process, this seems unlikely.
20021
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
ble."296 Second, he admitted that "the decision of controversies to
which the United States shall be a party may at first view seem
proper," but argued vaguely that "it may, without restraint, be ex-
tended to a dangerously oppressive length."29 7 Finally, he enumer-
ated the effects of ratification of this clause:
They [the federal courts] are also to have cognizance in controversies to which
the United States shall be a party. This power is superadded, that there
might be no doubt, and that all cases arising under the government might be
brought before the federal court. Gentlemen will not, I presume, deny that all
revenue and excise controversies, and all proceedings relative to the duties of
the officers of government, from the highest to the lowest, may and must be
brought by these means to the federal courts; in the first instance, to the infer-
ior federal court, and afterwards to the superior court. 2 9 8
The unanimous passage of this category of judicial power, the read-
ing of the clause by various Framers and ratifiers, and the fact that
sovereign immunity was not mentioned in any recorded discussion of
it, suggests that the Framers intended to subject the United States to
suit in the federal courts. This understanding of the historical record
reflects English practice involving sovereign immunity at the time,
which permitted such actions with various procedural limitations
(special forms of pleadings addressed to specific courts).299 The record
is consistent with, and indeed suggests, that the primary issue for the
Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution was where the United States
could be sued rather than whether it could be sued.
3. Cases Involving States and Diverse-State or Foreign Citizens
The Randolph, or Virginia Plan, which formed the Convention's
working draft, included jurisdiction in inferior federal courts and the
Supreme Court over "cases in which foreigners, or citizens of other
states, applying to such jurisdictions, may be interested" and "ques-
tions involving the national peace and harmony."300 Pinckney's plan
did not include any reference to these types of suits. 30 1 New Jersey's
plan, which simply sought to remedy the defects of the Articles of Con-
federation and to maintain the supremacy of the states, included judi-
296. See 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 479-80 ("The worthy gentleman has
told you that the United States can be plaintiffs, but never defendants. If so, it
stands on very unjust grounds. The United States cannot be come at for any
thing they may owe, but may get what is due to them. There is therefore no
reciprocity. The thing is so incomprehensible that it cannot be explained.").
297. 3 id. at 523.
298. 3 id. at 525-26.
299. See supra section III.B.
300. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 144.
301. 1 id. at 148-49.
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cial authority over "cases in which foreigners may be interested,"3 02
and Hamilton's plan contained a similar provision.3 03
The Convention voted to change the language of the Randolph Plan
to read "cases in which foreigners, or citizens of two distinct states of
the Union, applying to such jurisdictions, may be interested."30 4 Al-
though there were further votes on the provisions, there was no re-
corded debate.30 5 The August 6 draft prepared by the Committee of
Detail included the following provisions: "The jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court shall extend ... to controversies ... between a state and
citizens of another state ... and between a state ... and foreign states,
citizens, or subjects."30 6 There was no recorded discussion of this
provision.
The idea that national courts should handle cases involving states
and diverse citizens informed the constitutional process from its earli-
est beginnings. In a letter to Edmund Randolph in April 1787, prior to
the beginning of the Convention, James Madison discussed his prelim-
inary ideas for a plan of government: "It seems at least essential that
an appeal should lie to some national tribunals in cases which concern
foreigners, or inhabitants of other states" in order to preserve the na-
tion's interests against "the obsequiousness of the tribunals to the pol-
icy or prejudices of the states."30 7 Madison was the primary
draftsman of the Randolph Plan, which (unlike the other proposals)
includes a provision addressed to this issue.
Hamilton's discussion of state-diverse citizen jurisdiction in the ju-
diciary article in The Federalist No. 80 is extensive. Hamilton de-
scribes this category of national judicial power as necessary to the
peace of the confederacy and thus a "proper object of federal superin-
tendence and control."308 Hamilton gives two specific, related reasons
for this extension of power. First, the Constitution guarantees that
citizens of each state are entitled to the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the other states.30 9 It follows from the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause that the national judiciary must hear cases involving
state-diverse citizen cases:
It may be esteemed the basis of the Union that, "the citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several
302. 1 id. at 176.
303. 1 id. at 179.
304. 1 id. at 173.
305. Supra text accompanying notes 117-38.
306. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 229.
307. 5 id. at 108.
308. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 477-78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
309. Article IV, Section 2, provides: "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." U.S. CONST. art. V,§ 2.
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States." And if it be a just principle that every government ought to possess
the means of executing its own provisions by its own authority, it will follow,
that in order to the inviolable maintenance of that equality of privileges and
immunities to which the citizens of the Union will be entitled, the national
judiciary ought to preside in all cases in which one State or its citizens are
opposed to another State or its citizens. 3 1 0
Second, and related, the state courts could not be trusted to apply the
law impartially to diverse citizens:
To secure the full effect of so fundamental a provision against all evasion and
subterfuge, it is necessary that its construction should be committed to that
tribunal which, having no local attachments, will be likely to be impartial be-
tween the different States and their citizens, and which, owing its official exis-
tence to the Union, will never be likely to feel any bias inauspicious to the
principles on which it is founded .... The reasonableness of the agency of the
national courts in cases in which the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be
impartial speaks for itself. No man ought certainly to be a judge in his own
cause, or in any cause in respect to which he has the least interest or bias.
This principle has no inconsiderable weight in designating the federal courts
as the proper tribunals for the determination of controversies between differ-
ent States and their citizens. 3 1 1
This concern over the likelihood of state court adjudication
prejudiced against diverse citizens was repeated over and over in the
ratification debates. It seems clear that such prejudice existed; states
had passed laws which favored their citizens in the payment of
debts312 and were generally believed to favor their own citizens.31a
James Wilson, who prepared a draft of the Constitution as a member
of the Committee of Detail, articulated the following reason for state-
diverse citizen jurisdiction during the Pennsylvania ratification
debates:
310. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 477-78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
311. Id.
312. Supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
313. Davie's comments in the North Carolina ratification debates are instructive on
this point. He posed this hypothetical question:
Is it probable, if a citizen of South Carolina owed a sum of money to a
citizen of this state, that the latter would be certain of recovering the full
value in their courts? That state might in future, as they have already
done, make pinebarren acts to discharge their debts. They might say
that our citizens should be paid in sterile, inarable lands, at an extrava-
gant price. They might pass the most iniquitous instalment laws,
procrastinating the payment of debts due from their citizens, for
years-nay, for ages. Is it probable that we should get justice from their
own judiciary, who might consider themselves obliged to obey the laws of
their own state? Where, then, are we to look for justice? To the judiciary
of the United States. Gentlemen must have observed the contracted and
narrow-minded regulations of the individual states, and their predomi-
nant disposition to advance the interests of their own citizens to the
prejudice of others. Will not these evils be continued if there be no
restraint?
4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 157.
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When this power is attended to, it will be found to be a necessary one. Impar-
tiality is the leading feature in this Constitution; it pervades the whole. When
a citizen has a controversy with another state, there ought to be a tribunal
where both parties may stand on a just and equal footing.
3 1 4
David Ramsay 3 15 explained the judiciary article similarly: "The judi-
cial declares, that where impartial trials from the nature of the case
cannot be expected from state tribunals, there the federal judiciary
shall interpose. "316
In the North Carolina ratification, William Davie, a delegate to the
Constitutional Convention as well as to North Carolina's convention,
echoed these concerns:
It has been equally ceded, by the strongest opposers to this government, that
the federal courts should have cognizance of controversies between two or
more states, between a state and the citizens of another state, and between
the citizens of the same state claiming lands under the grant of different
states. Its jurisdiction in these cases is necessary to secure impartiality in
decisions, and preserve tranquility among the states. It is impossible that
there should be impartiality when a party affected is to be judge.
3 1 7
James Wilson's lengthy discussion in the Pennsylvania ratification
convention sounded these same themes. With respect to the power
over cases involving a state and foreign states, citizens or subjects,
Wilson acknowledged that "This part of the jurisdiction, I presume,
will occasion more doubt than any other part"31 8 but articulated im-
portant reasons for it:
[I]s it not necessary, if we mean to restore either public or private credit, that
foreigners, as well as ourselves, have a just and impartial tribunal to which
they may resort? I would ask how a merchant must feel to have property lie
at the mercy of the laws of Rhode Island. I ask, further, How will a creditor
feel who has his debts at the mercy of tender laws in other states? It is true
that, under the Constitution, these particular iniquities must be restrained in
future; but, sir, there are other ways of avoiding payment of debts. There
have been instalment acts, and other acts of a similar effect. Such things, sir,
destroy the very sources of credit.
Is it not an important object to extend our manufactures and our com-
merce? This cannot be done, unless a proper security is provided for the regu-
lar discharge of contracts. This security cannot be obtained, unless we give
the power of deciding upon those contracts to the general government....
It was thought proper to give the citizens of foreign states full opportunity
of obtaining justice in the general courts, and this they have by its appellate
314. 2 id. at 491.
315. Ramsay was trained as a physician and served in the South Carolina House of
Representatives and as delegate in the South Carolina ratifying convention. 2
BAILYN's DEBATES, supra note 40, at 1009.
316. Oration at Charleston, South Carolina entitled "Heaven Smiled on Their Deliber-
ations, and Inspired Their Councils with a Spirit of Conciliation," in COLUMBIAN
HERALD (South Carolina), June 5, 1788, reprinted in 2 BAILYN's DEBATES, supra
note 40, at 507.
317. 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 159.
318. 2 id. at 491.
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jurisdiction; therefore, in order to restore credit with those foreign states, that
part of the article is necessary. I believe the alteration that will take place in
their minds when they learn the operation of this clause, will be a great andimportant advantage to our country; nor is it any thing but justice: they ought
to have the same security against the state laws that may be made, that the
citizens have; because regulations ought to be equally just in the one case as
in the other. Further, it is necessary to preserve peace with foreign
nations. 3 1 9
Madison's statements in the Virginia ratification debates similarly
acknowledged the problems of biased state courts:
We well know, sir [speaking to Monroe] that foreigners cannot get justice done
them in these [state] courts and this has prevented many wealthy gentlemen
from trading or residing among us. There are also many public debtors, whohave escaped from justice for want of such a method as is pointed out in the
plan on the table. 3 2 0
Thus, the debate in the ratification process addressed a wide-
spread concern that state judiciaries would not treat diverse citizens
fairly. In a time in which individuals thought of their state as their
country 321 this was a real concern. The extension of federal judicialpower over cases between states and diverse citizens afforded a solu-
tion to this problem. If the state-diverse citizen clause were subject to
an unexpressed sovereign immunity, it would provide no solution at
all. State legislative and executive actors, who would be charged withproviding consent, could not be presumed to be any less biased againstdiverse citizens than the state judiciary. Thus, a presupposition of
sovereign immunity on the part of the Framers and ratifiers woulddefeat their articulated purposes, rendering this head of judicial
power completely ineffective.
E. The Statements of Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall
Reconsidered
1. The Immediate Political Context
When Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall commented on the immu-
nity issue, it was clear that ratification of the Constitution was uncer-
tain. By order of the Convention, ratification by nine states was
necessary for creation of a new government under the Constitution.
Although eight states322 had ratified when these statements were
made, several by unanimous vote 323 and others by wide margins,324
319. 2 id. at 491-93.
320. 3 id. at 583.
321. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 167 (quoting Patrick Henry's praise in theVirginia ratification debates for "this country," meaning the State of Virginia).322. Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Ma-
ryland, and South Carolina.
323. Delaware, New Jersey, and Georgia ratified by unanimous vote on December 7,1787, December 18, 1787, and January 2, 1788, respectively. See 1 ELLIOT'S DE-
BATES, supra note 38, at 319, 320-21, 323-24.
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Massachusetts had ratified only by a very narrow margin,3 25 and diffi-
cult battles were anticipated in New Hampshire, Virginia (Marshall's
and Madison's home state), and New York (Hamilton's home state).3
26
The Federalist No. 81 appeared on May 28, 1788, shortly after the
eighth state (South Carolina) ratified. Madison and Marshall spoke at
the Virginia ratification convention on June 20, 1788.327 New Hamp-
shire ratified the following day, on June 21, 1788, making the Consti-
tution official. Virginia became the tenth state to ratify, on June 25,
1788, and New York, the eleventh, on July 26, 1788. Taken in this
immediate context, it is clear that Marshall, Madison and Hamilton
had an enormous incentive to advance a "safe" interpretation on the
controversial issue of state susceptibility to suit in the federal courts.
2. Alexander Hamilton
Alexander Hamilton's statements in The Federalist No. 81 have
been routinely cited in modern decisions and commentary as primary
support for the proposition that the Constitution embodied common
law sovereign immunities. As this Article has already suggested,
when taken against the backdrop of the historical evidence, Hamil-
ton's statements constitute an elevation of political expediency over
philosophical integrity. Hamilton relied on the principle of sovereign
immunity to calm Antifederalist fears about the solvency of the states
and to secure New York's ratification of the Constitution over strong
opposition. In The Federalist No. 81, Hamilton addressed the issue of
the States' debts and concerns that the States would be subject to suit:
Though it may rather be a digression from the immediate subject of this pa-
per, I shall take occasion to mention here a supposition which has excited
some alarm upon very mistaken grounds. It has been suggested that an as-
signment of the public securities of one State to the citizens of another would
enable them to prosecute that State in the federal courts for the amount of
those securities; a suggestion which the following considerations prove to be
without foundation.
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of
an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general
practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sover-
eignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union. Unless,
therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention,
it will remain with States and the danger intimated must be merely ideal....
324. Pennsylvania ratified by a vote of 46 to 23 on December 12, 1787, 1 id. at 319-20,
Connecticut by 128 to 40 on January 9, 1788, 1 id. at 322, Maryland by 63 to 11
on April 28, 1788, 1 id. at 324-25, South Carolina by 149 to 73 on May 23, 1788. 4
id. at 340.
325. The vote in Massachusetts was 187 to 168. 2 id. at 178-81. Massachusetts was
the sixth state to ratify, on February 6, 1788. 1 id. at 323.
326. North Carolina did not ratify until November 21, 1789, after Congress proposed
the Bill of Rights. 1 id. at 333. Rhode Island, the last of the original states to
ratify, voted for ratification by a vote of 34-32 on May 29, 1790. 1 id. at 334-37.
327. 3 id. at 531, 533, 555-56.
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[There is no color to pretend that the State governments would, by the adop-
tion of that plan, be divested of the privilege of paying their own debts in their
own way, free from every constraint but that which flows from the obligations
of good faith. The contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding
on the conscience of the sovereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive
force. They confer no right of action independent of the sovereign will. To
what purpose would it be to authorize suits against States for the debts they
owe? How could recoveries be enforced? It is evident that it could not be done
without waging war against the contracting State; and to ascribe to the fed-
eral courts, by mere implication, and in destruction of a pre-existing right of
the State governments, a power which would involve such a consequence,
would be altogether forced and unwarrantable. 3 2 8
Others have read Hamilton simply as addressing state-citizen diver-
sity cases rather than cases arising under federal law. 329 This is a
credible position. However, this Article concludes that these state-
ments, so critical to the Supreme Court's present position on sovereign
immunity, should be discounted generally, with respect to state-citi-
zen diversity cases as well as cases arising under federal law.
First, the political context and Hamilton's correspondence demon-
strates his conviction that ratification was both absolutely necessary
and highly unlikely. In these circumstances, Hamilton had an enor-
mous incentive to manipulate public opinion in favor of ratification,
and one should exercise caution in taking Hamilton's statements at
face value. Hamilton believed that ratification of the Constitution
produced by the Convention was essential to the security of the
states.3 30 His private correspondence with Madison demonstrates
Hamilton's view that ratification by Virginia and New York was cru-
cial and that the consequences of a failure to ratify would be disas-
trous. Hamilton wrote in May: "We think here that the situation of
your state is critical,"331 and later,
For my own part the more I can penetrate the views of the Antifederal party
in this state, the more I dread the consequences of non adoption of the Consti-
tution by any of the other states, the more I fear an eventual disunion and
civil war. God grant that Virginia may accede. 3 3 2
328. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487-88 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
329. See, for example, Justices Souter and Stevens in dissenting opinions in Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 78, 145 (1996). See also Gibbons, supra note
4.
330. THE FEDERALIST No. 1, at 36 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
331. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Madison (May 19, 1788), in ALEXAN-
DER HAMILTON, A BIOGRAPHY IN HIS OWN WORDS, at 188-89, (Mary-Jo Kline ed.,
1973).
332. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Madison (June 8, 1788) in ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, A BIOGRAPHY IN HIS OWN WORDS, supra note 331, at 193. Hamilton
also offered to pay the costs of delivering, by the quickest possible means, infor-
mation from the conventions in New Hampshire and Virginia. See Letter from
Alexander Hamilton to James Madison, supra, at 189 ("and the moment any deci-
sive question is taken, if favorable, I request you to dispatch an express to me
with pointed orders to make all possible diligence, by changing horses &c. All
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In Hamilton's estimation, the stakes were high: the alternatives to
ratification were "anarchy and convulsion"3 33 and "disunion and civil
war."3 34 The political climate in New York rendered ratification un-
likely. New York had been represented at the Constitutional Conven-
tion by Hamilton and two Antifederalists, 33 5 ensuring that New
York's votes would be Antifederalist; the popular vote for the New
York convention had yielded forty-six Antifederalist delegates and
only nineteen Federalist delegates, all from New York City and sur-
rounding counties;3 36 and the popular governor George Clinton, who
presided over New York's ratification convention, opposed ratifica-
tion.33 7 Hamilton's conviction that ratification was necessary, in light
of the apparently overwhelming opposition to it, certainly gave him an
incentive to manipulate opinion on a matter of great concern to the
Antifederalists. As it turned out, New York's successful ratification
was due in large part to the ratifications by New Hampshire on June
21 and Virginia on June 25. Virginia's ratification was particularly
significant, since it was the largest of the states, and the home of
George Washington, the most likely leader of the new union. Circula-
tion of a rumor that New York City and some of the surrounding coun-
ties in the southern part of the state, a Federalist stronghold, would
secede from the state if it failed to ratify,3 3s probably also contributed
to New York's ratification.
Second, the timing of The Federalist No. 81 supports the sugges-
tion that it was motivated by extreme political circumstances and
expences shall be thankfully and liberally paid."); Letter from Alexander Hamil-
ton to John Sullivan (June 6, 1788) in ALEXANDER HAMILTON, A BIOGRAPHY IN HIS
OWN WORDS, supra note 331, at 192 ("permit me to request that the instant you
have taken a decisive vote in favor of the Constitution, you send an express to me
at Poughkeepsie. Let him take the shortest route to that place, change horses on
the road, and use all possible diligence. I shall with pleasure defray all expenses,
and give a liberal reward to the person.").
333. MADISON, supra note 72, at 656 ("Mr. Hamilton expressed his anxiety that every
member should sign. A few characters of consequence, by opposing or even refus-
ing to sign the Constitution, might do infinite mischief by kindling the latent
sparks which lurk under an enthusiasm in favor of the Convention which may
soon subside. No man's ideas were more remote from the plan than his were
known to be; but is it possible to deliberate between anarchy and Convulsion on
one side, and the chance of good to be expected from the plan on the other.").
334. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Madison, supra note 332.
335. Those Antifederalists were Robert Yates and John Lansing, who left the Conven-
tion on July 10, 1787, because the Convention intended to exceed their instruc-
tions and to do more than simply amend the Articles of Confederation, and both
of whom also served as delegates to the New York convention where they opposed
ratification.
336. 2 BAILYN'S DEBATES, supra note 40, at 1025-85. Forrest McDonald estimates that
the popular vote was about 16,000 to 7,000 against ratification. See FORREST MC-
DONALD, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 114 (1979).
337. See generally 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 261-62, 268, 326, 359-60.
338. CLINTON ROSSITER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE CONSTITUTION 68 (1964).
20021
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
should be read in that light. This important edition of The Federalist
was written on May 28, 1788, just days before the New York conven-
tion assembled in Poughkeepsie. The quoted passages were clearly a
digression, specifically intended to answer Antifederalist concerns
which had been previously raised by others.339 The Federalist is a po-
litical document, written with the specific aim of securing New York's
ratification of the Constitution, and Hamilton was perhaps not above
manipulation of popular opinion to achieve so important an
objective.340
Third, Hamilton's phrasing in the passage is conditional rather
than direct: the states enjoy sovereign immunity "[u]nless ... there is
a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention."341 "The
plan of the convention" simply refers to the Constitution.342 Hamilton
attended much of the Convention343 and the finished document was
before him. He was as able as anyone to determine whether there was
or was not a surrender of immunity in the plan of the Convention.
Why the qualification? Hamilton may have qualified the statement
precisely because he believed, in conformance with the majority's
reading,344 that the Constitution entailed a surrender of immunity in
Article III cases. Hamilton's equivocation may thus have permitted
him to meet Antifederalist objections, without actually misstating the
meaning of the Constitution.
Fourth, and related, Hamilton avoided specific discussion of the is-
sue by simply referring to an earlier issue of The Federalist: "The cir-
cumstances which are necessary to produce an alienation of State
sovereignty were discussed in considering the article of taxation and
need not be repeated here."345 Hamilton's reference to The Federalist
No. 32 permits him to sidestep a specific discussion of sovereign im-
munity, avoiding the necessity of explaining how its supposed reten-
tion squared with the language of the Constitution and the structure
339. See supra subsection III.C.3.b.
340. See, e.g., M.E. BRADFORD, ORIGINAL INTENTIONS 75 (1993) ("Hamilton was some-
times honest about the model of government under consideration.").
341. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
342. See supra note 196.
343. Hamilton left the Convention on June 30 to attend to private affairs. See Ros-
SITER, supra note 338, at 47. The other New York delegates, Robert Yates and
John Lansing, left the Convention after July 5. ROBERT YATES, SECRET PROCEED-
INGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION 140 (George R. Steward, ed., Southern
Univ. Press, 1987) (1821) (Yates's notes end on July 5). Hamilton attempted to
persuade them to return and returned himself during the first week of Septem-
ber. 2 BAILYN'S DEBATES, supra note 40, at 1053, 1060.
344. See supra subsection III.C.3.b.




of the new government. According to The Federalist No. 32, alienation
of state sovereignty would only exist in three cases:
[Where the Constitution in express terms granted an exclusive authority to
the Union; where it granted in one instance an authority to the Union, and in
another prohibited the States from exercising the like authority; and where it
granted an authority to the Union to which a similar authority in the States
would be absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant.
3 4 6
Application of the principles discussed in The Federalist No. 32 to sov-
ereign immunity is difficult. The fit is not precise: Hamilton is dis-
cussing the powers delegated to the national government in Article I,
and not its privileges. However, Article III, Section 2 extends the judi-
cial power of the United States to cases between states and between a
state and a citizen of another state, and specifies that the Supreme
Court has original jurisdiction over cases "in which a State shall be
Party." This is an alienation of the privilege of sovereign immunity
within Hamilton's third category. It is clearly part of the judicial
power of the United States to entertain these suits, and state sover-
eign immunity is "contradictory and repugnant" to this power.
Fifth, although Hamilton is correct in saying that there is nothing
in the Constitution which would prevent the States from "paying their
own debts in their own way,"34 7 this too seems to involve rhetorical
maneuvering. The states could pay their debts in their own way;
nothing in the Constitution specified how such debts must be dis-
charged. However, under Article I, Section 10, the states could not
pass any "law impairing the obligation of contracts"; and under Article
III, Section 2, the states could not refuse to pay their debts to nonci-
tizens without facing a potential lawsuit in federal court. Again,
Hamilton provides reassurance without addressing the real question.
Sixth, the paucity of Hamilton's substantive rationale for the re-
tention of common law sovereign immunity is evident. He simply re-
cites Blackstone's flawed account of the sovereignty of the King,
without acknowledging the King's susceptibility to suit without con-
sent evidenced in Blackstone and in English case law of the time,348
and without advancing reasons for its adoption in a republican form of
government. His pragmatic concerns are also problematic. The en-
forceability of any constitutional mandate can be questioned: How
could the Article I delegation to the federal government of the power
to coin money, or the requirements of Article II for the selection of
representatives, be enforced against a truly recalcitrant state except
through war? The greatest and the least of the constitutional agree-
346. THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 198 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
347. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 488 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
348. See supra Section TII.B.
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ments are susceptible to the objection Hamilton raised concerning ju-
risdiction over the states.
Finally, sovereign immunity is inconsistent with Hamilton's inter-
pretation of the Constitution advanced in other writings and in other
parts of The Federalist. Hamilton's own plan of government, intro-
duced to the Constitutional Convention on June 18, 1787, during a
single speech which lasted five or six hours, almost completely elimi-
nated state authority. The national legislature had "power to pass all
laws whatsoever"349 subject to the veto of the highest executive, with-
out any limitation reserving specified or residual legislative powers of
the states. The plan further provided:
All laws of the particular states, contrary to the Constitution or laws of the
United States to be utterly void. And the better to prevent such laws being
passed, the governor or president of each state shall have a negative upon the
laws about to be passed in the state of which he is governor or president. 3 5 0
Hamilton's plan also created a Supreme Court, with appellate juris-
diction [from state courts] "in all causes in which the revenues of the
general government, or the citizens of foreign nations, are con-
cerned."s51 The plan permitted establishment of state courts by the
national government "for the determination of all matters of general
concern."352 In explaining the Constitution in The Federalist, Hamil-
ton is clear that it is necessary for the federal judiciary to have power
over the states:
It seems scarcely to admit of controversy that the judiciary authority of the
union ought to extend to these several descriptions of causes. t . To all those
which arise out of the laws of the United States, passed in pursuance of theirjust and constitutional powers of legislation .... The first point depends upon
this obvious consideration that there ought always to be a constitutional
method of giving efficacy to constitutional provisions. What for instance
would avail restrictions on the authority of the state legislatures, without
some constitutional mode of enforcing the observation of them? The states, by
the plan of the convention are prohibited from doing a variety of things; some
of which are incompatible with the interests of the union, and others with the
principles of good government. The imposition of duties on imported articles,
and the emission of paper money, are specimens of each kind. No man of
sense will believe that such prohibitions would be scrupulously regarded,
without some effectual power in the government to restrain or correct the in-
fractions of them. This power must either be a direct negative on the state
laws,35 3 or an authority in the federal courts, to over-rule such as might be in
manifest contravention of the articles of the union. There is no third course
349. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 179.
350. 1 id. at 180.
351. 1 id. at 179.
352. 1 id. at 179-80.
353. This was apparently Hamilton's preference. His plan for the government, sub-
mitted June 18, 1787, provided:
10. All laws of the particular states, contrary to the Constitution or laws
of the United States, to be utterly void. And the better to prevent such
laws being passed, the governor or president of each state shall be ap-
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that I can imagine. The latter appears to have been thought by the conven-
tion preferable to the former, and I presume will be most agreeable to the
states.
3 5 4
The idea that the states must be subject to the control of the national
government, through the authority of the federal courts, cannot be
squared with the idea that the states have sovereign immunity.
Others have explained Hamilton's various statements by recogniz-
ing the limited nature of his remarks in The Federalist No. 81: he
speaks not of a full sovereign immunity, but only about the possibility
of individual suits against states for the payment of debts. 3 55 Thus,
these disparate statements, published on the same day, can be recon-
ciled: Hamilton's remarks about sovereign immunity apply only to
creditor suits against the states, and not to cases involving issues of
national uniformity. Under this reading, The Federalist No. 81 makes
only the limited point that the states would lose their sovereign immu-
nity where it was necessary to ensure the primacy of the Union, which
presumably would not include actions to enforce contracts against the
state.
However, some of the arguments advanced by this Article above
and other of Hamilton's statements suggest that the constitutional
waiver of states' immunity has a broader reach. For example, Hamil-
ton stated in The Federalist No. 80 that "[c]ontroversies between the
nation and its members or citizens can only be properly referred to the
national tribunals. Any other plan would be contrary to reason, to
precedent, and to decorum."3 56 This statement presupposes that the
United States, and by implication, the states, can be parties to law-
suits, and not only as plaintiffs, without limitation as to type of action.
Thus, Hamilton's often-quoted comments on sovereign immunity
in The Federalist No. 81 reflect neither the views of other Framers and
ratifiers nor his own, and should be discounted as an attempt to se-
cure ratification of the Constitution in the face of Antifederalist con-
pointed by the general government, and shall have a negative upon the
laws about to be passed in the state of which he is governor or president.
1 id. at 180. It was Madison's preference as well. See infra text accompanying
note 366.
354. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
355. For example, Justice Stevens has stated: "Hamilton offered his view that the fed-
eral judicial power would not extend to suits against unconsenting States only in
the context of his contention that no contract with a State could be enforceable
against the State's desire. He did not argue that a State's immunity from suit in
federal court would be absolute." Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
92 (1996) (Stevens, J. dissenting); Justice Souter has argued that Hamilton lim-
ited his argument to diversity jurisdiction, and that his statements do not apply
to federal question jurisdiction. Id. at 145-49 (Souter, J., dissenting). See also
Gibbons, supra note 4.




cerns about the future of the states under a new system. Given theimportance of the issues, Hamilton equivocated on the issue of immu-
nity, and according to contemporaneous and later observers, Hamil-
ton's view affords the words of the Constitution an interpretation
which they cannot reasonably bear.357 In his own time, Hamilton was
accused of deviating from his own philosophy for political purposes.During the New York debates, John Lansing, a member of the NewYork delegation at the Philadelphia convention, noted Hamilton's ad-
mission that state governments should be preserved under the newgovernment, and his earlier arguments in Philadelphia, which Lan-
sing characterized as inconsistent:
It has been admitted by an honorable gentleman from New York, (Mr. Hamil-
ton,) that the state governments are necessary to secure the liberties of thepeople .... [I]n the late Convention at Philadelphia ... [tihat honorable gen-
tleman was then fully convinced that [hostility between the general and stategovernments] would exist, and argued, with much decision and great plausi-bility, that the state governments ought to be subverted, at least so far as toleave them only corporate rights, and that, even in that situation, they would
endanger the existence of the general government. But the honorable gen-
tleman's reflections have probably induced him to corrupt that sentiment. 3 5 8
Bracketed material appears in the notes of the New York debates at
this point:
[Mr. Hamilton here interrupted Mr. Lansing, and contradicted, in the mostpositive terms, the charge of inconsistency included in the preceding observa-
tions. This produced a warm personal altercation between those gentlemen,
which engrossed the remainder of the day.]3 5 9
The notes for the next day, Monday, June 30, begin: "The personaldispute between Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Lansing was again broughtforward, and occupied the attention of the committee for a considera-
ble part of this day."360
In our time, Hamilton has been similarly accused of sacrificing
principle for political gain. Clinton Rossiter, who defends Hamilton
against the "popular" charge that The Federalist consists of a lawyer's
357. See supra text accompanying notes 179, 208-21.
358. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 376.
359. 2 id.
360. 2 id. According to reports in the Daily Advertiser, Judge Robert Yates's minutes
of the Convention were consulted, with the conclusion that Hamilton did not in-tend that the states would have only such powers as were held by municipal cor-porations, but only that they would be "deprive[d] of the means of impeding the
operation of the Union." DAILY ADVERTISER, June 30, 1788, reprinted in ALExAN-
DER HAMILTON, A BIOGRAPHY IN HIS OWN WORDS, supra note 331, at 201. At least
one piece of Hamilton's correspondence suggests that Lansing's assessment was
correct. In a letter to Robert Morris he states: "It has ever been my opinion thatCongress ought to have complete sovereignty in all but the mere municipal law of
each state; and I wish to see a convention of all the States, with full power to alter




efforts to win a weak case with arguments known to be false,
36 1 none-
theless acknowledged that Hamilton was not above an occasional
lapse: "[Iln all the struggles of the age over the distribution of power
and prestige between nation and states, Hamilton fought tirelessly,
cleverly, and if necessary even unscrupulously for the cause of
Union."3 62
The linchpin of the current view of states' immunity is a questiona-
ble interpretation of Constitutional language, advanced by a man
whose defenders as well as his critics acknowledge that some of his
statements were pragmatic polemics. A review of the language and
structure of The Federalist No. 81, against the backdrop of an histori-
cal record contrary to Hamilton's expressed view, supports a conclu-
sion that The Federalist No. 81 was written by a man who was
dissembling for the greater good.
3. James Madison
The Supreme Court's view of sovereign immunity also rests on the
statements of James Madison in the Virginia ratification debates.
Speaking about the judicial power extended to the federal courts,
Madison said:
Its jurisdiction in controversies between a state and citizens of another state
is much objected to, and perhaps without reason. It is not in the power of
individuals to call any state into court. The only operation it can have, is that,
if a state should wish to bring a suit against a citizen, it must be brought
before the federal court. This will give satisfaction to individuals, as it will
prevent citizens, on whom a state may have a claim, being dissatisfied with
the state courts. It is a case which cannot often happen, and if it should be
found improper, it will be altered. But it may be attended with good effects.
This may be illustrated by other cases. It is provided, that citizens of different
states may be carried to the federal courts.
But this will not go beyond the cases where they may be parties. A femme
covert may be a citizen of another state, but it cannot be a party in this court.
A subject of a foreign power, having a dispute with a citizen of this state, may
carry it to the federal court; but an alien enemy cannot bring suit at all. It
appears to me that this can have no operation but this - to give a citizen a
right to be heard in the federal courts; and if a state should condescend to be a
party, this court may take cognizance of it.36
3
It is clear from the debate in Virginia that those present did not accept
Madison's explanation; Patrick Henry, in particular, believed that
Madison was dissembling.36 4
Madison's private correspondence supports this view of his state-
ments regarding the immunity of the states. His letters make clear
that he considered federal control over the states to be essential, and
361. RoSsITER, supra note 338, at 59.
362. Id. at 19.
363. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 533.
364. See supra subsection III.C.3.a.
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that the judicial power was the method by which that goal would be
accomplished. The need for control is clear in a letter to George Wash-ington, dated April 16, 1787. In discussing the division of authority
between federal and state governments, Madison states:
[A] negative in all cases whatsoever on the legislative acts of the States, asheretofore exercised by the Kingly prerogative, appears to me to be absolutely
necessary, and to be the least possible encroachment on the State jurisdic-
tions. Without this defensive power, every positive power that can be given on
paper will be evaded & defeated. The States will continue to invade the Na-
tional jurisdiction, to violate treaties and the law of nations & to harass each
other with rival and spiteful measures dictated by mistaken views of its
interest.3 6 5
Madison's letter to Thomas Jefferson, New York, October 24, 1787,
explains how this division of power was hammered out in the
Convention:
The Second object, the due partition of power, between the General & local
Governments, was perhaps of all, the most nice and difficult. A few contended
for an entire abolition of the States; some for indefinite power of Legislation in
the Congress, with a negative on the laws of the States: some for such a power
without a negative: some for a limited power of legislation, without such a
negative: the majority finally for a limited power without the negative. The
question with regard to the Negative underwent repeated discussions, and
was finally rejected by a bare majority. As I formerly intimated to you my
opinion in favor of this ingredient, I will take this occasion of explaining my-
self on the subject. Such a check on the States appears to me necessary 1. toprevent encroachments on the General authority. 2. to prevent instability
and injustice in the legislation of the States. 1 .... It may be said that the
Judicial authority under our new system will keep the States within theirproper limits, and supply the place of a negative on their laws. The answer is,
that it is more convenient to prevent the passage of a law, than to declare it
void after it is passed; that this will be particularly the case, where the law
aggrieves individuals, who may be unable to support an appeal agst. a State to
the supreme Judiciary; that a State which would violate the Legislative rights
of the Union, would not be very ready to obey a Judicial decree in support of
them, and that a recurrence to force, which in the event of disobedience would
be necessary, is an evil which the new Constitution meant to exclude as far aspossible. 2. A constitutional negative on the laws of the States seems equally
necessary to secure individuals agst. encroachments on their rights. The mu-
tability of the laws of the States is found to be a serious evil. The injustice of
them has been so frequent and so flagrant as to alarm the most stedfast
friends of Republicanism. I am persuaded I do not err in saying that the evilsissuing from these sources contributed more to that uneasiness which pro-
duced the Convention, and prepared the public mind for a general reform,
than those which accrued to our national character and interest from the in-
adequacy of the Confederation to its immediate objects.3 6 6
It is impossible to read this passage, written after the Constitution
was presented to the states for ratification, as consistent with sover-
365. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (April 16, 1787) in PADOVER,
supra note 176, at 184-85.
366. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (New York, Oct. 24, 1787), in 1
BAILYN'S DEBATES, supra note 40, at 192, 195-99.
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eign immunity. In contrasting federal legislative and judicial power to
override state law, Madison specifically contemplates actions by indi-
viduals against states: the legislative veto would be better protection,
"particularly . . . where the law aggrieves individuals, who may be
unable to support an appeal agst. a State to the supreme Judici-
ary."367 Madison was clear on the need for a national oversight,
through private suits, on state laws. The original draft, presented by
Edmund Randolph for the Virginia delegation and drafted primarily
by Madison, included the following provision:
Resolved,.. . that the national legislature ought to be empowered.., to nega-
tive all laws passed by the several states, contravening, in the opinion of the
national legislature, the articles of union, or any treaty subsisting under the
authority of the Union.
3 6 8
Early in the Convention, on June 8, Charles Pinckney, seconded by
Madison, moved to strike this provision and substitute a much
broader power, "to negative all laws which to them shall appear im-
proper."369 This proposal was defeated, with only Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, and Madison's Virginia voting in the affirmative.
370
Madison's notes of the Convention state his position:
He [Madison] could not but regard an indefinite power to negative legislative
acts of the States as absolutely necessary to a perfect system. Experience had
evinced a constant tendency in the States to encroach on the federal authority;
to violate national Treaties; to infringe the rights & interests of each other; to
oppress the weaker party within their respective jurisdictions. A negative
was the mildest expedient that could be devised for preventing these mis-
chiefs. The existence of such a check would prevent attempts to commit
them .... [I]n order to give the negative this efficacy, it must extend to all
cases. A discrimination would only be a fresh source of contention between
the two authorities .... This prerogative of the General Government is the
great pervading principle that must controul the centrifugal tendency of the
States; which, without it, will continually fly out of their proper orbits and
destroy the order & harmony of the political System.
3 7 1
When the Convention considered the resolutions offered by Ran-
dolph as amended by the whole house, it reviewed the proposed legis-
lative veto again, in its original, narrower version. Madison repeated
his arguments in favor of a veto power, adding that the states could
"pass laws which will accomplish their injurious objects before they
can be repealed by the General Legislature or be set aside by the Na-
tional Tribunals."3 72 Governor Morris and Roger Sherman argued
strongly against a national legislative veto power to veto state laws as
unnecessary and offensive, noting that state laws contrary to the na-
tional law would be set aside by the judiciary or repealed by a national
367. 1 id. at 198.
368. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 144.
369. 1 id. at 166.
370. 1 id.
371. MADISON, supra note 72, at 88-89.
372. Id. at 304.
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law.373 The proposal was defeated, with only three states, Massachu-
setts, Virginia, and North Carolina in favor.374 Luther Martin pro-
posed, as an alternative, an early version of the Supremacy Clause,
which passed unanimously. 375 In the absence of a congressional
power to negative the states' passage of legislation, the Convention
recognized that power resided in the national judiciary to override
state law. This extension of national judicial power to suits against
the states was, in Madison's view, a poor alternative to the legislative
veto. However, given his repeated expression of concern, Madison
considered it absolutely essential to accomplish the vertical separation
of powers necessary to the system.
Given this context, it is not plausible to explain Madison's com-
ments in the Virginia ratification debates as an attempt to explain theprovision from the perspective of those who carried the day. Those
who prevailed and defeated the national legislative veto of state laws
viewed the states as subject to the power of the national judiciary.
And in the statements to Jefferson, Madison clearly contemplates thepossibility of an action against the states under the system as it waspassed by the majority. Madison's comments to the contrary in the
Virginia ratification debates must be viewed, like Hamilton's The Fed-
eralist No. 81 digression, as a political attempt to secure ratification in
Virginia.
That Madison, like Hamilton, felt political pressures, is clear. He
understood the difficult political situation in New York, and in his own
state of Virginia, and understood that the national government he en-
visioned could not be realized absent ratification in those states.
Madison believed also that this was the only opportunity for national
unity; his writings make it clear that he believed a second Constitu-
tional Convention would prove disastrous. Writing to Edmund Ran-
dolph in January 1788, Madison said:
[I]f a Government be ever adopted in America, it must result from a fortunate
coincidence of leading opinions, and a general confidence of the people in those
who recommend it. The very attempt at a second Convention strikes at the
confidence in the first; and the existence of a second by opposing influence toinfluence, would in a manner destroy an effectual confidence in either, andgive a loose to human opinions;-which must be as various and irreconcilable
concerning theories of Government, as doctrines of Religion; and give opportu-
nities to designing men, which it might be impossible to counteract. 37 6
Madison's later correspondence on the nullification controversy re-iterates his view of the vertical division of power between states and
the United States as depending on the judiciary.
373. Id. at 305-06.
374. 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 207.375. 1 id.; see also MADISON, supra note 72, at 305-06.376. Letter of James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Jan. 10, 1788), in 1 BAILYN's DE-
BATES, supra note 40, at 746.
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In forming this compound scheme of Government, it was impossible to lose
sight of the question, What was to be done in the event of controversies, which
could not fail to occur, concerning the partition line between the powers be-
longing to the Federal and to the State governments? That some provision
ought to be made, was as obvious and as essential as the task itself was diffi-
cult and delicate .... The provision immediately and ordinarily relied on is
manifestly the Supreme Court of the United States, clothed as it is with a
jurisdiction "in controversies to which the United States shall be a party."
3 7 7
In other correspondence relating to nullification, Madison identified
the Supremacy Clause and the extensions of the national judicial
power to cases involving federal law as creating an essential check on
the power of the states. In speaking of the government of United
States and the state governments, Madison noted that:
[Ilt could not escape attention, that controversies would arise concerning the
boundaries of jurisdiction; and that some provision ought to be made for such
occurrences. A political system that does not provide for a peaceable and au-
thoritative termination of occurring controversies, would not be more than the
shadow of a government; the object and end of a real government being the
substitution of law and order, for uncertainty, confusion, and violence.
To permit negotiation, as between independent sovereigns, in cases of dis-
pute, would have lost sight altogether of a Constitution and Government for
the Union, and opened a direct road from a failure of that resort, to the ultima
ration between nations wholly independent of and alien to each other.
The Constitution, not relying on any of the preceding modifications, for its
safe and successful operation, has expressly declared, on the one hand, 1,
"that the Constitution, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, and all trea-
ties made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law
of the land; 2, that the Judges of every state shall be bound thereby, any thing
in the constitution and laws of an state to the contrary notwithstanding; 3,
that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to all cases in law
and equity arising under the constitution, the laws of the United States, and
treaties made under their authority, &C."
3 7 8
This passage was written well after the Eleventh Amendment. 3 79 Al-
though perhaps Madison had in mind only the possibility of the
United States government suing a state government, it is reasonable
to read this passage as supporting the proposition that the structure
of the government required susceptibility of state governments to
suits in Article III cases generally.
Thus, Madison's statements and positions, apart from that single
position taken in the Virginia ratification debate, indicate an under-
standing that governments could be sued. It is an extraordinary irony
that Madison and Hamilton, ardent supporters of a strong centralized
377. Letter from James Madison to N.P. Trist (Feb. 15, 1830), in PADOVER, supra note
176, at 195-96.
378. Letter from James Madison to Edward Everett (Aug. 1830), in PADOVER, supra
note 176, at 152-54.
379. The Eleventh Amendment was proposed to the states in March 1794 and ratifica-
tion was completed in February 1795.
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government, provide the cornerstones of a modern system so at odds
with their fundamental conception.
4. John Marshall
John Marshall was not present at the Constitutional Convention,
but served as a delegate to the Virginia ratifying convention. Follow-
ing Madison's remarks on state sovereign immunity during the ratifi-
cation debate in Virginia, Marshall seconded Madison's
interpretation:
With respect to disputes between a state and the citizens of another state, itsjurisdiction has been decried with unusual vehemence. I hope that no gen-
tleman will think that a state will be called at the bar of the federal court. Is
there no such case at present? Are there not many cases in which the legisla-
ture of Virginia is a party, and yet the state is not sued? It is not rational to
suppose that the sovereign power should be dragged before a court. The in-
tent is, to enable states to recover claims of individuals residing in other
states. I contend this construction is warranted by the words. But, say they,
there will be partiality in it if a state cannot be a defendant- if an individual
cannot proceed to obtain judgment against a state, though he may be sued by
a state. It is necessary to be so, and cannot be avoided. I see a difficulty in
making a state a defendant, which does not prevent its being a plaintiff. If
this be only what cannot be avoided, why object to the system on that account?
If an individual has a just claim against any particular state, is it to be pre-
sumed that, on application to its legislature, he will not obtain satisfaction?
But how could a state recover any claim from a citizen of another state, with-
out the establishment of these tribunals? 38 0
Marshall's participation in the ratification process was lesser than
Madison's and Hamilton's, and these comments are his only recorded
statements relevant to the issue. However, his later writings on the
Supreme Court suggest a very different perspective. Marshall's ser-
vice as Chief Justice from 1801 to 1835, and his opinions, notably in
Marbury v. Madison,381 McCulloch v. Maryland,382 and Cohens v. Vir-
ginia,3 s 3 affirmed the supremacy of the Constitution and the power of
the Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of state legislation
and decisional law. His 1810 opinion in Fletcher v. Peck advances a
constitutional reading specifically at odds with his view as expressed
in the Virginia ratification debates:
The constitution, as passed, gave the courts of the United States jurisdiction
in suits brought against individual states. A state, then, which violated its
own contract was suable in the courts of the United States for that violation.
Would it have been a defence in such a suit to say that the state had passed a
law absolving itself from the contract? . . . And yet, if a state is neither re-
380. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 555-56. By 1821, in his decision in Cohens
v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, Marshall described sovereign immunity as a device uti-
lized to protect states from their creditors, having nothing to do with the dignity
of states or the respect that should be accorded them. Id. at 291-92.
381. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
382. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
383. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
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strained by the general principles of our political institutions, nor by the
words of the constitution, from impairing the obligation of its own contracts,
such a defence would be a valid one. This feature is no longer found in the
constitution; but it aids in the construction of those clauses with which it was
originally associated.
3 8 4
Marshall's opinions in Cohens v. Virginia also indicate that ratifica-
tion constituted consent to suit.38 5 These decisions suggest, as with
other statements made by Hamilton and Madison, that the view Mar-
shall expressed in the Virginia ratification debates was part of a politi-
cal strategy to secure ratification.
5. Conclusion
Thus, the great weight of evidence from the years 1787 and 1788
demonstrates that the founding generation read Article III as an
agreement by the states individually and collectively as the United
States to submit to the jurisdiction of the national courts in Article III
cases, including cases brought by individuals. This Article disagrees
with the concession of the current Court's dissenters, that "Madison,
Hamilton, and Marshall all agreed that Article III did not of its own
force abrogate the States' pre-existing common-law immunity."
38 6
The statements by Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall comprise the
sum of the evidence for the contrary view, and these are simply insuf-
ficient to support the conclusion that Article III was intended to be
subject to common law sovereign immunities.
F. Early Case Law Holding that Ratification Constituted
Consent
Early judicial interpretations of the language in Article III indicate
that the jurisdictional grants in Article III themselves constitute the
consent of the sovereign (the individual states and the United States)
to suit. In the case of the states, their ratification of the Constitution,
with its extension of judicial power to actions involving the states in
Article III, constituted this consent: "The judicial Power shall extend
... to Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and
Citizens of another State."38 7 Early case law recognized ratification
as consent (with the exception, after the adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment, of suits against a State by a citizen of another State or
citizens or subjects of a foreign state). In the case of the national gov-
ernment, the states limited the sovereign power of the new national
government by subjecting it to suit. The grant of jurisdiction over the
United States limits the power delegated by the states to the federal
384. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810).
385. See infra text accompanying notes 414-18.
386. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 143 n.39 (Souter, J., dissenting).
387. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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government: "The judicial Power shall extend ... to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party."3ss
Early decisions of the Supreme Court held that the states, through
their ratification of the Constitution, did in fact consent to submit to
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. In Chisolm v. Georgia, Justice
Blair, who was part of the Virginia delegation at the Constitutional
Convention and who also represented his state in the ratification de-
bates, found that the Constitution expressly extended the national ju-
dicial power to controversies such as the one before the court, rejected
as contrary to constitutional language the construction that the juris-
dictional grant extended only to cases brought by a state, and held
explicitly that ratification constituted consent: "[W]hen a State, by
adopting the Constitution, has agreed to be amenable to the judicial
power of the United States, she has, in that respect, given up her right
of sovereignty."389 Justice Blair confined his analysis to the words of
the Constitution, and did not rely on external evidence of any sort.
His interpretation of these words, given his participation as a Framer
and a ratifier, and his status as a member of the Court, is entitled to
significant weight.
Justice Wilson similarly ruled in his opinion in Chisolm that the
State of Georgia could be sued by an individual, in a ringing rejection
of Georgia's argument that a government could not be held accounta-
ble for its wrongs. Wilson was a delegate to the Constitutional Con-
vention and to the Pennsylvania ratifying convention. Most
importantly, however, as a member of the Committee of Detail, Wil-
son, along with Edmund Randolph, drafted the Constitution
presented to the Convention on August 6 which included much of the
present language of Article 111.390 Thus, Wilson's opinion in Chisolm
is entitled to particular deference. He was not simply a Framer and
ratifier of the Constitution, but one of its primary draftsmen. Wilson's
opinion describes the people as sovereign, bound by law because they
choose to be; the aggregate body of the people, the State, is similarly
bound by law. The dignity of the states does not alter this conclusion:
"If the dignity of each singly is undiminished; the dignity of all jointly
must be unimpaired."391 Any other notion of sovereignty was mis-
placed in the new United States:
[S]overeignty is derived from a feudal source; and like many other parts of
that system so degrading to man, still retains its influence over our senti-
ments and conduct, though the cause, by which that influence was produced,
never extended to the American States.3 9 2
388. Id.
389. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S (2 Dall.) 419, 451-52 (1793).
390. Supra note 123 and accompanying text.
391. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 456 (Wilson, J.).
392. Id. at 457.
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According to Wilson, "laws derived from the pure source of equality
and justice must be founded on the CONSENT of those, whose obedi-
ence they require."39 3 Thus, the people had the power to bind the
states and to vest the national government with legislative power over
the states, and they had in fact done so. 39 4
If the legislative power extended to the states, the judicial necessa-
rily followed: "it would be superfluous to make laws, unless those laws,
when made, were to be enforced."3 95 This conclusion was consistent
with and even necessitated by the purposes of the Constitution to form
a more perfect union, to establish justice, and to ensure domestic
tranquility.
Is it congruous, that, with regard to such purposes, any man or body of men,
any person natural or artificial, should be permitted to claim successfully an
entire exemption from the jurisdiction of the national Government? Would
not such claims, crowned with success, be repugnant to our very existence as a
nation?
3 9 6
Finally, Wilson agreed with Blair that the language of the Constitu-
tion removed any doubts about his conclusions with Article III: "[T]he
judicial power of the United States shall extend to controversies, be-
tween a state and citizens of another State."3 9 7
Justice Cushing's analysis of the language of the Constitution in
Article III, Section 2, and his assessment of the reasons for the various
extensions of judicial power, led him to the same conclusion. He found
that the language of the Constitution clearly permitted diverse citizen
suits against the States. The reasons for this extension of judicial
power supported the conclusion: the central government was en-
trusted with preserving the peace, and the ability to adjudicate contro-
versies between states, between states and diverse citizens, and
between states and foreign states, citizens, or subjects, was essential
to avoiding armed conflict.3 98
Chief Justice Jay was in accord. He framed the question as,
"[W]hether Georgia has not, by being a party to the national compact,
consented to be suable by individual citizens of another State,"3 9 9 and
concluded that Georgia did in fact consent to suit through the express
language of the Constitution, as well as its spirit:
393. Id. at 458.
394. Wilson supported his position by examining the structure of the government cre-
ated by the Constitution. He concluded that the Constitution specifically contem-
plated congressional control over the states, id. at 464, relying on the
incontrovertible evidence of this intent in Article I, Section 10, which provides
that all state laws with respect to duties and imposts "shall be subject to the
Revision and Controul of the Congress." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
395. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 464.
396. Id. at 465.
397. Id. at 466.
398. Id. at 467-68 (Cushing, J.).
399. Id. at 473 (Jay, C.J.).
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I am convinced that the sense in which I understand and have explained the
words "controversies between States and citizens of another State," is the true
sense. The extension of the judiciary power of the United States to such con-
troversies, appears to me to be wise, because it is honest, and because it is
useful. It is honest, because it provides for doing justice without respect of
persons, and by securing individual citizens as well as States, in their respec-
tive rights, performs the promise which every free Government makes to
every free citizen, of equal justice and protection. It is useful, because it is
honest, because it leaves not even the most obscure and friendless citizen
without means of obtaining justice from a neighbouring State; because it obvi-
ates occasions of quarrels between States on account of the claims of their
respective citizens; because it recognizes and strongly rests on this great
moral truth, that justice is the same whether due from one man or a million,
or from a million to one man; because it teaches and greatly appreciates the
value of our free republican national Government, which places all our citi-
zens on an equal footing, and enables each and every of them to obtain justice
without any danger of being overborne by the weight and number of their
opponents; and, because it brings into action, and enforces this great and glo-
rious principle, that the people are the sovereign of this country, and conse-
quently that fellow citizens and joint sovereigns cannot be degraded by
appearing with each other in their own Courts to have their controversies
determined. 4 0 0
Again, Jay's participation in the process of ratification entitles his
opinion to special deference. Although Jay did not attend the Consti-
tutional Convention, he was active in the ratification effort in New
York, writing five of The Federalist papers, and helping to guarantee
New York's ratification by assisting New York Antifederalists in their
proposal to call a convention to amend the Constitution.
Notably, counsel for the plaintiff Chisolm in the case was Edmund
Randolph. His position as the proponent of the first working draft of
the Constitution ("the Randolph Plan"),40 1 a member of the Commit-
tee of Detail, and a draftsman of the Constitution submitted to the
Convention following its summer deliberations,402 entitles his opinion
to significant weight. He argued in Chisolm, consistent with his argu-
ments in the Virginia ratification convention, 4 03 that the Constitution
permitted actions against the states by its language and by its
spirit.40 4
The only Justice who dissented from the conclusion that the states
were subject to suit in federal court under Article III was Justice Ire-
dell. 40 5 He agreed with the majority of the court that the people were
sovereign, and that in ratifying the Constitution, the people limited
the sovereignty of the states. If the federal courts had jurisdiction
400. Id. at 479.
401. See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
402. See supra text accompanying note 123.
403. See supra text accompanying notes 219-21.
404. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 420-21.
405. Justice Iredell had been a delegate to North Carolina's ratifying convention. 4
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 1.
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over the state of Georgia under Article III, Section 2, Iredell reasoned,
it was still necessary to determine whether substantive law permitted
a particular action. The source of such law included the laws of the
United States, statutory and decisional, and the common law of En-
gland. Justice Iredell stated that no precedent existed which would
sanction suit against the state of Georgia contrary to its will. To
demonstrate his point, Iredell made extensive reference to The Case of
the Bankers,40 6 decided in England at the end of the seventeenth cen-
tury. In that case, the court permitted subjects to sue the King, with-
out his consent, to enforce payment of debts he owed. Lord Chief
Justice Holt found that the plaintiffs had proceeded by monstrans de
droit, which did not require the King's prior consent, and observed
that it was unnecessary to obtain the King's consent even where the
plaintiff proceeded by petition of right.40 7 Justice Iredell relied en-
tirely on the opinion of Lord Sommers, whose decision was overturned
on appeal and whose opinion also supports the position that suit may
lie against the King without his consent.408 Although Iredell acknowl-
edged that The Case of the Bankers supported an action against Geor-
gia, he constricted its holding radically: "admitting the authority of
that decision in its fullest extent, yet it is an authority only in respect
to such cases, where letters patent from the crown have been granted
for the payment of certain sums out of a particular revenue."409 Ire-
dell has it both ways: no action lies against the state for its debts un-
less there is English common law precedent for it, but the precedent of
Bankers, which in fact permits such an action, does not apply because
it deals with debts of the Crown under letters patent rather than the
debts of a state. So, a suit is possible only where the common law
406. The Case of the Bankers in the Court of Exchequer, 1700, 2 W. & M., 12 Will. 3,
reprinted in 14 HOWELL, supra note 146, at 1-114.
407. Id. at 34. Holt stated: "It is objected, that the petition should be first sued to the
King: but by the records in Ryly's Placita Parl. 351, 257 Staundf. 72, it appears,
that these petitions of right have been sued to the court of the King's bench." Id.
408. Lord Sommers discussed Stat. 8 Ed., I Ryley 442:
[Where notice is taken that the business of parliament is interrupted by
a multitude of petitions, which might be redressed by the chancellor and
justices. Wherefore it is thereby enacted, that petitions which touch the
seal shall come first to the chancellor; those which touch the Exchequer,
to the Exchequer; and those which touch the justices, or the law of the
land, should come to the justices; and if the business be so great, or si de
grace that the chancellor, or others, cannot do them without the King,
then the petitions shall be brought before the King to know his pleasure;
so that no petitions come before the King and his council, but by the
hands of the chancellor, and other chief ministers; that the King and his
council, may attend the great affairs of the king's realm, and his foreign
dominions.
Id. at 83-84. The clear import of these passages in Sommers's opinion is that the
King could be sued, and that such suits could proceed without his personal
consent.
409. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 439 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
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supplies a precedent, as it does here, but the systems are so different
that the precedent is factually inapplicable.
Two of the Justices in Chisolm discussed, in dicta, the issue of citi-
zen suits against the United States. Justice Cushing noted the objec-
tion that the United States, under his analysis of the Constitution,
was similarly subject to suit by citizens. Although he "doubted" that
conclusion, he said, "[i]f this be a necessary consequence, it must be
so."410 Justice Jay also recognized that his analysis led to the conclu-
sion that the United States was subject to suit by a citizen. He noted a
distinction which might yield a different conclusion-that the judici-
ary could seek the assistance of the national government in enforcing
its judgments against a state, but that no such assistance would be
available to enforce judgments against the national government. 4 11
Jay concluded, however, that such actions should lie:
I wish the State of society was so far improved, and the science of Government
advanced to such a degree of perfection as that the whole nation could in the
peaceable course of law, be compelled to do justice, and be sued by individual
citizens. Whether that is, or is not, now the case, ought not to be thus collater-
ally and incidentally decided: I leave it a question. 4 1 2
Subsequent decisions reached the conclusion that the states, and
by implication the United States through the collective action of the
states, had consented to suit simply by ratifying the Constitution with
its Article III extensions of jurisdiction over states and United
States.413 Among these decisions was Cohens v. Virginia,414 in which
the Court held that Virginia was subject to the federal question juris-
diction of the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Marshall set out the gen-
eral proposition which "will not be controverted" that states can be
sued only if they consent. 4 15
But its consent is not requisite in each particular case. It may be given in a
general law. And if a State has surrendered any portion of its sovereignty, the
question whether a liability to suit be a part of this portion, depends on the
instrument by which the surrender is made. If, upon a just construction of
that instrument, it shall appear that the State has submitted to be sued, then
it has parted with this sovereign right ofjudging in every case on the justice of
its own pretensions, and has entrusted that power to a tribunal in whose im-
partiality it confides. 4 1 6
The states surrendered their sovereignty over war, peace, commerce,
and other significant matters to the national government by the Con-
stitution. In Marshall's view, Virginia surrendered its sovereign im-
410. Id. at 469.
411. Id. at 478.
412. Id.
413. The states could, consistent with the Constitution, retain immunity from suit in
their own courts.
414. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
415. Id. at 380.
416. Id.
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munity from suit through various jurisdictional grants in Article III:
"[A] case arising under the constitution or laws of the United States, is
cognizable in the Courts of the Union, whoever may be the parties to
that case."41 7 "The mere circumstance, that a State is a party, gives
jurisdiction to the Court."418 Thus, Chief Justice Marshall understood
ratification of the Constitution by the states as their consent to suit.
His later opinion in Osborn v. Bank of the United States419 similarly
held that the Eleventh Amendment did not prevent an action against
a state concerning an unconstitutional tax.
The 1838 case of Rhode Island v. Massachusetts4 2o similarly found:
Those states, in their highest sovereign capacity, in the convention of the peo-
ple thereof; on whom, by the revolution, the prerogative of the crown, and the
transcendent power of parliament devolved, in a plenitude unimpaired by any
act, and controllable by no authority, adopted the constitution, by which they
respectively made to the United States a grant of judicial power over contro-
versies between two or more states. By the constitution, it was ordained that
this judicial power, in cases where a state was a party, should be exercised by
this Court as one of original jurisdiction. The states waived their exemption
from judicial power, as sovereigns by original and inherent right, by their own
grant of its exercise over themselves in such cases, but which they would not
grant to any inferior tribunal. By this grant, this Court has acquired jurisdic-
tion over the parties in this cause, by their own consent and delegated author-
ity; as their agent for executing the judicial power of the United States in the
cases specified. 4 2 1
Mr. Justice Curtis, in his dissenting opinion in Florida v. Geor-
gia4 2 2 stated: "It must be remembered, also, that a State can be sued
only by its own consent. This consent has been given in the constitu-
tion . . "423
In United States v. Texas,42 4 the court also found that Texas had
consented to suits against it through Article III:
The States of the Union have agreed, in the Constitution, that the judicial
power of the United States shall extend to all cases arising under the Consti-
tution, laws, and treaties of the United States, without regard to the character
417. Id. at 383.
418. Id. The Eleventh Amendment did not apply, according to Marshall, because the
writ of error was not a "suit" within the meaning of the amendment. See also
McKesson Corp. v. Division of ABT, 495 U.S. 18, 31 (1990) (holding that Eleventh
amendment does not constrain the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
over cases arising from the state courts); Graber, The Passive-Aggressive Virtues:
Cohens v. Virginia and the Problematic Establishment of Political Power, 12
CONST. COMMENT 67 (1995); Jackson, supra note 4, at 13-25.
419. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
420. 37 U.S. 657 (1838).
421. Id. at 720 (citation omitted).
422. 58 U.S. 478 (1854) (Curtis, J., dissenting) (concluding that the United States was
not entitled to participate as a nonparty in a boundary dispute between Georgia
and Florida, since, inter alia, Article III did not entail states' consent to such a
suit).
423. Id. at 507.
424. 143 U.S. 621 (1892).
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of the parties, (excluding, of course, suits against a State by its own citizens or
by citizens of other States, or by citizens or subjects or foreign States,) and
equally to controversies to which the United States shall be a party, without
regard to the subject of such controversies, and that this court may exercise
original jurisdiction in all such cases, "in which a state shall be party," with-
out excluding those in which the United States may be the opposite party.
The exercise, therefore, by this court, of such original jurisdiction in a suit
brought by one State against another to determine the boundary line between
them, in a suit brought by another to determine the boundary line between
them, or in a suit brought by the United States against a state to determine
the boundary between a Territory of the United states and that State, so far
from infringing, in either case, upon the sovereignty, is with the consent of the
State sued. Such consent was given by Texas when admitted into the Union
upon an equal footing in all respects with the other States.4 2 5
Even cases well into the twentieth century found that Article III in
itself constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity. In the 1934 case of
Monaco v. Mississippi,426 the Court noted that states possess immu-
nity from unconsented suit except where there has been a surrender of
this immunity in the plan of the Convention (quoting The Federalist
No. 81) and held that such a surrender was inherent in and essential
to the Constitution when a state is sued by another state or the United
States (but not, as in Monaco v. Mississippi, where a foreign state sues
the state). According to the Court,"The waiver or consent, on the part
of a State, which inheres in the acceptance of the constitutional plan,
runs to the other States who have likewise accepted that plan, and to
the United States as the sovereign which the Constitution creates,"
and "[t]he jurisdiction of this Court over the parties in such cases was
thus established 'by their own consent and delegated authority' as a
necessary feature of the formation of a more perfect Union."4 27 In
1989, the Supreme Court held that by ratifying the Constitution, the
states relinquished immunity by consent:
[T]o the extent that the States gave Congress the authority to regulate com-
merce, they also relinquished their immunity where Congress found it neces-
sary, in exercising this authority, to render them liable. The States held liable
under such a congressional enactment are thus not "unconsenting"; they gave
their consent all at once, in ratifying the Constitution containing the Com-
merce Clause, rather than on a case-by-case basis.
4 28
Collectively, these cases establish that the various jurisdictional
grants in Article III, from federal question jurisdiction to party-spe-
cific jurisdiction, constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity.
425. Id. at 646.
426. 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
427. Id. at 328-30.
428. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1989).
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G. The Eleventh Amendment
The Supreme Court's view is that the Eleventh Amendment is not
limited to its language, but stands for a "presupposition" of sovereign
immunity. 429 The Eleventh Amendment reads simply:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.4 3 0
This language, which appears to have merely eliminated the Article
III state-citizen diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, has been
broadly construed to prevent actions by a citizen against his or her
own state, 431 as well as actions brought under the first clause of Arti-
cle III, Section 2, which arise under federal law,4 32 actions brought by
foreign nations433 or Indian tribes,434 actions in admiralty,435 actions
in administrative courts,436 and even actions in state courts to enforce
federal law.437
All of these holdings depend on the view of history adopted by the
Supreme Court in 1890, in Hans v. Louisiana,438 in which the Su-
preme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment prevents a citizen
from suing his own state in federal court, despite its specific limiting
language. The Court reached that conclusion based on its view of the
country's reaction to Chisolm v. Georgia.439 According to the Hans
429. E.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 54 (1996).
430. U.S. CONsT. amend. XI.
431. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
432. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (holding that the Indian Commerce Clause
did not give Congress the power to subject the states to suit under the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act); Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775
(1991).
433. Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
434. Blatchford, 501 U.S. 775.
435. Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921).
436. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S.Ct. 1864 (2002).
437. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
438. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
439. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). The earliest judicial recitation of this story that I
have seen is in Justice Campbell's dissenting opinion in the 1854 case of Florida
v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 478 (1854). Justice Campbell cites Hamilton,
Madison, and Marshall; recites Georgia's reaction to the Chisholm case; and
states that:
One month after [the decision in Chisholm], January, 1794, the senate
was moved by Mr. Strong, of Massachusetts, to adopt the eleventh
amendment to the constitution, declaring that the constitution should
not be construed to authorize such suits. Various attempts were made in
both branches of congress to limit the operation of the amendment, but
without effect. It was accepted without the alteration of a letter, by a
vote of 23 to 2 in the senate, and 81 to 9 in the house of representatives,
and received the assent of the state legislatures. Georgia ratified the
amendment as 'an explanatory article,' her legislature 'concurring there-
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Court, the majority's decision in Chisolm, that the Constitution per-
mitted suit by a diverse citizen against a state "created such a shock of
surprise throughout the country that, at the first meeting of Congress
thereafter, the Eleventh amendment to the constitution was almost
unanimously proposed, and was in due course adopted by the legisla-
tures of the States."4 40 This account has been discredited. 44 1 The
Congress did not act on the proposed amendment until January
1794,442 almost a year after the decision in Chisolm. The states did
not complete the ratification process until 1798.44 3 As of March 1797,
more than four years after the Chisolm decision, half of the states had
not even responded on the issue.4 44 These facts substantially under-
cut the "shock of surprise" account advanced by the Hans court. The
Hans court also stated, "Any such power as that of authorizing the
federal judiciary to entertain suits by individuals against the States
had been expressly disclaimed, and even resented, by the great de-
fenders of the Constitution whilst it was on its trial before the Ameri-
can people,"445 and quoted Hamilton in The Federalist No. 81,446 and
Madison 4 47 and Marshall 448 in the Virginia ratification debates. As
this Article has demonstrated, there is good reason to doubt that
Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall articulated the consensus of the
drafters and ratifiers. Significantly, Marshall's view of the Eleventh
Amendment differed substantially from that announced in Hans. In
his 1821 opinion in Cohens v. Virginia, Justice Marshall offered a
forthright account of state indebtedness as a matter of concern to the
states in ratification of the Constitution and as the reason for the
Eleventh Amendment:
It is a part of our history, that, at the adoption of the constitution, all the
States were greatly indebted; and the apprehension that these debts might be
prosecuted in the federal Courts, formed a very serious objection to that in-
strument. Suits were instituted; and the Court maintained its jurisdiction.
The alarm was general; and, to quiet the apprehensions that were so exten-
with, deeming the same to be the only just and true construction of the
judicial power by which the rights and dignity of the several States can
be effectively secured.' Thus the supreme constitutional jurisdiction of
the United States, the concurrent action of congress, and the state legis-
latures, expressing a consent nearly unanimous, corrected the opinion of
the supreme court, and intercepted its final judgments in these cases, by
declaring that the constitution should not be so construed as to allow
them.
Id. at 520.
440. Hans, 134 U.S. at 11.
441. E.g., Gibbons, supra note 4.
442. See id. at 1933-34.
443. Id. at 1938 n.261; accord 1 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 38, at 341.
444. Gibbons, supra note 4, at 1938 n.261.
445. Hans, 134 U.S. at 12.
446. See supra subsection III.E.2.
447. See supra subsection III.E.3.
448. See supra subsection III.E.4.
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sively entertained, this amendment was proposed in Congress, and adopted by
the State legislatures. That its motive was not to maintain the sovereignty of
a State from the degradation supposed to attend a compulsory appearance
before the tribunal of the nation, may be inferred from the terms of the
amendment. It does not comprehend controversies between two or more
States, or between a State and a foreign State. The jurisdiction of the Court
still extends to these cases: and in these a State may still be sued. We must
ascribe the amendment, then, to some other cause than the dignity of a State.
There is no difficulty in finding this cause. Those who were inhibited from
commencing a suit against a State, or from prosecuting one which might be
commenced before the adoption of the amendment, were persons who might
probably be its creditors. 4 4 9
This narrow view of the Eleventh Amendment was accepted by the
Supreme Court until the post-Reconstruction period. During that era,
the Supreme Court wrestled with difficult political issues created by
the refusal of newly restored southern governments to honor bonds
issued by their predecessors. According to Judge Gibbons' analysis, 4 50
the Court's decision in Hans v. Louisiana is attributable to its recogni-
tion that its position and power was under serious threat in the post-
Civil War era. If the Court ruled against the southern states, there
was a very real possibility that its decisions could not be enforced. In
1878, the Congress had passed the Posse Comitatus Act,451 which pro-
hibited United States Marshalls from using Army regulars to help to
enforce court orders. The President's power to use the Army to en-
force the Court's rulings was also in question. In 1886, the Demo-
cratic House had blocked appropriations for the Army. These actions
effectively precluded enforcement of federal law against a resisting
state. 45 2 In the face of these political realities, the Court simply
adopted the expedient solution and expanded the reach of the Elev-
enth Amendment. In Judge Gibbons' words, "the justices needed a
way to let the South win the repudiation war. The means Bradley
chose was to rewrite the eleventh amendment and the history of its
adoption."453
Dissenters on the Supreme Court454 and numerous scholars455
have adopted the early view of the Eleventh Amendment, exemplified
449. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 291 (1821).
450. Gibbons, supra note 4, at 1990.
451. Act of June 18, 1878, ch. 263, §15, 20 Stat. 145, 152 (current version codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1385 (2002)).
452. Gibbons, supra note 4, at 1990.
453. Id. at 2000.
454. E.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). Justice Brennan stated:
[Tihe Court's Eleventh Amendment doctrine diverges from text and his-
tory virtually without regard to underlying purposes or genuinely funda-
mental interests. In consequence, the Court has put the federal
judiciary in the unseemly position of exempting the States from compli-
ance with laws that bind every other legal actor in our Nation.
Id. at 247-48; accord Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
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by Marshall's opinion in Cohens v. Virginia, rather than the post-Re-
construction view of Bradley in Hans v. Louisiana. This original read-
ing of the Eleventh Amendment relies on the language and history of
the Amendment and holds that it simply overruled Chisolm v. Geor-
gia, repealing the citizen-state and alien-state diversity clauses in Ar-
ticle III, but leaving the rest of Article III, including judicial power
over actions against the states on issues of federal law, intact. Partic-
ularly given the Framers' and ratifiers' sense of the importance of fed-
eral judicial power over the states,45 6 this reading of the Eleventh
Amendment must be preferred.
H. Conclusion
Each of these arguments concerning the intent of the Framers (the
structure of the government, the language of the constitution, the
statements of the Framers and ratifiers, the specific reasons for the
extensions of various judicial power, and understandings expressed in
the early years of the republic) is in itself compelling evidence. Taken
together, they provide a powerful refutation of the notion that the
states and the United States are protected by broad constitutional
sovereign immunities.
IV. NONHISTORICAL RATIONALES FOR
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The arguments above demonstrate that the ratification of the Con-
stitution entailed consent of the states and the United States to the
exercise of the national judicial power over Article III cases, subject to
the narrow immunity later afforded by the Eleventh Amendment.
However, in addition to the discredited historical arguments advanced
for sovereign immunity, the courts have articulated other reasons for
immunity. This Article turns now to an assessment of these addi-
tional, nonhistorical rationales for sovereign immunity. Just as the
historical rationale for sovereign immunity is flawed, nonhistorical
justifications are also problematic. None of the rationales advanced
by the courts, except separation of powers, possesses sufficient force,
singly or collectively, to sustain the doctrine independent of its dis-
455. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987); Gibbons, supra
note 4; Fletcher, supra note 4; Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sover-
eign Immunity Doctrines: Congressional Imposition of Suit Upon the States, 126
PA. L. REV. 1203 (1978); Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment,
and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988); Lee, Sovereign Immunity
and the Eleventh Amendment: The Uses of History, 18 URB. LAW. 519 (1986); Mar-
shall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1342
(1989); Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst
Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61 (1984); Tribe, supra note 4.
456. See supra text accompanying notes 106-14, 161-66.
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credited historical foundation. And although separation of powers jus-
tifies immunity in some cases, it cannot provide an adequate
justification in many of the cases which are dismissed based on
immunity.
A. Early Case Law
A number of the early decisions of the Supreme Court simply
stated that no action would lie against a sovereign without consent,
without justification by reason or citation to authority, and ignoring
the language of the Constitution and the early case law holding that
ratification was consent. 45 7 United States v. McLemore,4 5 s a suit by a
judgment debtor against the United States, held that the circuit court
should not have issued an injunction against the United States' at-
tempt to obtain payment and should not have ordered the United
States to pay the plaintiffs costs:
There was no jurisdiction of this case in Circuit Court, as the government is
not liable to be sued, except with its own consent, given by law. Nor can a
decree or judgment be entered against the government for costs.4 5 9
Hill v. United States,460 an action seeking an injunction against the
United States's enforcement of the plaintiffs' promissory note, simi-
larly held that actions against the United States could proceed only
with its consent, citing only McLemore:
No maxim is thought to be better established, or more universally assented to,
than that which ordains that a sovereign, or a government representing the
sovereign, cannot ex delicto be amenable to its own creatures or agents em-
ployed under its own authority for the fulfillment merely of its own legitimate
ends. A departure from this maxim can be sustained only upon the ground of
permission on the part of the sovereign or the government expressly declared,
and an attempt to overrule or to impair it on a foundation independently of
such permission must involve an inconsistency and confusion, both in theory
and practice, subversive of regulated order or power .... [Wie content our-
selves with referring to a single and recent case in this court which appears to
cover the one now before us in all its features. We allude to the case of the
United States v. McLemore.
4 6 1
Subsequent cases fail to add much. The case of The Siren462 states:
It is a familiar doctrine of the common law, that the sovereign cannot be sued
in his own courts without his consent. The doctrine rests upon reasons of pub-
lic policy; the inconvenience and danger which would follow any different rule.
It is obvious the public service would be hindered, and the public safety en-
dangered, if the supreme authority could be subjected to suit at the instance of
every citizen, and consequently controlled in the use and disposition of the
means required for the proper administration of the government. The exemp-
457. See supra section III.F.
458. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286, 288 (1846) (mem.).
459. Id. at 288.
460. 50 U.S. (9 How.) 386 (1850) (mem.).
461. Id. at 389 (citing McLemore, 45 U.S. at 288).
462. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 154 (1868).
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tion from direct suit is, therefore, without exception. This doctrine of the com-
mon law is equally applicable to the supreme authority of the nation, the
United States. They cannot be subjected to legal proceedings at law or in eq-
uity without their consent; and whoever institutes such proceedings must
bring his case within the authority of some act of Congress. 463
The Supreme Court in Nichols v. United States46 4 held:
Every government has an inherent right to protect itself against suits, and if,
in the liberality of legislation, they are permitted, it is only on such terms and
conditions as are prescribed by statute. The principle is fundamental, applies
to every sovereign power, and but for the protection which it affords, the gov-
ernment would be unable to perform the various duties for which it was cre-
ated. It would be impossible for it to collect revenue for its support, without
infinite embarrassments and delays, if it was subject to civil processes the
same as [sic] private person. 4 65
Each of the cases invoke the notion of sovereignty, but offer only
the additional rationales that to permit suits against the government
would be "inconvenient" and "dangerous" and would prevent the func-
tioning of government. These concerns are inconsistent with the view
of separation of powers, both horizontal and vertical, envisioned by
the Framers, in which the branches of government check each other
and the federal government checks the states.46 6 The founding gener-
ation viewed these checking functions as essential to the proper func-
tioning of government. Further, concerns about the ability of
governments to function has surely been set to rest, given the exten-
sive waivers of immunity by the Congress and various states. 46 7
463. Id. at 154.
464. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122 (1868).
465. Id. at 126.
466. See supra subsection III.C.1.
467. Congressional waivers include the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1364(a)(2) (2002) (es-
tablishing jurisdiction over claims against the United States based on the Consti-
tution, acts of Congress, executive department regulations, express or implied
contracts with the United States, and claims for liquidated or unliquidated dam-
ages not sounding in tort; passed in 1887, to remedy inadequacies of the Court of
Claims which was created in 1855); the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.§ 1346(b) (2002) (subjecting the United States to suit in district court for common
law torts); the Mandamus and Venue Act, Judicial Code §1361 (2002) (providing
that the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature
of mandamus to compel officers or employees of the United States of its agencies
to perform a constitutional or statutory duty owed to the plaintiff); the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §702 (2002) (permitting individuals to sue the
United States for legal wrongs committed by its agency or employees and seeking
relief other than money damages); 28 U.S.C. §1346(a)(1) (2002) (permitting recov-
ery in district courts against the United States for erroneously or illegally as-
sessed or collected taxes); 28 U.S.C. §1347 (2002) (jurisdiction over partition
actions when the United States is a joint tenant); 28 U.S.C. §2410 (2002) (waiving
immunity in actions to quiet title, foreclose mortgage, partition, condemn on




Modern courts have also articulated various rationales for sover-
eign immunity, including maintenance of the states' dignity, protec-
tion of the treasury, promotion of efficient government, and the
structural concerns represented by the doctrine of separation of pow-
ers. Only the last rationale, separation of powers, has validity. This
Article turns next to an assessment of each of these rationales.
1. Protection of the Treasury
One of the rationales offered for the extension of immunity to gov-
ernment entities is the protection of the public fisc.46 8 This is an im-
portant consideration. As the historical materials demonstrate,
concerns over the states' indebtedness was a central issue in the ratifi-
cation debates. 469 However, many Framers and ratifiers believed that
states should honor their obligations and pay their debts,470 and they
provided a method for enforcement of those debts. In modern times,
the United States Congress, 471 as well as many state legislatures,4 72
have consented to suit in broad categories of cases, indicating that
protection of the public treasury is not a central concern as balanced
against the right to a remedy for legal wrongs. Waivers of immunity
by the very entities entrusted with public funds suggests that the
courts' concerns about protecting public funds are misguided. Basic
fairness requires that government, perhaps more so than private indi-
viduals or entities, should remedy its wrongs. The fact that courts
468. Under the modern Supreme Court's view, however, concerns about state funds
have assumed central importance in the Eleventh Amendment context. For ex-
ample, to determine whether Eleventh Amendment immunity applies, courts
consider the source of recovery in the action. If the action seeks recovery of funds
from the state treasury, Eleventh Amendment immunity applies. Fed. Mar.
Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S.Ct. 1864 (2002) (stating that "state sov-
ereign immunity serves the important function of shielding state treasuries and
thus preserving 'the States' ability to govern in accordance with the will of their
citizens'"); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 750-51 (1999) ("Private suits against
nonconsenting States-especially suits for money damages-may threaten the fi-
nancial integrity of the States," possibly placing an "unwarranted strain on the
States' ability to govern in accordance with the will of their citizens."); Hess v.
Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 47 (1994) (stating that protection of
the state treasury from federal court judgments is the "impetus" for the Eleventh
Amendment: "the vulnerability of the State's purse [is] the most salient factor in
Eleventh Amendment determinations").
469. See supra subsection III.C.3.a.
470. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (providing that "No State shall.., pass any.., law
impairing the obligations of contracts.")
471. See supra note 467.
472. Many states have adopted statutes similar to those listed supra note 467. See,
e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (2002); CAL. GOVT CODE § 905.2 (2002); GA. CODE
ANN. § 50-21-25 (2001); MICH. STAT. § 691.1410 (2002); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 41.031, 41.032 (2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10 (2001).
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regularly issue large damage awards against government entities de-
prives this rationale of its force.
Federalism concerns alone are not sufficient to overcome the con-
clusion that protection of public funds cannot justify broad immuni-
ties. If protection of the treasury is not a significant concern along a
horizontal axis (suits against states in state court, and against the
federal government in federal court), it is difficult to see why it is a
compelling concern along a vertical axis (in suits against states in fed-
eral courts). Justice Kennedy in Alden v. Maine4 73 cites two related
rationales for immunity apart from considerations of constitutional
form. First, suits against states may threaten their financial integ-
rity, and second, such suits impede political processes in the states by
affecting political decisions about allocation of funds. If suits against
states in state courts have not threatened their financial or political
integrity, it is unlikely that suits in federal court will. If they did,
other doctrines, including separation of powers and the political ques-
tion doctrine, could be employed to protect the state. In short, fiscal
concerns are not in themselves sufficient to ground complete immu-
nity, and such concerns could be taken into account in appropriate
cases in the absence of immunity.
2. Promotion of Government Efficiency
The often-repeated rationale for sovereign immunity, that it pro-
motes effective decisionmaking, unhampered by the threat of liabil-
ity,47 4 is perverse. We typically think that accountability for
decisions, including the threat of liability in appropriate cases, pro-
motes good decisionmaking. This is a premise which underlies both
enacted and decisional law and much of legal scholarship. To hold
those who are entrusted with important decisions accountable for
their decisions is simple common sense. Legislators and elected mem-
bers of the executive branch are politically accountable to the public,
but unelected government actors, who carry out the bulk of the gov-
ernment's activities, are typically not. If governmental immunities
apply, these unelected members of the executive branch are not pub-
licly accountable in any way. They may be accountable, if at all, only
473. 527 U.S. at 750-51.
474. This rationale has received its fullest explication in the context of the discretion-
ary function exception to the United States' waiver of immunity in the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.§ 2680(a) (2002). A line of Supreme Court cases ex-
plains the purposes of this exception as protecting the judgment of executive or
administrative actors, preventing judicial second-guessing of such judgments,
and protecting the government from liability that would impede its efficiency.
United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991); Berkovitz v. United States, 486
U.S. 531 (1988); United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense
(Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797 (1984); United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 163
(1963); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
[Vol. 8 1: 1
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
to their government employers (who may in fact benefit by their ac-
tions). Thus, we might expect that government immunities would
lead to a lower quality of government decisionmaking. Interestingly,
early discussions in the English courts focusing on the need for ac-
countability of various public officials balanced competing factors very
differently than modern American courts. In 1703, Chief Justice Holt
said, "If public officers will infringe men's rights, they ought pay
greater damages than other men, to deter and hinder other officers
from the like offenses." 47 5 Lord Mansfield, writing a generation later,
opined:
Therefore, to lay down in an English court of Justice such a monstrous pro-
position, as that a governor, acting by virtue of letters patent under the great
seal, is accountable only to God and his own conscience; that he is absolutely
despotic and can spoil, plunder, and affect his Majesty's subjects, both their
liberty and property, with impunity, is a doctrine that cannot be
maintained.
4 7 6
As with protection of government funds, this argument applies
horizontally and vertically; if accountability promotes good decision-
making, it matters little whether the decisionmaker acts for the state
or the federal government or is accountable in state or federal court.
The most complicated cases would, of course, involve federal courts
making states accountable based on federal law, but as the historical
analysis in Part III demonstrates, this form of accountability inheres
in the structure of the Constitution and was intended by the
Framers. 4 77
A related rationale for immunity is that litigation stops or slows
the activities of government. This rationale is susceptible to the same
critique. First, governments at state and federal levels have in fact
subjected themselves to suit in many instances, undercutting the ar-
gument.4 78 Second, stopping or slowing government activities to pre-
vent or remedy government breaches of the law is unquestionably
appropriate. Finally, concerns about the functioning of government
can be protected with measures far less expansive than broad immu-
nities, as Part V argues.
3. The Dignity of the States
Although the need to preserve the dignity of the states by not sub-
jecting them to suit is typically cited in decisions dealing with federal
judicial power over the states, it is, based on the history recounted by
this Article 47 9 and the fact that federal and state legislatures have
475. Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 956 (1703).
476. Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161, 175 (1744).
477. See supra subsections III.C.1 and 3.
478. See supra notes 467, 472.
479. See supra Part III.
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waived immunities in many cases, 480 "embarrassingly insuffi-
cient."481 As envisioned by the Framers, federalism entailed numer-
ous limitations on the powers of both the states and the federal
government, including subjection to suit in federal court in the catego-
ries of cases enumerated in Article 111.482
4. Separation of Powers
Sovereign immunity furthers the structural principle of separation
of powers when courts defer to the political decisionmaking of the leg-
islative or executive branches. This is true whether that deference oc-
curs horizontally, between coordinate branches of government, or
vertically when federal courts defer to the political decisions of the
states (or vice versa). Separation of powers is an important modernjustification for sovereign immunity. However, it cannot provide ajustification for judicial abstention from all cases involving govern-
ment entities. A good illustration of this point is the level of immunity
typically afforded municipalities. As both proprietary or corporate
and governmental entities, municipalities have never been afforded
the full immunities enjoyed by states and the federal government.
Where municipalities exercise proprietary functions, courts treat
them as they would any private corporation. However, even with re-
spect to their public functions, municipalities do not enjoy complete
immunity. Their immunity is qualified rather than absolute. When
municipalities exercise discretion on matters of public policy, the
courts use a deferential standard of review in recognition of a munici-
pal litigant's public functions,483 often consisting of a determination of
whether there was any rational basis for the municipal action. 48 4
Courts have generally viewed municipal immunities restrictively in
recognition of the basic principle that legal wrongs require a
remedy.485
The discretionary function exception to waivers of immunity by the
federal government in the Federal Tort Claims Act and in similar
state acts provides another analogy. The exception is based in separa-
tion of powers concerns. 4 86 As construed by the Supreme Court, it
480. See supra notes 467, 472.
481. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. 506 U.S. 139, 151(1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting); accord Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 802-03
(1999) (Souter, J., dissenting).
482. See supra Part III.
483. E.g., Owen v. Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
484. E.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
485. E.g., Owen, 445 U.S. at 650-51.
486. The Second Circuit, for example, stated that by barring tort liability for activities
that require the alleged tortfeasor to consider and weigh competing policies in
arriving at his decision, the discretionary function test protects courts from "in-
volve[ment] in making... decision[s] entrusted to other branches of the govern-
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shields from liability government actions which are discretionary and
which are based on public policy considerations. Thus, separation of
powers concerns are not sufficient to preclude cases against the gov-
ernment as a jurisdictional matter. Rather, these concerns simply
counsel abstention in cases in which the issues are not appropriate for
judicial resolution. Yet another analogy is the common-law treatment
of government duties in negligence actions. In such cases, the courts
have jurisdiction (generally as a result of a waiver of immunity), but
they defer to the executive actor in cases involving issues appropriate
for political rather than judicial resolution.48 7
Each of these examples involves horizontal separation of powers.
As this Article has argued above,48 8 the same concerns underlie verti-
cal separation of powers. The treatment of foreign sovereigns under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the act of state doctrine
provide useful analogies here.
V. REPLACING SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AS A
JURISDICTIONAL BAR WITH
PRUDENTIAL DOCTRINES
This Article has reached two important conclusions. First, the as-
serted historical basis for sovereign immunity is incorrect. Sovereign
immunity was not, and is not, a constitutional doctrine. Only the rep-
etition of mistakes of historical fact account for the doctrine's vitality.
Second, the only plausible rationale for sovereign immunity, among
all of those which have been advanced, is separation of powers. This
section outlines, in a preliminary fashion, existing doctrines which
could be used to protect structural separation of powers concerns in
the absence of sovereign immunity.
The Supreme Court should recognize that the purportedly histori-
cal facts on which it has relied since Hans v. Louisiana are incorrect.
Over time, the Supreme Court has created its own history of the
founding; decisions which fit the exigencies of their own times, like
Hans v. Louisiana,48 9 provide the basis of that history. The recitation
by the Supreme Court of purported fact, even over time, cannot create
historical fact. 490 It simply creates legal precedent based on incorrect
ment," and especially from questions involving "not negligence but social wisdom,
not due care but political practicability, not reasonableness but economic expedi-
ency." Caban v. United States, 671 F.2d 1230, 1233 (2d Cir. 1982). See also Tif-
fany v. U.S., 931 F.2d 271, 277 (4th Cir. 1991) (stating that discretionary function
exception is grounded in political question doctrine).
487. See infra section V.B.
488. See supra note 11.
489. See supra notes 23, 440-45 and accompanying text.
490. Despite implications to the contrary. See, for example, Justice Powell's footnote
in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, n.2 (1985): "The 'new evi-
dence' discovered by the dissent in The Federalist and in the records of the state
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historical fact. Stare decisis does not require adherence to mistakes of
fact, and the Court should correct its errors. Correcting these errors
requires a recognition that sovereign immunity is neither a constitu-
tional doctrine nor a jurisdictional doctrine.
Correcting the Supreme Court's factual errors also requires a rec-
ognition that the value of sovereign immunity lies only in its ability to
maintain the integrity of political decisionmaking, both horizontally
(federal-federal and state-state) and vertically (federal-state). Com-
plete immunity obviously protects too much. Sovereign immunity's
value can be protected with the political question doctrine, common
law duty determinations, or discretionary function analyses, among
others, on a horizontal axis. Where the federal government has con-
sented to suit, it has often recognized and protected separation of pow-
ers principles.491 Given the broad immunities afforded to states in the
federal courts, vertical abstention doctrines are less developed. How-
ever, as a conceptual matter, the issues to be decided and the values to
be protected in horizontal separation of powers and vertical federalism
are quite similar. Whether cases involve the limits of judicial power
within a single system (state-state or federal-federal) or within a dual
system (federal-state), the basic issue is which part of the government
has power to handle a particular matter and the values to be protected
are those which inhere in a system of divided and checked powers.
Given the common value of protecting political decisionmaking which
underlies both vertical and horizontal separation of powers, the politi-
cal question, duty, and discretionary function analyses developed in
the context of horizontal separation of powers could appropriately be
used in federalism cases. Existing federalism doctrines, including
Burford, Pullman, and Colorado River, which reflect some of the same
concerns as the political question, duty, and discretionary function
analyses, can be expanded and developed to provide further protection
of state political decisionmaking from federal court interference. The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which protects equal sovereigns
against judicial oversight of political, but not private or commercial
decisionmaking, may also provide a useful analogy in the process of
replacing sovereign immunity with prudential doctrines.
ratifying conventions, has been available to historians and Justices of this Court
for almost two centuries." It is perhaps appropriate to assume that one's prede-
cessors have done their jobs adequately, but this statement suggests a view of the
historical record, and the Supreme Court's role in assessing it, which is problem-
atic. The Court cannot create historical fact through the process of stare decisis.
If the Court can review the legal interpretations of its predecessors, why not the
historical interpretations?
491. See infra notes 515-18 and accompanying text.
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A. The Political Question Doctrine
Federal courts may abstain from deciding cases which fall within
their Article III jurisdiction on grounds of nonjusticiability. The polit-
ical question doctrine presupposes that courts share responsibility for
constitutional interpretation with other branches of government. The
doctrine is one of the ways in which this division of responsibility is
expressed. For example, lower federal courts left the question of the
constitutionality of the war in Vietnam to the political branches
through application of the political question doctrine.492 Justice Bren-
nan summarized the political question doctrine in Baker v. Carr, the
leading case on the doctrine:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and man-
ageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expres-
sing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question. 4 9
3
A federal court may thus defer to Congress or the executive branch on
a particular constitutional question. Similarly, a federal court might
defer to the political decision of a state's legislative or executive
branch. Most of Justice Brennan's considerations for abstention apply
equally to horizontal and vertical separation of powers concerns, and
most of them could support a decision that a federal court should not
interfere with the political decisionmaking of a state. 494
492. Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 615
(D.C. Cir. 1973); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1309-12 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1043-44 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689
(E.D. Pa. 1972), affd mem. sub nom.
493. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
494. This view of the political question doctrine may be criticized on two grounds.
First, the Supreme Court has indicated that political questions involve separa-
tion of powers among coordinate branches and not federal-state relations. In
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), Justice Brennan wrote that "it is the relation-
ship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Govern-
ment, and not the federal judiciary's relationship to the States, which gives rise
to the 'political question.'" Id. at 210. See also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 352
(1976) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) ("[T]he separation-of-powers principle, like
the political question doctrine, has no applicability to the federal judiciary's rela-
tionship to the States."); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 517-22 (1969) (reit-
erating that the political question doctrine arises from separation of powers
concerns). This conclusion has been criticized by some commentators. See, e.g.,
Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Reme-
dies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 664 (1978) (arguing that separation of powers princi-
ples apply to relations between the federal judiciary and state governments;
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There is also an important relationship between political questions
and other means by which courts defer to other branches of govern-
ment. The political question doctrine derives from Chief Justice Mar-
shall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison, which relates political
questions to discretionary functions:
The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to
inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they
have a discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the
constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this
court.
4 9 5
Interestingly, many of the commentators who argue that the federal
courts deny their constitutional duty when they abstain from exercis-
ing jurisdiction also rely on Marshall. In his opinion in Cohens v. Vir-
ginia, the Chief Justice stated that the federal courts have "no more
right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to
usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason
to the constitution."496
B. Duty Questions: Ministerial vs. Discretionary Functions;
Governmental vs. Proprietary Functions; The Public
Duty Doctrine
Even in cases where the immunity of a state or municipality has
been waived, courts acknowledge that separation of powers principles
require protection of decisionmaking functions of coordinate branches,
and may refuse to find that a government entity or agent owed a duty
of care to protect against a particular harm. Courts generally treat
the issues of duty and immunity as distinct. Thus, even where a legis-
lative waiver exists, whether the government entity or actor owed a
duty of reasonable care to the plaintiff is an antecedent question. The
federal courts may lack power to remedy specific constitutional violations com-
mitted by state government). This Article takes the position that federalism con-
cerns may encompass doctrines like the political question doctrine, even if that
doctrine is not specifically applicable to federal-state relations.
Second, the political question doctrine has come under attack as undercutting
the fundamental principles of judicial review articulated in Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), despite Marshall's own recognition in Marbury, see
infra text accompanying note 495, that some matters are reserved to the political
branches and may not be adjudicated. See, e.g., Martin Redish, Judicial Review
and the "Political Question," 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1031 (1985). Others have argued
that there is no political question doctrine. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Is There a
Political Question Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 600 (1976) ("The thesis I offer for
discussion is that there may be no doctrine requiring abstention from judicial
review of'political questions.'"); Wayne McCormack, The Justiciability Myth and
the Concept of Law, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 595, 614 (1987) (stating that the
political question doctrine is "more easily demonstrated to be nonexistent than
any other nonjusticiability doctrine").
495. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
496. 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821).
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duty determination may take into account the identity of the defen-
dant as a government entity and the nature of the defendant's respon-
sibilities as a government entity, in addition to other
considerations. 49 7 Courts have protected government entities from
tort liability in appropriate cases using various doctrines and tests, all
of which are based on the principles of separation of powers. Thus,
courts shield discretionary decisions as opposed to ministerial func-
tions of government entities; governmental as opposed to proprietary
functions; and public as opposed to private duties.
Courts often distinguish between ministerial, routine, and opera-
tional functions of government actors, for which liability may be im-
posed, and discretionary functions involving the exercise of judgment
on policy matters, for which the government enjoys immunity. Al-
though this distinction has been criticized for imprecision, 498 courts
have continued to articulate and apply it. 49 9 It has been codified in
the Federal Tort Claims Act's discretionary function exception to the
federal government's waiver of sovereign immunity60 0 as well as simi-
lar state statues. 50 1
Another method by which courts protect the decisionmaking of co-
ordinate branches is the public duty doctrine. Although it has been
repudiated following waivers of sovereign immunity in some jurisdic-
tions, 50 2 and criticized as undercutting legislative waivers of sover-
497. For example, California courts have long enumerated the following factors to as-
sess duty generally:
[1] the foreseeability of harm to the [injured party], [2] the degree of cer-
tainty that the [injured party] suffered harm, [3] the closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, [4]
the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, [51 the policy of
preventing future harm, [6] the extent of the burden to the defendant,
and [7] the consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exer-
cise care with resulting liability ....
Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968). The seventh factor clearly
permits consideration of the defendant's identity as a government actor. In addi-
tion, however, when a public entity is involved, the California courts utilize addi-
tional factors, such as, the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the
risk involved; the extent of the agency's powers, the role imposed on it by law,
and the limitations imposed on it by budget. See, e.g., Peterson v. San Francisco
Cmty. Coll. Dist., 685 P.2d 1193 (Cal. 1984); Thompson v. Alameda, 614 P.2d 728
(Cal. 1980);.Hernandez v. Pomona, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 406, 409-10 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996); Smith v. Alameda County Soc. Servs. Agency, 153 Cal.Rptr. 712 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1979); Raymond v. Paradise Unified Sch. Dist., 31 Cal.Rptr. 847 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1963).
498. See infra note 514.
499. Id.
500. See infra note 510.
501. See supra note 472.
502. E.g., Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River, 371 So. 2d 1010, 1015 (Fla. 1979)
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eign immunity in others,503 many courts continue to use the doctrine
to protect state or municipal agencies from liability to individual citi-
zens for a breach of a duty owed to the public generally.504 The public
duty doctrine holds that because the government owes a duty to the
public in general, it does not owe a duty to any individual citizen.505
For example, the public duty doctrine protects law enforcement au-
thorities from liability for failure to prevent criminal harms,506 or
state agencies from liability for negligence in the conduct of inspec-
tions for the protection of the public generally. 5 07 The public duty doc-
trine explicitly acknowledges the limited resources of local
governments and the nature of decisionmaking by those bodies.
C. Discretionary Functions
The federal government has waived its sovereign immunity in
many instances.508 In the Federal Torts Claims Act,509 for example,
Congress made the federal government susceptible to tort claims in
the same way as an individual would be. This possible tort liability is
subject to a number of exceptions, including the "discretionary func-
tion" exception. 5 10 Under this exception, the government retains im-
munity for claims "based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the
part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or
not the discretion involved be abused."511 Although the legislative
history is minimal, the Court's subsequent decisions make it clear
that the purpose of the exception was "to prevent judicial 'second-
503. E.g., Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 241 (Ala. 1976); Ryan v. State, 656 P.2d 597,
599 (Ariz. 1982); Martinez v. Lakewood, 655 P.2d 1388, 1390 (Colo. Ct. App.
1982); Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664, 671 (Iowa 1979); Stewart v.
Schmieder, 386 So.2d 1351, 1358 (La. 1980); Schear v. Bd. of County Comm'rs,
687 P.2d 728, 730 (N.M. 1984); Brennen v. Eugene, 591 P.2d 719, 725 (Or. 1979);
Coffey v. Milwaukee, 247 N.W.2d 132, 139 (Wis. 1976).
504. E.g., Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152, 158 (Colo. 1986) (citing cases); Sawicki v. Ot-
tawa Hills, 525 N.E.2d 468 (Ohio 1988); Martinelli v. Hopkins, 787 A.2d 1158(R.I. 2001); E.P. v. Riley, 604 N.W.2d 7 (S.D. 1999); Tucker v. West Virginia Dept.
of Corr., 530 S.E.2d 448
(W.Va. 1999).
505. The doctrine has a long history, having originated in the Supreme Court's 1855
decision in South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396 (1855).
506. E.g., Wood v. Guilford County, 558 S.E.2d 490 (N.C. 2002); Day v. State, 980 P.2d
1171 (Utah 1999).
507. E.g., Hunt v. N.C. Dep't of Labor, 499 S.E.2d 747 (N.C. 1998); Stone v. N.C. Dep't
of Labor, 495 S.E.2d 711 (N.C. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1016 (1998).
508. See supra note 467 and accompanying text.
509. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2002).
510. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2002). This exception to the waiver of immunity is concep-





guessing' of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in so-
cial, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in
tort."512 The Court has adopted a two-part analysis: the exception
shields only (1) discretionary decisions (those which involve judgment
or choice), which are (2) based on considerations of public policy.
513
Application of the test has proved problematic for the courts.
5 14
The Supreme Court has explained that public policy considera-
tions include social, economic, and political considerations,
5 15 in-
cluding the balancing of safety concerns against budgetary or other
feasibility concerns, 5 16 and has distinguished public policy con-
512. United States v. S.A. Empresa de viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines),
467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984), quoted in United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 323
(1991), and Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-37 (1988); see also H.R.
REP. No. 77-2245 at 10 (1942) (discussing discretionary function exception).
513. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. 531.
514. Numerous commentators have recognized the difficulties inherent in assessing
whether protected discretion is involved in a government decision. RICHARD H.
FALLON JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 1031 (4th ed. 1996) (stating that the discretionary function exception is
the "most important" exception to the FTCA and "has caused difficulty from the
outset"); John W. Bagby & Gary L. Gittings, The Elusive Discretionary Function
Exception from Government Tort Liability: The Narrowing Scope of Federal Lia-
bility, 30 Am. Bus. L.J. 223 (1992); Ronald A. Cass, The Discretionary Function
Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, in 2 Administrative Conference of the
United States, Recommendations and Reports 1503 (1987) (stating that the dis-
cretionary function exception needs clarification); David S. Fishback & Gail Kille-
fer, The Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act:
Dalehite to Varig to Berkovitz, 25 IDAHO L. REV. 291, 294-303 (1988-89); William
P. Kratzke, The Supreme Court's Recent Overhaul of the Discretionary Function
Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1 (1993); Harold
Krent, Preserving Discretion Without Sacrificing Deterrence: Federal Governmen-
tal Liability in Tort, 38 UCLA. L. REV. 871 (1991); Daniel E. Matthews, Federal
Tort Claims Act - The Proper Scope of the Discretionary Function Exception, 6
AM. U. L. REV. 22 (1957) (stating that more precise definition of term is needed);
Bruce A. Peterson and Mark E. Van Deer Wide, Susceptible To Faulty Analysis:
United States v. Gaubert and The Resurrection Of Federal Sovereign Immunity,
72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447 (1997); Cornelius J. Peck, The Federal Tort Claims
Act -A Proposed Construction of the Discretionary Function Exception, 31 WASH.
L. REV. 207 (1956) (discussing litigation and confusion over discretionary func-
tion exception); John M. Rogers, A Fresh Look at Agency "Discretion," 57 TuL. L.
REV. 776, 804-22 (1983); Donald N. Zillman, Protecting Discretion: Judicial Inter-
pretation of the Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act,
47 MAINE L. REV. 365 (1995); Note, The Discretionary Function Exception of the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 66 HARv. L. REV. 488 (1953).
515. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537; Varig Airlines, 457 U.S. at 820.
516. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 819-20 (stating that government decisions regard-
ing safety regulation entail balancing safety against practical considerations
such as staffing and funding); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 40-41
(1953) (holding that this exception protected government decision involving bal-
ancing of safety and feasibility); Richardson v. United States, 943 F.2d 1107,
1111-12 (9' Cir. 1991) (holding that this exception protected government conduct
based on balancing safety and cost). But see Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 58 (Jackson, J.,
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siderations from scientific, mathematical, and other "objective"
criteria.517
The discretionary function analysis, although it derives from a
statute, has much in common with common law distinctions betweenprotected planning or discretionary functions and unprotected minis-
terial or operational functions. Both are based on separation of pow-
ers concerns and both protect government decisionmaking in the
absence of immunities. Thus, common law analyses may inform theinterpretation of the discretionary function exception, and the discre-
tionary function exception may offer a useful resource for common law
adjudication. The Supreme Court has in fact indicated its willingness
to use the discretionary function immunity absent statutory authori-
zation by engrafting it onto other Congressional waivers of immunity
which do not explicitly include it.518
D. Abstention Doctrines Based on Federalism Concerns
Again, the broad immunities afforded to the states as a result ofthe Supreme Court's misconstruction of the Constitution and the re-
sulting law of sovereign immunity means that federal courts oftenhave no need to invoke the political question doctrine or related sepa-
ration of powers concerns to protect political decisionmaking at the
state level. Where immunity is viewed to be constitutional and juris-dictional, many such questions simply do not arise. However, in the
absence of immunity, the Court has shown deference to state adminis-
dissenting) (arguing that not all decisions that balance care and cost deserve
immunity).
517. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 331; Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 545.518. Courts have read a discretionary function immunity into government waivers,
such as the Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA), codified as amended at 46 U.S.C.A.§§ 741-52 (2002), which do not contain such a provision, based on the principle of
separation of powers. See, e.g., Tew v. United States, 86 F.3d 1003 (10 th Cir.1996); Earles v. United States, 935 F.2d 1028, 1030-32 (9th Cir. 1991); Sea-Land
Serv., Inc. v. United States, 919 F.2d 888, 891 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500U.S. 941 (1991); In re Asbestos Litigation, 891 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1989); Wiggins
v. United States, 799 F.2d 962, 966 (5th Cir. 1986); Williams v. United States,747 F.2d 700 (11th Cir.1984) (per curiam), affg Williams ex rel. Sharpley v.United States, 581 F.Supp. 847 (S.D.Ga. 1983); Gemp v. United States, 684 F.2d404, 408 (6th Cir. 1982); Bearce v. United States, 614 F.2d 556, 558-60 (7th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837 (1980); Chute v. United States, 610 F.2d 7, 11-13(1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936 (1980); Canadian Transport Co. v.United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Contra Lane v. UnitedStates, 529 F.2d 175, 179 (4th Cir. 1975). The Fourth Circuit's contrary view hasbeen narrowed by Tiffany v. United States, 931 F.2d 271, 277 (4th Cir. 1991)(applying discretionary function exception to the SAA on constitutional separa-
tion of powers grounds), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1030 (1992), and Faust v. SouthCarolina State Highway Dept., 721 F.2d 934, 938-40 (4th Cir.1983) (applying dis-
cretionary function exception analysis to a claim under the SAA), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1226 (1984).
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trative and legislative processes through various abstention doctrines.
These doctrines also provide a foundation for judicial protection of ver-
tical separation of powers in the absence of constitutional and jurisdic-
tional immunities.
Pullman abstention entails federal court deference to state courts
where the resolution of a state law question might eliminate the ne-
cessity of deciding a federal constitutional question.5 1
9 This situation
obviously does not apply in many cases which presently involve the
assertion of an immunity, but the Supreme Court in Pullman articu-
lated a number of considerations justifying abstention, which might be
applied in immunity cases. Those considerations include avoiding
"needless friction with state policies" 5 20 and "sensitive area[s] of social
policy upon which the federal courts ought not to enter unless no al-
ternative to its adjudication is open," 52 1 and maintaining "scrupulous
regard for the rightful independence of the state governments."
5 22
Pullman thus provides support for a decision by federal courts to ab-
stain from deciding a case against a state, independent of sovereign
immunity.5 23
Burford abstention extends the Pullman holding. In Burford v.
Sun Oil Co.,524 the plaintiff sought to enjoin execution of an order by
the Texas Railroad Commission granting an adjacent leaseholder per-
mission to drill new wells. Unlike Pullman, Burford involved no con-
cerns about avoiding an unnecessary constitutional holding.
519. Railroad Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
520. Id. at 500. According to the Court, "Few public interests have a higher claim
upon the discretion of a federal chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction
with state policies." Id.
521. Id. at 497.
522. Id. at 501.
523. Many scholars would no doubt disagree with this view; many argue that absten-
tion violates rather than protects separation of powers principles. See, e.g., MAR.
TIN REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER: JUDICIAL
JURISDICTION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY 47-74 (1991); Donald Doernberg,
"You Can Lead a Horse to Water..." The Supreme Court's Refusal to Allow the
Exercise of Original Jurisdiction Conferred by Congress, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
999 (1989-90); Martin Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of
the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984). Many agree with the view implic-
itly adopted by this Article that the federal judiciary appropriately abstains from
exercising its jurisdiction in some instances. David Shapiro, for example, argues
that considerations of equity, federalism and comity, separation of powers, and
judicial administration may overcome the presumption which favors the exercise
of jurisdiction. David Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV.
543, 579 (1985); see also Michael Wells, Why Professor Redish is Wrong about
Abstention, 19 GA. L. REV. 1097 (1985); Ann Althouse, The Humble and the Trea-
sonous: Judge-Made Jurisdiction Law, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1035 (1989-90);
Jack Beerman, "Bad" Judicial Activism and Liberal Federal-Courts Doctrine: A
Comment on Professor Doernberg and Professor Redish, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1053 (1989-90).
524. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
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Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that the district court shouldhave exercised its discretion to decline jurisdiction. Justice Black's
opinion was premised on the fact that the case involved complex ques-tions of Texas policy in the regulation of oil and gas, which impactedthe economy and tax structure of the state and which had been de-
cided by the state administrative agency charged with authority anddiscretion to administer the law. In such circumstances, the Texas
courts should have the first opportunity to address these state policyissues, and federal courts appropriately abstain to permit the develop-
ment of coordinated policy by state courts and agencies. The Courthas subsequently summarized the Burford holding as follows:
Where timely and adequate state review is available, a federal court sitting in
equity must decline to interfere with the proceedings or orders of state admin-istrative agencies: (1) when there are "difficult questions of state law bearing
on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends
the result in the case then at bar"; or (2) where the "exercise of federal review
• . . would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with
respect to a matter of substantial public concern." 5 2 5
Thibodaux abstention takes Burford a step further. In the absence of
a state agency decision, federal courts may abstain where adjudication
of a state policy is best left to state courts. Thibodaux526 involved theissue of whether Louisiana municipalities had power to condemn theproperty of a public utility. Justice Frankfurter's opinion emphasized
that eminent domain proceedings were state matters, "intimately in-
volved with sovereign prerogative" best left to state courts, especially
where the "apportionment of governmental powers between City andState" were at issue.527 Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice War-
ren and Justice Douglas, dissented. However, Justice Brennan explic-itly recognized that abstention can be justified to avoid "the hazard of
unsettling some delicate balance in the area of federal-state relation-
ships."528 Although the Supreme Court has not often relied on these
abstention doctrines, it has continued to cite abstention cases with
approval. 529
In these cases, the Supreme Court has demonstrated its willing-
ness to avoid federal adjudication of cases involving matters of state
authority. Thus, existing doctrine provides a foundation for similarforms of abstention in cases which could arise if the Court abandoned
its current view of immunity.
525. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361 (1989) (quotingColorado River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976)).
526. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959)
527. Id. at 28.
528. Id. at 32.
529. E.g., New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. 350, and Colorado River, 424 U.S. 800.
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E. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the Act of State
Doctrine
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)53° affords jurisdic-
tion to the federal courts over foreign states in specified circum-
stances. The limitations on a sovereign's immunity are instructive in
considering the appropriate scope of immunity for states in the ab-
sence of a broad constitutional immunity. The FSIA permits a federal
court to take jurisdiction over cases in which a foreign sovereign has
waived immunity; which arise from the foreign sovereign's commer-
cial activities carried on in the United States or which have a direct
effect in the United States; which involve torts by a foreign state or its
agents acting in the scope of employment, subject to discretionary
function and intentional tort exceptions similar to those in the Federal
Tort Claims Act; and which involve terrorism by identified nations.
531
Despite these extensions of jurisdiction, the common law act of
state doctrine precludes United States courts from adjudicating the
public acts of a foreign power in its own territory. The leading case is
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.532 According to Justice Harlan
in Sabbatino, the act of state doctrine is not a constitutional doctrine:
the Constitution does not "require the act of state doctrine; it does not
irrevocably remove from the judiciary the capacity to review the valid-
ity of foreign acts of state."5 33 The doctrine thus parallels the view of
state sovereign immunity advanced in this Article. Nonetheless, the
doctrine has "constitutional underpinnings," arising out of
the basic relationships between branches of government in a system of separa-
tion of powers .... The doctrine ... expresses the strong sense of the Judicial
Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign
acts of state may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of goals
both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole.
5 3 4
Similarly, judicial decisions to avoid reaching the merits of a case in-
volving one of the states may be viewed as furthering the goals of hori-
zontal separation of powers and of vertical separation of powers or
federalism.
VI. CONCLUSION
Despite its long history to the contrary, sovereign immunity is not
a constitutional doctrine. For too many years, a flawed history of the
founding, enunciated by the Supreme Court in Hans v. Louisiana and
perpetuated by subsequent Courts, has prevented application of fed-
530. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-( 4 ), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (2002).
531. 28 U.S.C. §1605 (2002) (providing general exceptions to the jurisdictional immu-
nity of a foreign state).
532. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
533. Id. at 423.
534. Id. at 423-24.
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eral law to the federal and state governments in many instances, andhas provided indirect support for immunities within state and munici-pal governments. Such immunities simply elevate the government
above the law, shielding it from the operation of the law and deprivingpotential litigants against the government of the protection of the law.Sovereign immunity does in fact protect the structural principle of
separation of powers: in many cases, there are good and compelling
reasons based in separation of powers for judicial deference to the de-
cisions of political branches of government. However, these interests
can be protected without resorting to historically discredited sovereignimmunities. Existing doctrines, including the political question doc-
trine, duty determinations, discretionary function immunities, and va-
rious abstention doctrines among others, may provide a framework forhandling cases in which such deference is appropriate.
